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Summary
This thesis offers a systematic account of Žižek’s dialectical materialist Marxism that follows
the development of his work from his initial Lacanian critique of Marxism and Stalinist 
totalitarianism, to his attempt to develop a new form of Communist politics including a 
conception of a Communist utopia.  The core and overarching argument of this thesis is that 
Žižek develops his positions in response to three challenges that he confronts after the 
limitations of his previous radical democratic politics become evident. These are: an 
alternative to traditional Marxism and liberal democracy that continues to protect against 
repeating the errors of the former; an analysis of late-capitalism at libidinal, political and 
economic levels to explain new forms of ideology, the limitations of liberal democratic 
politics, and the continuing role of capitalism and class in our contemporary world; and, the 
reformulation of the Lacanian category of the Real in order to overcome the deadlock of the 
opposition between das Ding and lack and the political conservatism it produces. In the 
analysis of Žižek’s response to these challenges, I examine the tension that emerges between 
the Lacanian and Marxist dimensions of Žižek’s dialectical materialism and how he manages 
this tension in order to avoid returning to the problems associated with traditional Marxism. 
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Introduction
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1. Dialectical Materialism
In 1994, in the book The Metastases of Enjoyment (2005[1994]), Slavoj Žižek announces a 
remarkable change of political and theoretical allegiance. Towards the end of the book in 
what at first might have appeared as a rather innocuous passage1 that is subsequently 
expanded upon in a clarificatory footnote,2 Žižek declares that his work should be understood
as a return to the project of dialectical materialism, the much maligned philosophy of 
Marxism. In addition to this, in the “self-interview” that forms the appendix to the book, 
Žižek outlines the political contours of this new theoretical project, positioning his own work 
as a return to the problematic of a psychoanalytically informed Marxism.3 
Why was this remarkable? Žižek had entered the English speaking world in 1989 with
the path-breaking work on Lacanian psychoanalysis, Hegelian dialectics and ideology 
critique, The Sublime Object of Ideology (2008[1989]). An influential dissident and a part of 
the movement for democracy in Socialist Yugoslavia, Žižek uses the theoretical positions he 
develops in Sublime Object to critically diagnose the destructive dynamics inherent to “really
existing socialism” and Stalinism, and to make a powerful argument against Marxism and 
1 Žižek, ME, p.126.
2 Žižek, ME, p.135-6, n.18.
3 Žižek, ME, pp.181, 182-4.
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other radical political positions on the ground that they are forever haunted by a totalitarian 
potential. On the basis of his Hegelian-Lacanian ontology, Žižek responds to this danger by 
building a case for a novel form of liberal democracy informed by psychoanalysis as the only
legitimate mode of political power and the only way that, at a political level, these totalitarian
dangers could be definitively escaped. Five years after committing to this liberal democratic 
position and making theoretical alliances with other “radical” democrats such as Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe this all changes, however. 
Žižek’s change of position in Metastases is remarkable, in other words, because it 
marks the point of an abrupt volte-face, in which Žižek explicitly abandons his previous 
democratic political commitments and endorses a return to a Marxist philosophical and 
political project, as well as a name — dialectical materialism — that was indissociable from 
the Stalinist totalitarianism that he initially criticised as not only untenable but as disastrous.  
Since his announcement of his change of position, Žižek has steadily repositioned, developed
and expanded his work in a number of ways. Žižek now understands his attempt to develop 
Lacanian psychoanalysis and Hegelian dialectics as a part of a project to rejuvenate the 
philosophy of dialectical materialism. The terrain of his philosophical engagement has also 
shifted towards other contemporary revolutionary philosophers, the most prominent among 
which, Alain Badiou, now influences Žižek’s work far more than any other political 
philosopher. Žižek’s political analyses have also moved significantly, going from the critique
of radical politics and totalitarianism to the development of a critique of liberal democracy, 
capitalism, and the kind of subjects and politics that they have engendered in our 
contemporary period. Žižek now dismisses the “fetish” of democracy and the “Fukuyamian” 
position that characterises, he contends, our contemporary world, while arguing for a 
revolutionary politics that must fight to realise the Idea of Communism. And finally, 
2
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alongside this, Žižek’s conception of political practice has expanded significantly to include a
conception of a “Leninist” Act, class struggle, and a collective politics based on the fidelity 
to a Cause. 
The central aim of this thesis is a critical exploration of Žižek’s dialectical 
materialist Marxism that attempts to understand the trajectory that his work has taken and the
positions he has developed against the backdrop of the dramatic about-turn that he announced
in Metastases. The exploration will attempt to answer why Žižek embarks on this change of 
position, how his earlier critique of Marxism and socialism continues to inform his position, 
and how, via his dialectical materialism, he navigates the challenges of returning to a Marxist
philosophy and politics given their failures during the twentieth century.
1.2. Why is a Critical Exploration of Žižek's Dialectical 
Materialist Marxism Important?
The focus of this thesis reflects the importance of dialectical materialist philosophy and 
Marxist critique in Žižek’s work. Since his break from a radical democratic position the 
return to dialectical materialism has resided at the very core of Žižek’s theoretical project. 
Moreover, Žižek’s most recent work suggests that its importance is unlikely to abate any time
soon. Žižek has made dialectical materialism the subject of his three most recent substantial 
philosophical works – Parallax View (2006), Less Than Nothing (2012) and Absolute Recoil 
(2014) – while in recent years he has continued to place a form of Marxist critique and 
associated modes of practice at the core of his more explicitly political writings.  In these 
philosophical and political works Žižek’s project has also shown signs that it is continuing to 
develop. Among other advances and shifts, Žižek has enlarged his dialectical materialist 
3
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engagement with the contemporary sciences and developed a conception of a Communist 
political practice and utopian Idea. Žižek’s Marxism has also continued to be one of the most 
debated aspects of his work in a continuously expanding secondary literature that has 
produced a wide-range of responses to a theoretical and political project that evidently 
continues to perplex.  
It is impossible to talk about the importance of an exploration of Žižek’s Marxism 
without also acknowledging the unique public interest in him and his writing. Not many 
philosophers who claim that their main research interest is reviving the legacy of G.W.F 
Hegel get cited in national legislatives as a warning to other parliamentarians of the necessity
of serious political reform.4 Or, for that matter, become the subject of a seven minute 
discussion segment on Fox News after rumours emerge of a dalliance with Lady Gaga.5 It is 
safe to say that Žižek is unique. No other public figure today can organise a sell-out 
conference on reviving the Idea of Communism and write for publications and media outlets 
that range from the Guardian to Playboy Magazine. As a result, he is arguably one of the 
most famous radical public intellectuals and the most famous living Marxist of our time. And
he has demonstrated his radical credentials frequently, connecting with some of the most 
important political movements of recent years, including Occupy in the US,6 SYRIZA in 
4 “Michael D Higgins making his last speech in the Dail,” 16:04  Youtube.com, posted by Irish Labour Party,  
uploaded on Jan 26 2011, [Online] Accessed from: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OJJ5q1_5jX8 accessed 
on: 2.10.2013.
5 Fox News, “Red Eye Gregalogue,” Youtube.com, [Online] accessed from: http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=NowMOwl-Q44 Accessed on: 2.10.2013. It would seem that the rumour began after a London-based political
collective known as the De-territorial Support Group, who formed around the 2010 and 2011 student 
movement, faked an essay by Žižek on Lady Gaga. See Deterritorial Support Group, “Žižek/Gaga: Communism
knows no monster,” DeterritorialSupportGroup.wordpress.com, published 21st March 2011 [Online] accessed 
from: http://deterritorialsupportgroup.wordpress.com/2011/03/21/Žižekgaga-communism-knows-no-monster/ 
accessed on: 15th October 2013 (2011).
6 Slavoj Žižek, “Transcript: Don’t fall in love with yourself,” imposemagazine.com published 10th October 2011
[Online] accessed from: http://www.imposemagazine.com/bytes/slavoj-Žižek-at-occupy-wall-street-transcript 
accessed on: 15.10.2013. (2011).
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Greece,7 and Pussy Riot in Russia.8 Given this unique status, and the upsurge in interest in 
radical politics as a result of the crises and revolutions that have seemed to continuous shake 
the world since 2008, there is also considerable extra-academic imperative to engaging with 
Žižek’s Marxism. 
1.3. The Žižekian Field
This critical exploration of Žižek’s Marxism and dialectical materialism will offer an original
contribution to what has been called “the Žižekian Field.”9 This messy, unevenly developed, 
and diverse grouping of work mirrors the breadth and width of Žižek’s own interests. As well
as countless introductions, and a multi-lingual journal — The International Journal of Žižek 
Studies — a survey of this terrain finds applications and dissections of Žižek’s work in media 
studies,10 political and critical theory,11 theology,12 and philosophy.13 Žižek’s work has also 
been important in reviving the importance of Lacanian psychoanalysis in political and 
cultural analysis and for political theory.14 
7 Slavoj Žižek, “Speech in Syriza   M J Event,” Left.gr published on 4th June 2012 [Online] accessed from: 
http://left.gr/news/slavoj-Žižeks-speach-syrizas-event accessed on: 15.10.2013 (2012).
8 See the exchange of letters between Žižek and Nadya Tolokonnikova, Nadya Tolokonnikova and Slavoj 
Žižek, “Letter from Nadya Tolokonnikova to Slavoj Žižek,” Lacan.com [Online] accessed from: 
http://www.lacan.com/thesymptom/?page_id=2380 accessed:  15.10.2013. (2012).
9 Chris Mcmillan, Universality and Communist Strategy; Žižek and the Disavowed Foundations of Global 
Capitalism, PhD Thesis, School of Social and Cultural Studies, Massey University, Albany, New Zealand 
(2010)
10 Paul Taylor, Žižek and the Media, Cambridge: Polity Press (2010)
11 Jodi Dean, Žižek’s Politics, London: Routledge (2006); Heiko Feldner and Fabio Vighi, Žižek: Beyond 
Foucault, Basingstoke: Palgrave Mcmillan (2007); Adrian Johntson, Badiou, Žižek and Political 
Transformations: The Cadence of Change, Evanston: Northwestern University Press (2009).
12 Adam Kotsko, Žižek and Theology, London: Continuum (2008)
13 Thomas Brockelman, Žižek and Heidegger: The Question Concerning Techno-Capitalism, London: 
Continuum (2008).
14 Todd McGowan, The End of Dissatisfaction, New York: SUNY Press (2003). Todd Mcgowan, Enjoying 
What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis, London: University of Nebraska Press (2013). 
Yannis Stavrakakis, The Lacanian Left: Psychoanalysis, Theory, Politics, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press (2007).
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With regard to the reception of Žižek’s Marxism, in the secondary literature there is a 
broad and messy split between those who argue that it, or certain aspects of it, has valuable 
import for radical critique and practice, and a far more critical group who have raised 
questions not only of its value and its suitability15 but, in certain instances, whether it is 
anything more than rhetorical provocation.  
Within the group that have defended Žižek’s Marxism in certain respects we find Jodi
Dean’s Žižek’s Politics (2006), which outlines the use of Žižek’s work on Lenin and the Party
form as a powerful response to the limitations of identity politics, Žižek’s Dialectics (2010), 
in which Fabio Vighi outlines the dialectics of refusal and sublimation and argues that it 
offers a potential solution to our inability to move beyond the ideological, libidinal and 
political deadlocks of our present, and Chris McMillan’s Žižek and Communist Strategy 
(2012), which constructs a case for Žižek’s “Utopia of the Real” as the basis for a viable 
Communist political strategy. Alongside these there is also Matthew Flisfeder’s “Dialectical 
Materialism and ‘the feminine sublime’” (2013), which argues that Žižek’s dialectical 
materialism can be considered as a critico-revolutionary method, and, as such, aligns Žižek 
with a tradition of Marxist philosophy that was inaugurated by Georg Lukács’s understanding
of Marx’s dialectic. Within this project I build upon a number of these accounts, critically 
defending Žižek’s revolutionary dialectic as a core aspect of his dialectical materialism and a 
utopian mode of thinking as central to his conception of Communism. Nevertheless, I will go
beyond these accounts of Žižek’s work by addressing a number of their limitations and blind-
spots. At the centre of these is the tendency within this broad grouping to focus on specific 
aspects of Žižek’s dialectical materialism in isolation from the wider project that 
characterises his Marxism. As such, we can identify a definite lacuna in the reception of 
15 See, for example: Ian Parker, Slavoj Žižek: A Critical Introduction, London: Pluto Press (2004)
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Žižek’s work in this regard. There has yet to be an account of his work that understands his 
Marxist project from the perspective of the specific conditions and core problems that have 
driven its development. The partial nature of many of the engagements with Žižek’s work is 
reflected in their tendency to simply ignore more problematic aspects of Žižek’s dialectical 
materialist Marxism, including his engagement with the sciences and a dimension of his work
that has been labelled by certain critical accounts as the “second Žižek.”16
As a result, despite the centrality of the project of rejuvenating a dialectical materialist
Marxism in Žižek’s work, this project offers what is only the second sustained book-length 
engagement with the topic, and the first defence of this project. The only other work to 
engage with Žižek’s Marxism as a whole at this length and detail is Matthew Sharpe’s Slavoj
Žižek: A Little Piece of the Real (2004). While critically powerful in a number of ways, and 
highly insightful insofar as to the originality of several aspects of Žižek’s work, Sharpe’s 
detailed engagement is limited by the approach that it takes, aligning and positioning Žižek 
within Western Marxist critical theory, the broad theoretical tradition that sought to offer an 
alternative to “classical” Marxism with the project of a total immanent critique. The 
limitation of Sharpe’s analysis can be seen in how Žižek’s work sits uncomfortably with this 
tradition. As well as the fact that he is from Eastern Europe and belongs to a later generation, 
Žižek also explicitly rejects the premises of Western Marxist critical theory.17 Surveying his 
work, Žižek privileges dialectical materialism over historical materialism and while Hegelian
critique plays a pivotal role in his work Žižek is far more indebted to Jacques Lacan and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis.  In some sense, Žižek is also closer to the orthodox or classical 
dialectical materialism of Engels and Lenin insofar as he attempts to engage positively with 
the empirical sciences. Without acknowledging these and other differences, Sharpe’s account
16 For the clearest division between the “two” Žižek’s see Geoff Boucher and Matthew Sharpe, Žižek and 
Politics A Critical Introduction, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press (2010). 
17 See Žižek, “interview,” p.118.
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overlooks the specificity of Žižek’s Marxism, the problems that it is developed in order to 
address and the particular problems it has in doing so. It leads to Sharpe largely dismissing 
Žižek’s Marxism as a failure on the grounds that it is unable to resolve the problem of the 
unity of theory and practice that Western Marxism sought, according to Sharpe, and as a 
result repeating a number of its antinomies. 
Insofar as it fails to give due attention to the specific conditions and aims that inform 
Žižek’s project, Sharpe’s account repeats a general trend in the critical discussion of Žižek’s 
work that is especially evident in a number of the highly critical accounts of his Marxism. 
The problem is also found in Geoff Boucher’s The Charmed Circle of Ideology (2010) which
conflates Žižek with the problematic of post-Marxism and its problematic break from 
Althusserian Marxism. However, its most extreme example in the secondary literature is 
found in Ernesto Laclau’s critique of Žižek’s work in a joint dialogue with Judith Butler and 
Žižek in Contingency, Hegemony and Universality (2000). Here, Laclau criticises Žižek’s 
Marxism, claiming that it is little more than a series of rhetorical flourishes that obscure what
is otherwise a  ‘psychoanalytic discourse.’18 On this basis, Laclau concludes that Žižek’s 
Marxist concepts ‘mean absolutely nothing.’19 The limitation of Laclau’s critique can be 
located in his view that Žižek’s Marxism is not ‘organised around a truly political 
reflection.’20 This, as we will see, is simply not true. Žižek’s Marxism emerges from specific 
political problems, is informed by the historical situation of its emergence, and is guided by a
number of political and theoretical problems that it tries to resolve. 
18 Laclau, CHU, p.289.
19 Laclau, CHU, p.206.
20 Laclau, CHU, p.289.
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1.4. Aims and Methodology
The original contribution of this thesis resides in its response to these limitations in the 
secondary literature. This project will offer a critical defence of Žižek’s dialectical materialist
Marxism as a broadly unified project attempting to understand its development and its 
different aspects in the context of its emergence, announced by Žižek, as we have seen, in 
Metastases.  With regard to Laclau’s critique, I accept that Žižek’s dialectical materialist 
Marxism is primarily psychoanalytic in tenor, informed primarily by a hybrid Lacanian-
Hegelian understanding of the dialectic, but I contend that this does not mean that it is not 
also based on a “political reflection.” It is in identifying that which informs and conditions 
the development of Žižek’s dialectical materialist Marxism that I am able to make the 
argument that resides at the core of this thesis:
Žižek’s dialectical materialist Marxism is a response to three challenges that Žižek confronts 
when coming up against the limits of his radical democratic position. 
 First, an alternative political theory and practice to traditional Marxism and liberal 
democracy that continues to protect against repeating the errors of the former given 
its disastrous failures during the twentieth century. 
 Second, an analysis of late-capitalism at a libidinal, political and economic level to 
explain the new forms of ideology and jouissance, the limitations of liberal 
democratic politics, and the continuing role of capitalism and class in our 
contemporary world. 
 Third, a reformulation of the Lacanian category of the Real in order to overcome the 
paralysing deadlock of the opposition between the Thing and lack, which almost 
inevitably produces a political conservatism. 
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I contend that Žižek realises the necessity of addressing these challenges during the period of 
democratisation in Eastern Europe, at which point the limitations of his previous analyses and
democratic politics were exposed. A dialectical materialist Marxism is Žižek’s response to 
these challenges. 
While making this argument and outlining Žižek’s project in these terms, this thesis 
also pursues several secondary goals. Given the breadth of Žižek’s work and its constantly 
developing character several areas remain severely under-examined in the secondary 
literature, including the aforementioned topics of his engagement with the sciences and his 
recent conception of Communism.  In this thesis I will dedicate substantial space for an 
engagement with these areas of Žižek’s work in the context of his return to dialectical 
materialism. I will also offer an analysis of the troubling figure of the “second Žižek” that is 
found primarily in his writing shortly after his Marxist turn, usually associated at a 
philosophical level with Žižek’s reading of F.W.J. Schelling, and at a political level with a 
conception of political practice in terms of a destructive, suicidal Act. Rather than ignoring 
this figure, or using it to dismiss Žižek’s Marxism entirely, I aim to identify and locate its 
errors in order to cleave a gap between it and Žižek’s dialectical materialist position. 
With regard to the strategy that informs my critical exploration of Žižek’s work, I 
focus primarily on his philosophical and political writing. Where I draw on Žižek’s books on 
theology or cinema, for example, I do so only to inform the pursuit of specific topics. It does 
mean, however, that I take seriously some of his political writing, which has been dismissed 
as “journalistic” by some.21 While Žižek’s work does sometimes veer in this direction, it is 
much overstated as a critique. Even when Žižek writes for a popular audience his dialectical 
21 See Sharpe, Slavoj Žižek, pp.196, 206.
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materialist approach informs his analysis. This will be demonstrated in the later chapters of 
this project. In terms of the problem that any Žižek researcher faces — the sheer breadth of 
subject matter and the amount he has produced in such a short time — I have focused 
primarily on certain themes and problems that Žižek returns to repeatedly, rather than a few 
selected books. This strategy has been necessitated by the way that Žižek himself develops 
his position, returning to a topic across several works to construct and revive certain ideas 
through layers of interpretation and analysis.
More specifically, I pursue the evaluative and critical dimension of this thesis using a 
form of immanent critique that begins with Žižek’s own terms and postulates, conscious or 
otherwise, and judges his work on them. In the case of this project, the immanent mode of 
evaluation allows us to produce a critique of the “second Žižek” and his problematic 
engagement with the sciences. It also allows us to identify the tension in Žižek’s project 
between the position of the analyst and that of the master that reflects the tension that results 
from the primarily critical position necessitated by his Lacanian critique of Marxism, and a 
minimally programmatic position that is necessitated by attempting to answer the question 
that all Marxist theory ultimately confronts: “What is to be done?”
1.5. "Marxism"
Within this introduction I have referred to Slavoj Žižek’s position as that of a dialectical 
materialist Marxist. In the history of Marxism, the phrase “dialectical materialism” was first 
used by German socialist, philosopher, and friend of Marx, Joseph Dietzgen.22 While neither 
Karl Marx nor Friedrich Engels ever use this name in their writing — materialist dialectic, 
22 Tony Burns, “Joseph Dietzgen and the History of Marxism,” in Science and Society, vol.66, no.2. (2002) 
pp.202-227. Rather than as sometimes assumed, Grandfather of Russian Marxism, Georgi Plekhanov. Žižek 
makes this mistake in Parallax View. See p.391, n.40.
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was the closest the latter came — the term became indissociable from their philosophical 
positions and from Marxist philosophy more generally. While Jacques Lacan also uses this 
term to describe his own meta-psychology in philosophical terms in one of his later 
seminars23 and Adrian Johnston (2008) uses the term to describe the dynamic that operates at 
the two levels of a Lacanian derived transcendental materialist theory of the subject,24  this 
should not raise any doubts as to the political implications of the appearance of the term in 
Žižek’s work. When he first describes his project as the re-articulation of dialectical 
materialism Žižek ties his philosophy to its traditional other, the Marxist science of historical 
materialism25 and also suggests how the lessons of the Engelsian, Stalinist dialectical 
materialism have informed his own position.26 Yet, given that some contest whether Žižek’s 
work can be considered Marxist at all27 it bears asking on what grounds we can claim that his 
dialectical materialism belongs to this tradition. That is to say, before we go any further we 
need to pause to consider the peculiar nature of the combination of theory and practice that is 
called Marxism. 
It is my contention that Žižek’s dialectical materialism can be considered Marxist 
because it retains a connection to the aim of all Marxist philosophy insofar as it recognises 
that the role of philosophy is not merely to interpret but also transform the world. With 
regard to the many fundamental differences between Žižek’s position and this or that 
tradition of Marxist thought, to dismiss Žižek on these grounds is a gesture that 
23 Lacan describes his own philosophical position as a dialectical materialism in the unpublished Seminar 18; it 
is clear that this is only a secondary consideration for Žižek, despite the importance of Lacanian psychoanalysis 
to his philosophical project. Žižek, LTN, p.780.
24 See Adrian Johnston, Žižek’s Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity, Evanston, Ill: 
Northwestern University Press (2008).
25 Žižek, ME, p.126.
26 Žižek, ME, p.136, n.18.
27 Parker, Slavoj Žižek, p.2.
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misrecognises both the transformations in Marxism over its recent history and the nature of 
the tradition as such. 
The most recent “crisis of Marxism” can be understood to have destroyed the very 
notion of Marxist orthodoxy, not least because at the heart of the crisis has been the 
destruction of the authorities and institutional powers that were able to pass judgement on 
what differentiates orthodoxy from heresy.  Along with the end of orthodoxy, as Jacques 
Bidet and Stathis Kouvelakis (2008) argue, in its most recent history the ‘[t]he old lines of 
demarcation have in the main ceased to operate.’28 Whereas thirty years ago we might have 
been able to more or less clearly delineate Western Marxism from its traditional counterpart, 
and within each grouping see variations and disagreements over certain matters, the “crisis of
Marxism” ‘has released a variety of more or less fleeting currents, schools, groups and 
unique individual trajectories, translated into shifting reclassifications in the theoretical 
field.’29 Yet, if anything, this splintering far from destroying the very category of Marxism in 
our contemporary period could be said to, in fact, merely reveal an essential truth: that 
Marxism has never been a pure tradition, or isolated from heretic revision and remodelling. 
That is to say that Marxism has always ‘lived off incessant restructuring and innovation, 
constantly finding in the surrounding culture, in perspectives generated outside its conceptual
space and through the breaks that their integration involved, the conditions for its renewal.’30 
What defines Marxism, thus, is not a group of essential features but merely a ‘special 
relationship to certain ideas derived from Marx’ and a willingness to reinterpret them 
28 Jacques Bidet and Stathis Kouvelakis “Introduction: Marxism, Post-Marxism, Neo-Marxisms” in Critical 
Companion to Contemporary Marxism eds. Jacques Bidet and Stathis Kouvelakis Netherlands: Brill (2008) 
p.xii.
29 Bidet and Kouvelakis, “Introduction,” p.xii.
30 Bidet and Kouvelakis, “Introduction,” p.xii. On similar grounds Alain Badiou has claimed that Marxism 
“does not exist” in the sense of a homogenous unified tradition. See Alain Badiou, Metapolitics, trans. Jason 
Barker, London: Verso (2005) p.58
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according to demands of different situations and the possibilities offered by different 
theoretical traditions.31 
I take Žižek’s work to be one particular example of the “thousand Marxisms,” to use 
Bidet and Kouvelakis’s term, that have emerged from this “crisis.” As I will argue, Žižek’s 
Marxism can be understood as a product of a unique conjuncture consisting of the influence 
of Lacanian psychoanalysis and Hegelian dialectics and the challenges that I have outlined. 
This is not to say that Žižek represents a total break with the past, however. He certainly has 
some commonalities with Freudo-Marxism,32 he also, as has been well documented, has 
several common concerns with Althusserianism.33 There are overlaps with Georg Lukács 
insofar as one side of his dialectical materialism is a critical mode of knowing that locates 
and exposes the moment of consciousness in a totality, although, through Lacan rather than 
Hegel, this does not produce a reconciliation in the traditional sense of the term, as we will 
shortly see. And, surprisingly, despite Žižek’s attempt to reclaim dialectical materialism from
its Stalinist history, Žižek’s work shares several similarities with classical dialectical 
materialism. It does mean, however, that Žižek’s Marxism radically alters classical Marxist 
categories from class struggle to the proletarian, despite these points of overlap. For this 
reason, we might prefer the term neo-Marxism to describe Žižek’s position. Although, 
personally, I think that this wrongly suggests there might have been something like “original”
Marxism to begin with. Any survey of “Marxism” over the last one hundred and fifty years 
will demonstrate a multitude of different Marxisms, with a pre- or post-fix. If we were to 
continue this tradition and give Žižek’s work an appropriate label, then, we would want to 
31 Bidet and Kouvelakis, “Introduction,” p.xii.
32 Žižek, ME, pp.181, 182-4.
33 Several articles explained this relationship and its various facets, theoretical and political. Rastko Močnik, 
‘Ideology and Fantasy’ in The Althusserian Legacy edited by E. Ann Kaplan and Michael Sprinker, London: 
Verso (1993); Mladen Dolar “Beyond Interpellation” in Qui Parle, vol.6, no.2 (Spring/Summer 1993) pp.75-96;
Slavoj Žižek and Renata Salecl, “Lacan in Slovenia” in Radical Philosophy, no.58 (1991) pp.25-31.
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emphasise its primarily philosophical bent. With this in mind I have described Žižek’s 
position as a Dialectical Materialist Marxism.
1.6. Plan of the Thesis
This thesis is divided into three sections. In section one, “Political and Theoretical 
Foundations,” I outline what will eventually become the foundations on which Žižek returns 
to the project of a dialectical materialist Marxism. In chapter two, I consider Žižek’s critical 
analyses of “really existing socialism” as a form of university discourse, before turning to his 
understanding of the specific character of Stalinist totalitarianism in terms of the Party’s role 
as a Fetish and the perverse character of the Stalinist Communist. What defines these 
positions is the mistaken belief that a particular element can embody or occupy the place of 
universality. For Žižek, we see that it is this structure, acting within the university discourse 
that characterises “really existing socialism” that produces the violence and terror that 
characterises the most shocking phenomena within Stalinism. In the final section of the 
chapter we will reveal the second key dimension of Žižek’s critique, which locates the 
foundation of the Stalinist position in an error inherent to traditional Marxism as a result of 
Marx’s incomplete critique of utopianism. Žižek contends that Marx’s mistake resulted in the
persistence of a fantasy of the Other, which continued to define Marxist politics, its dialectics
of transformation and its conception of Communism.
In chapter three, I continue to outline the conditions of Žižek’s return to Marxism. I 
argue that despite initially appearing as a promising response to the dangers of totalitarian 
politics, Žižek’s conception of a (radical) liberal democratic politics confronts serious 
challenges at a conceptual and political level. Examining how the experience of the 
democratisation of Eastern Europe altered Žižek’s views on the effectiveness of a democratic
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politics, I argue that the challenges he meets here become the impulse that drives his turn to 
dialectical materialism and Marxism. In this chapter, I conclude by outlining the political, 
analytical and theoretical tasks that Žižek’s dialectical materialism has to confront. 
Section two, Dialectical Materialism, explores Žižek’s philosophical response to 
these deadlocks and the development of his dialectical materialism. Chapter four outlines 
Žižek’s dialectical materialism as a mode of revolutionary dialectical critique.  I demonstrate 
that through his Lacanian understanding of Hegel Žižek is able to avoid the problems of 
classical Marxist philosophy by conceiving of the role of dialectical practice in terms of the 
analyst, who occupies the lack in the Other. After outlining the critical goal of the dialectic as
a “totality with failures”, this chapter turns to consider how Žižek’s dialectics escape from 
the deadlock that characterised his democratic phase. I argue that there are three key features 
of the dialectic. First, the dialectic operates primarily to produce the conditions of 
transformation in the form of a shocking moment in which the smooth surface of an 
ideological or political totality is denatured through a confrontation with the symptom. 
Second, I argue that Žižek’s dialectical materialism is able to break free from the disabling 
binary that characterised his democratic period through a re-conceptualisation of the Real as 
a rupturing gap. Third, I argue that with this new conception of the Real, Žižek is also able to 
think historicity and, as a result, overcome a certain ahistorical limit that was evident in his 
democratic phase. I end the chapter with a discussion of the potential limitations of Žižek’s 
dialectical method, noting how there are questions with regard to whether the dialectic can 
function as Žižek intends to produce the form of change that his Marxism demands.
Chapter five, turns to consider how Žižek responds to this last problem. I argue that 
Žižek’s controversial “politics of Truth” should be understood as an attempt to address the 
gap between theory and practice that appears as a result of the dialectic’s limitations. I 
16
Introduction
consider Žižek’s relationship to Alain Badiou’s work as crucial in this regard. Charting 
Badiou’s influence, I focus on a significant advance in Žižek’s work. Badiou’s notion of 
subtraction allows Žižek to develop a symptomal politics, which, connected to a conception 
of feminine subjectivity, allows an escape from the political dead-end of his democratic 
phase. However, highlighting a slight shift in the function of dialectical materialist 
philosophy with the “politics of Truth” I question whether it is possible for the philosopher to
maintain the place of the lack in the Other associated with the analyst.  I argue that the 
tension between dialectical materialism as a revolutionary practice and as the “politics of 
Truth” reflects that of the Lacanian critique of classical Marxism and Žižek’s return to 
Marxist philosophy, which seems to necessitate a minimally prescriptive role for philosophy 
that risks returning it to the place of the fetish.
In chapter six, I turn to consider the properly traumatic point of the Žižekian field: the
“second Žižek.” After considering the notion of the abyssal, suicidal (other) Act, I connect its
absolute character to Žižek’s Lacanian re-reading of Schelling. From the perspective of his 
dialectical materialist position, I examine the consequences of the positions associated with 
the “second Žižek” at the levels of epistemology and politics. Through a comparison of 
Žižek’s reading of Democritean and Epicurean philosophy with that of Marx’s I argue that 
locating the source for change in an ahistorical motor or abyssal contradiction can only end in
disabling political paralysis. At the level of politics and ideology, I argue that the (other) Act 
is a deeply ideological figure, reflecting a deadlock that is characteristic of “the end of 
History” and, as such, appears to operate to displace political analysis through a fantasy of 
immediate and total transformation. 
Chapter seven considers one of the most neglected areas of Žižek’s dialectical 
materialism: the return to a dialectical materialist science. I argue that the neglect of this area 
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of Žižek’s work is surprising given its immediate resonance with the failures of the classical 
dialectical materialism of Engels, Stalin, et al.. After delineating and clarifying the multiple 
approaches to the sciences in Žižek’s work I take critical aim at Žižek’s engagement with 
quantum physics and his attempt at a Lacanian-Hegelian interpretation. Building on Adrian 
Johnston’s (2013) critique of Žižek’s position, I argue that the under-appreciation of the 
historical failures of a dialectical materialist science has led Žižek to repeat many of the same
errors. 
Section three of the thesis, “Communism and Capitalism”, turns to the practice of 
dialectical materialism. In chapter eight, “Capitalism and its Symptoms”, I outline Žižek’s 
account of the transformations in contemporary subjectivity, Žižek’s renewed effort at 
understanding liberal democracy, and how Žižek connects these to an account of the 
contradictions of capitalism. I conclude by reflecting on the limitations of Žižek’s dialectical 
mode of knowing at the socio-political level, arguing that it largely fails to produce the result 
that the dialectic aims to: the shock of the Real. I suggest that a recent turn towards 
describing his dialectical practice in terms of “cognitive mapping” is symptomatic of this 
limitation. I argue that, while problematic, it does not wholly negate the force of his 
dialectical practice, since it continues to identify spaces of struggle and potential 
transformation.  
Chapter nine, “Communism,” looks at the most recent innovation in Žižek’s work. In 
this chapter I offer an alternative perspective on Žižek’s conception of a Communist politics 
and Communist utopianism that addresses a number of insufficiencies in the current 
literature. First, I outline how Žižek conceives of Communism as a Cause that allows a form 
of collective identification and subtractive politics. Second, I uncover a utopian hermeneutic 
in Žižek’s most recent work that successfully navigates the problems of traditional Marxist 
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utopianism. Demonstrating the potential of this utopian practice I outline Žižek’s own “Idea 
of Communism” as a socio-political discourse of the analyst. In the final and concluding 
section of the thesis I return to the problem of a “politics without the Other” in the context of 
Žižek’s Communism. I argue that Žižek successfully manages the tension inherent to his 
project – identified in the conclusion of chapter 5 – by continuing to limit the role of the 
theorist and emphasising the political and subjective moment of transformation. 
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Chapter 2: Žižek's Lacanian Critique of
Marxism and Stalinism
2.1. Introduction
Throughout his work, Žižek identifies many flaws in orthodox and unorthodox forms of 
Marxism, but the problem that seems to have perturbed him more than any other, especially 
in his earliest work, is it’s general dual-failure to offer a sufficiently critical explanation of 
Stalinism and a convincing account of the relationship between Stalinism and Marxist 
theory.1 For Žižek, the initial critical importance of a Lacanian psychoanalytical approach is 
its ability to explain and account for the nature of “really existing socialism,” including the 
dynamics that led to the crises of Stalinism, and the relationship between Stalinism and 
Marxist theory.2  Using a Lacanian approach, Žižek develops a critical theory of the social 
structure of socialism, the types of subjectivities it relies on and produces, and a critique of 
Marxist theory that indexes its flaws to the failures of “really existing socialism.” As such, 
1 Žižek, “HCC” p.113. Žižek’s critique is somewhat misplaced given that while, as he argues, the Frankfurt 
School did not offer many focused analyses of Stalinism there were nevertheless a welter of attempts to account 
for really existing socialism in Western Marxism. For a detailed survey of the major approaches and their 
successes and limitations, see Marcel van der Linden, Western Marxism and the Soviet Union: A Survey of 
Critical Theories and Debates Since 1917, trans. Jurriaan Bendien, Leden, NL: Brill (2007).
2 More generally, it was the ability of Lacanian psychoanalysis to provide an insight into and solution for several
problems inherent to Marxist theory and critical analysis that convinced Žižek to become a fully paid-up 
Lacanian. Žižek, “Interview,” pp.181-2.
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Žižek can be seen to address a problem that Marxism has long struggled to answer: how its 
own theory and practice led to the disaster of Stalinism and “really existing socialism.”3
The aim of this chapter is to outline Žižek’s critical analysis of socialism and 
Marxism, and thereby indicate the challenges that Žižek’s own Marxist dialectical 
materialism will also subsequently have to confront. I begin by demonstrating Žižek’s critical
analysis of socialism and Stalinism as manifestations of what Jacques Lacan called the 
discourse of the university. I will then turn to Žižek’s political critique of Stalinism in section
2.3. before connecting this critique of Stalinism and the account of socialism as a university 
discourse with Žižek’s critique of Marxism, demonstrating how the latter contained the seeds 
for the former. It is my contention that these critiques are pivotal in the development of 
Žižek’s work, as his later turn to Marxism is conceived on the basis that it must avoid these 
past mistakes.
2.2. "Really Existing Socialism" as a University Discourse
For Žižek, socialism was a paradigmatic instantiation of what Jacques Lacan calls the 
university discourse. In Seminar XVII (2007) Lacan outlines the discourse of the university as
one of four possible “discourses” — the master, the analyst, and the hysteric being the other 
three. For Lacan, a discourse is a form of social and inter-subjective relation that emerges as a
result of our linguistically structured social world. Lacan calls discourses our “social links” 
or, ‘social bonds, founded in language.’4 
3 This was the centre of the “Crisis of Marxism” declared by Louis Althusser in 1977. For Althusser, this meant 
yet another tarrying with the classics of Marxism, this time, albeit without the illusion of pure sources of 
untainted truths waiting to be uncovered. Louis Althusser, “The Crisis of Marxism” in Marxism Today, July 
(1978) p.218.
4 Jacques Lacan, The Seminars of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and 
Knowledge, 1972-1973, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Bruce Fink, London: W.W Norton (1998) p.21.
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The Discourse of the University
Locations
As transindividual structures, these “social links” describe the social role and function of core
elements such as knowledge (S2), authority (S1), our libidinal materiality (a), and the subject 
($) in different societies, situations and institutions. The respective role that each of these 
elements plays within a discourse is defined by the place it occupies in the discursive 
structure. Lacan designates the top-left-hand corner of the matheme as the place of the agent, 
the top-right the place of Other, the bottom-left as the position of truth and the bottom-right 
position as that of production. What is unique about the university discourse is that 
“knowledge”, S2 in Lacan’s mathemes, occupies the position of “the agent.” ‘Knowledge is 
the king’ as Lacan puts it.5 
5 Lacan, Jacques Lacan The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XVII The Other Side of Psychoanalysis ed. 
Jacques-Alain Miller. Trans. Russell Grigg London: W.W. Norton & Co. (2007) p.238.
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In identifying socialism as a mode of university discourse, Žižek follows Lacan’s 
brief suggestion on the matter in Seminar XVII: ‘What reigns in what one calls the Union of 
the Soviet Socialist Republics is University.’6 As a form of university discourse, Žižek argues
that neither socialism nor Stalinism can be considered a regression to a form of pre-modern, 
barbaric political rule. Rather, based on knowledge and assuming its universality for all 
subjects, socialism and Stalinism were thoroughly modern phenomena and part of the 
Enlightenment tradition.
Through utilising this Lacanian critique, Žižek is able to demonstrate how, far from 
being deviations or disasters, phenomena like the purge and the show trial were the “truth” of
socialist societies given that they represented the logical end point of its internal dynamics. 
There are, of course, limitations to using the university discourse to explain these specific 
phenomena. Indeed, these models are open, flexible, giving a sense of possibilities and 
tendencies, rather than offering an account of the particularities of any single case. What it 
does offer however is an outline of a set of structural possibilities, not dissimilar to the way 
that a semiotic square works for ideological analysis. It also demonstrates the immanence of 
certain tendencies and their potential consequences.
2.2.1. The Malevolent Truth of Knowledge
In Soviet Socialism, the knowledge, S2, that acted as the agent was the pseudo-scientific 
philosophy of dialectical materialism and the endless plans and quotas that were drawn from 
it in order to coordinate and structure the creation of a society that sought to maximise and 
increase productivity in its race to catch-up and finally overtake capitalism. Underlying this 
knowledge, however, was the power of the Party, S1, who were supposedly armed with this 
6 Lacan, Seminar XVII, p.237.
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knowledge, which served to form the basis of a scientific socialism. The Party’s role, 
however, was forever split between mere interpretation, determining the applicability and 
precise nature of what this objective knowledge meant, and the altogether more extensive 
function of creating and sustaining the conditions for the applicability of this knowledge. For 
Žižek, the relationship between knowledge production and its interpretation is crucial in 
understanding the nature of the university discourse. While in the university discourse 
knowledge appears as a neutral and objective set of propositions, these are always subject to 
one particular interpretation. The “truth” of objective knowledge is thus always the master’s 
gesture, which tellingly resides hidden under the bar, beneath knowledge, in Lacan’s 
visualisation of the university discourse.  Consequently, pure authority and power, S1 in 
Lacan’s formulation, always lurks underneath knowledge. Formally, S1 stands for the 
decision, the interpretation, the way that neutral knowledge is deciphered before it is 
presented as objective and neutral. As Žižek writes, ‘[t]he “repressed” truth of this discourse 
is that behind the semblance of neutral “knowledge” that we try to impart, we can always 
locate the gesture of the master.’7 
In socialism, we see the repressed role of the master emerge in the wild factional 
struggles that went on behind the unified appearance of the Party. These factional disputes 
were always, ultimately, about Power over who controlled or determined what this neutral 
“knowledge” was about, what it meant, what it demanded of subjects and society. This 
tension between neutral knowledge and power is also present at the very core of the founding 
document of Stalinism. In the opening sentence of Stalin’s “Dialectical and Historical 
Materialism” (2008) we find dialectical and historical materialism described as the “world 
outlook” of the Communist Party. The document, in other words, describes dialectical 
7 Žižek, LA, p.131.
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materialism as an ideology, one that constitutes an alternative outlook to that of bourgeois 
ideologues and, as such, is partial and particular. Nevertheless, while admitting this partiality,
Stalin also claims that the data of Marxist science regarding such things as the laws of 
development of society has ‘the validity of objective truth.’8 The tension between objective 
knowledge and its ideological nature in Stalin’s essay reflects the tension inherent to the 
university discourse between S2 and S1, knowledge and truth. The key question in this 
instance concerns what occupies the position of truth and the extent of its power. In the case 
of Stalinism, it was only the Stalinist Party that could determine the objectivity of knowledge 
or be objective towards society, due to its unique position as a mediator between the Other of 
History and the proletariat.
For Žižek, this is the pivotal problem with the university discourse. It is never neutral 
knowledge that decides the fate of the subject but always the master whose role is hidden 
from view, or at least is not openly admitted at the level of explicit communication. As Žižek 
argues, the master ‘is the constitutive lie of the university discourse’ insofar as it presents 
‘what effectively amounts to a political decision based on Power as a simple insight into the 
factual state of things.’9 This problem is not merely an epistemological one. The relationship 
that the discourse of the university outlines between knowledge and truth does not only 
suggest that “neutral” knowledge obfuscates some particular interest or ideological bias 
beneath it; rather, the role of the master is far more extensive than this. Its decisions can be 
thought to have a performative effect in certain instances, because it does not only decipher 
objective knowledge, but, rather, gives knowledge its objectivity through its centrality and 
power.10  
8 Joseph Stalin, Dialectical and Historical Materialism, New York: Key Press (2008) p.22.
9 Žižek, “Four Discourses,” p.88.
10 Žižek, “Fetish,” p.76.
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For Žižek, like Lacan, the authority and power of the master has the structure of the 
logic of the signifier — in Lacanian ontology, the logic of the signifier is the basis of all 
cultural and social structure.11 This logic describes how the intervention of a particular 
signifier retroactively structures the set of other signifiers so that ‘the thing in question 
becomes […] what it already was.’12 To cite one of Žižek’s favoured illustrations of the 
performative nature of the signifier’s structuring effect: there is nothing a priori “King-like” 
in the figure of the monarch; however, he becomes “King-like” when subjects treat him as 
such. In other words, things appear as what they are performatively as a result of the 
structuring effect of S1. 
This performative power means that the Party not only decides on which line or 
interpretation to take, but in doing so gives to those interpretations an objectivity that 
determines the relationship of others to this knowledge. In the case of the subject, the 
knowledge addresses it as an object, objet a, that has no being beyond its determination by 
knowledge — hence, the subject is reduced to a pure negative, a barred subject, $, in the 
place of production. In the case of socialism, knowledge was revealed to have a violent 
character insofar as it demanded subjects to reach productivity targets, or transform 
themselves into the new men and women of socialism. 
In Stalinism, Žižek shows how this relationship reaches a perverse apogee as a result 
of the Party’s almost unparalleled power over every aspect of social life and its accordant 
belief that it was both tasked with and able to pursue the total reorganisation of society given 
its Power and the universality of its knowledge. Žižek refers to the ideological distortion that 
created this relationship as ‘the totalitarian misrecognition of the performative dimension.’13 
11 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses, 1955-1956, ed. Jacques-Alain 
Miller, Trans. Russell Grigg, London: Routledge (1993) p.184.
12 Žižek, SH, p.24.
13 Žižek, SOI, pp.164-5.
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That is to say, along with the belief that the Party’s knowledge was All, this perspective 
reduced everything that was other to the “objective” knowledge of the Party to a meaningless,
subjective “scrap” or “waste” that could be dispensed with, since,  from the perspective of 
this knowledge, it was worthless. We can see the effect of the emergence of a totalitarian 
misrecognition in the pure unfalsifiable circularity of Stalinist reason. In the political sphere 
Žižek draws attention to this circularity in the relationship between the Party and the People.14
The People’s support for the Party is taken by the Party to be an objective fact, guaranteed by
the laws of History. The Party, then, takes the position that anyone who does not support the 
Party, is a “waste,” a mistake, something that can be discarded because it does not fit into its 
objective knowledge of History and, as such, is superfluous in the grand scheme of History. 
The truth of this reasoning is the performativity that it overlooks. The relationship between 
the Party and the People is not guaranteed by the Other of History, which the Party 
supposedly has knowledge of; rather, it is the Party that defines both what counts as History 
and the People. What it overlooks, in other words, is that ‘the People are only the People 
because the Party refers to them as such […]’15. The misrecognition of this performative 
dimension is highly problematic, because it means that those who do not support the Party, 
‘those who work against its rule,’ are “objectively” no longer part of the People but, rather, 
its “enemy.”16 As such, they can be dispensed with, imprisoned and even destroyed, given 
that they have no positive worth according to the Party’s objective knowledge of History.
14 Žižek, SOI, pp.164-5.
15 Žižek, SH, p.190.
16 Žižek, SOI, p.165.
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2.2.2. The Cynical Mode of Subjectivity
For Žižek, the dominant mode of ideological subjectivity in socialism takes the form of 
ideological cynicism, although, as we will shortly see, in its revolutionary phase the Stalinist 
misrecognition also produces a different form of ideological perversion. When we look at 
how the relationship between S1 and S2 functions in socialism, we can see why the university
discourse is likely to be especially conducive of an extremely cynical political culture. As the 
role of the master, S1, demonstrates, the underlying political character of the moment of the 
decision is still present in the university discourse. At a public level, however, it is repressed 
and represented as merely the result of a neutral-objective knowledge about the state of 
society. As such, the university discourse describes a political system in which individuals 
are likely to realise that these political decisions are contingent on the ideological whims of 
those in power, but are nevertheless unable to raise this point in public given that the nature 
of these decisions continues to be hidden at an ideological level. As a result, the relationship 
between S2 and S1 appears likely to produce the disenchanted political subjectivity of the 
modern cynic at the level of both those in power and those who are left powerless under 
socialism. 
For Žižek, what characterises the cynical mode of subjectivity is its apparently post-
ideological character. Whereas ideology is traditionally conceived as ‘a lie experienced as 
truth’17, the nature of the master’s gesture in the university discourse distorts the function of 
ideology so that it is no longer taken seriously, even by those who wield power. For Žižek, 
this happened in Stalinism with dialectical materialism which became an ideology that ‘was 
not to be believed in’ but, rather, ‘ritualistically enacted’ to legitimate the irrepressibly 
political nature of the Party’s power and its decisions.18 As this power overran any sense of 
17 Žižek, SOI, p.27.
18 Žižek, “HCC,” p.110.
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the neutrality of the knowledge on which it was supposedly based, its ideological character 
was such that it no longer pretended to be a “lie that is taken seriously,” even by its authors. 
As a result, S2, knowledge became mere ideology, a pure ‘means of manipulation.’19 
For Žižek, a similar form of ideological cynicism was found among the general 
population who knew all too well that the official ideology was a lie, that the system was 
highly exploitative and that the Party ruled only for the benefit of the higher echelons of a 
highly stratified bureaucracy, even as it “feigned to rule” in the name of the People.20 The 
catch for Žižek, and the reason why the system did not collapse under the weight of its own 
perverse character, was that, despite this knowledge, subjects continued to act as if they 
supported the Party and were enthusiastic about the cause of building socialism.21 For Žižek, 
this logic defined socialist societies far beyond Stalinism through to the stagnant, post-
totalitarian, late-socialist societies. 
Žižek explains the structure of this mode of socialist ideology as a form of perversion 
that took the form of a “fetishistic disavowal.” Clinically, disavowal is a form of denial. The 
paradigmatic case in Lacanian psychoanalysis is the denial of the trauma of castration, 
whereby the male child confronts his mother’s lack of a penis.22 The fetishistic disavowal, 
however, does not lead to this knowledge being wholly rejected. Rather, it is displaced onto 
another level or object – the fetish – which functions to make the knowledge of the trauma 
bearable.23 The result of this fetishistic disavowal at the level of the subject is a disjunction 
between otherwise contradictory ideas that come to be held and continue to operate side by 
side. For Žižek, the fetishistic disavowal describes the psychical structure of the form of 
19 Žižek, SOI, p.27.
20 Žižek, SOI, p.226.
21 Žižek, SOI, p.225.
22 Žižek, “Fetish,” p. 70. See also: Jean Laplanche and Jean Bertrand Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-
Analysis, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith, London: Karnac Books (1973) p.118.
23 Žižek, FATTAF, p.66.
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“dual consciousness” that Lesek Kolakowski identified as a particular feature of socialist 
societies.24 The subject is thus split between the level of enunciation and enunciated content 
and is able to fully acknowledge this split: “I Know Very Well, But All the Same…” as the 
title of Octave Mannoni’s (2003) essay on the subject of fetishistic disavowal puts it.25 For 
Žižek, the subject of socialism accepts the untruth of ideology in the same way that one might
accept a traumatic perception through disavowal: “I know very well” the lie of ideology “but 
all the same” I will act as if I do not know it. As Žižek describes apropos the subject of the 
cynical mode of ideology and the fetishistic disavowal: ‘[t]hey know very well how things 
really are, but still they are doing it as if they did not know.’26
For Žižek, the cynical subjectivity of socialism furnishes us with a key lesson about 
ideology. As Žižek writes in what is now a well known passage from Sublime Object:
The illusion is not on the side of knowledge, it is already on the side of 
reality itself, of what people are doing. What they do not know is that their 
social reality itself, their activity, is guided by an illusion, by a fetishistic 
inversion. What they overlook, what they misrecognize, is not the reality but
the illusion which is structuring their reality, their real social activity. […] 
The illusion is therefore double: it consists in overlooking the illusion which
is structuring our real, effective relationship to reality. And this overlooked, 
unconscious illusion is what may be called the ideological fantasy. […] The 
fundamental level of ideology […] is not that of an illusion masking the real
state of things but that of an (unconscious) fantasy structuring our social 
reality itself.27
24 Lesek Kolakowski, The Main Currents of Marxism, trans. P.S. Falla, London: W.W. Norton (2005) p.864.
25 Octave Mannoni, “I Know Very Well, But All The Same…” in Perversion and the Social Relation eds. Molly
Anne Rothenbery, Dennis Foster, and Slavoj Žižek, Durham: Duke University Press (2003)
26 Žižek, SOI, p.30.
27 Žižek, SOI, pp.29-30.
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On the basis of this Žižek identifies the limitation of the cynical position, describing it as a 
form of “enlightened false consciousness.” What subjects fail to confront in their self-
distancing from the lie of ideology is how that ideology, in the form of fantasy, can continue 
to unconsciously structure social relationships and the effectivity of power. As Žižek puts it 
in the context of the commodity fetishist: ‘What they “do not know”, what they misrecognize,
is the fact that in their social reality itself, in their social activity […] they are guided by the 
[unconscious] illusion.’28 For Žižek, this is why late-socialist societies continued to operate 
effectively despite the knowledge of its ideological character among its subjects.  Its 
continual functioning relied not on what subjects thought they knew about ideological social 
reality but how they continued to act as if they did not know its ideological character. That is 
to say, the conscious ideological beliefs of socialist subjects existed alongside the continuing 
operation of the fantasy which structured and secured socialist social reality at the level of the
unconscious. 
2.2.3. The Political Psychoses of Stalinism
At the core of Žižek’s Lacanian analysis of socialism is an account of the most violent and 
destructive moments of Stalinism. While the purges and the show trials might have seemed 
anomalous, the result of some personal excesses or historical aberrations perhaps, for Žižek 
these seemingly exceptional events represented the ‘immanent possibility’ of Stalinism, and 
displayed ‘the truth of the fundamental position itself.’29 We can call this the 
“psychoticization” of the university discourse that results in a form of “political psychosis.” 
Here, I depart from Dean’s (2006) understanding of Žižek’s account of Stalinism. Dean 
argues that Žižek’s socialism is “split” between the university discourse and a “pervert’s 
28 Žižek, SOI, p.28.
29 Žižek, “Fetish,” p.88.
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discourse.”30  While a form of perversion does, indeed, play a large role in this breakdown – 
as we will see in the section that follows, it is a feature of the fetishistic position of the Party 
– I argue that this transformation is immanent to the structure of the university discourse and 
does not require the complication of an additional discursive structure. Moreover, Žižek has 
warned against the “liberal” mistake of conceiving of Stalin as ‘a perverse master […]’31 and 
elsewhere openly speaks of Stalinist subjectivity as being ‘closer to the psychotic position 
[…].’32
For Lacan, psychosis results from the destruction — the precise mechanism is the 
form of refusal known as foreclosure — of certain key symbolic nodes, or “quilting points,” 
which are needed to structure reality and the subject. For Lacan, ‘when they are not 
established, or when they give way’ the result is psychosis.33 Žižek argues there is an 
equivalent political and social form of psychosis. Although Žižek does not offer a precise 
chain of events, he suggests that at some point the Party’s ‘ritualistic discourse broke down’ 
resulting in an orgy of violence and terror that characterised the highest period of the purges, 
when the Party began to “devour” itself as well as society. These purges were a consequence 
of its total incapacity to ‘govern the country through normal executive measures.’34 What this 
means is that Stalinist society during this period lacked the necessary secure quilting points 
that allow a discourse to function ordinarily. We can point here to the role of the Party as the 
performatively empowered master. This incredible power, however, eventually comes back 
to haunt it. By demanding that ever more new truths be accepted and that subjects erase even 
30 Dean, Žižek’s Politics, p.79.
31 Žižek, DSST?, p.119.
32 Žižek, FTKN, p.186. With due respect to Dean, Žižek’s position was a relatively obscure before the 
translation of Žižek’s Sublime Hysteric, which only became available after the publication of Dean’s work. In 
this work Žižek directly refers to “political psychosis” in the title of chapter 10.
33 Lacan, Seminar III, pp.268-9. Žižek discusses this as a possible way towards the onset of psychosis in 
Sublime Object, see p.78.
34 Žižek, DSST?, pp.118-9.
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the memory of what only yesterday had been true, in turn, destabilises the whole structure of 
the university discourse. The Party’s actions eventually collapse the stable and formal set of 
rules needed to order and structure society when reality becomes merely what the Party 
demands of the subject at any single moment.35
Just as subjects loses its symbolic bearings with the foreclosure of these formal nodal 
points, their absence at a social level results in a disintegration into a maelstrom of political 
psychosis. For the subject, the end result of this lack of symbolic divisions and established 
differences is the proliferation of aggressive rivalries and libidinal attachments to imaginary 
others.36 Žižek sees something similar happening at the political level in Stalinism with the 
explosion of rivalries, tensions and endless cycles of accusations. Referencing Freud’s (1979)
reading of the case of Judge Schreber, Žižek argues that the search for enemies from all 
social classes was a kind of paranoiac construction that formed part of a desperate attempt to 
recover some kind of order and a minimal form of cognitive mapping out of the chaos.37 
However, given that these accusations were directed against the remaining figures of 
authority and power — party bosses, even figures within the security services — they only 
furthered the dissolution of the social link and exacerbated the cycle of destruction.38 The 
imaginary, immanent logic of aggression characteristic of paranoiac psychosis, thus, drove 
political actors to ‘violence directed towards an enemy.’39
For Žižek, the second key feature of the psychoticization of Stalinism is that the social
law begins to function like the superego.40 As Žižek tells us, the fundamental feature of the 
35 Žižek, “Fetish,” p.79.
36 Russell Grigg, "From the Mechanism of Psychosis to the Universal Condition of the Symptom: On 
Foreclosure"  in Key Concepts of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, ed. Danny Nobus, New York: Other Press (1999) 
p.57.
37 Žižek, DSST?, p.119, IDLC, pp.29-250.
38 Žižek, DSST?, pp.120.
39 Žižek, SH, p.155.
40 Žižek, SH, p.160.
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superego ‘is an impossible injunction that makes the subject feel guilty.’41 For Lacan, this 
injunction is always an injunction to Jouis!, “Enjoy!”42. This enjoyment does not mean 
pleasure as such, but, rather, refers to a kind of “deadly” jouissance, that is prohibited upon 
entry into a universal order of language. Paradigmatically, the superego is the other side of 
the public or social law, marking the irrationality of our acceptance of it.43 In the case of the 
subject, it is the link between the symbolic Law and the maternal Thing that was prohibited 
upon entry into the symbolic order of language.44 Its obscene dimension resides in how it 
enjoins us to do something that is impossible. It might demand that we sacrifice all 
enjoyment, while mocking us when we find that this very renunciation produces a jouissance 
of its own.45 Alternatively, it might directly demand that we “enjoy” knowing that we can 
never satisfy this itch. In Stalinism, the social law itself begins to function like the superego 
because it takes a similarly paradoxical form of demanding something that is inevitable, that 
we have no escape from. Žižek articulates this logic as follows: ‘you must because it is 
objectively necessary!’46 In a nod to the superegoistic character of Kant’s categorical 
imperative and the universal nature of the dialectical laws of History, Žižek describes the 
‘Stalinist “categorical imperative”’ as “it is your duty to realise a process governed by laws 
that are independent of your will!”47
The superegotisation of the social law results from the position of the Party within the
university discourse. As the point of intersection between S1 and S2, total authority and the 
total knowledge of reality, the Party has the power to define the contours and limits of social 
41 Žižek, SH, p.160.
42 ‘Nothing forces anyone to enjoy, except the superego. The superego is the imperative of jouissance – Enjoy!’ 
Lacan, Seminar XX, p.3.
43 Žižek, SH, p.160.
44 Žižek, LA, pp.150-2.
45 Žižek, SH, p.160.
46 Žižek, SH, p.160.
47 Žižek, SH, p.160.
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reality. As we have seen with the category of the People, it can decide who is included and 
excluded from the social body. The result is that it leaves any particularity — objet a in the 
position of the other in the Stalinist university discourse — in an impossible position, totally 
subordinated to the All as defined and described by the Party. This perverse logic culminates 
in the Stalinist show trials where the Party constituted all necessity and operated like the 
superego imperative. 
For the accused, it was as if there was no “reality” outside the superego of 
the Party, outside its obscene and malevolent imperative; the only 
alternative to this superego imperative was the void of the abominable Real, 
the confession that the Party demanded was the only way for them to avoid 
the “loss of reality.”48
The obscene impossibility of this demand on the subject achieves its purest form with the 
subject who decides to confess, demonstrating its adherence to the Party’s reality, only to find
that in doing so they are also excluded as a traitor. The psychotic structure in operation here 
is revealed more patently when this logic is confronted from the perspective of the individual 
subject. Where does this leave the subject outside of the decision of the Party? Precisely, in 
the non-space of nowhere. There is only the inescapable, suffocating, all-encompasing Other 
of the Party, simultaneously demanding every fibre of the subject’s being, even as that 
subject is deemed worthless. Žižek calls this the post-tragic character of the Stalinist victim.49
The accused of the show trials were not even given the dignity of retaining their own 
authenticity, their own being, a, but, rather, were reduced to a pure substanceless scrap, $.
48 Žižek, SH, p.161.
49 Žižek, DSST?, p.97.
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2.3. The Party as Fetish, the Subject as Pervert
The crucial political insight that Žižek draws from his analysis of socialism and Stalinism as 
the discourse of the university is the problematic position and power of the Party. Its 
extraordinary role can be viewed insofar as it sustains the central dynamics of the discourse 
of the university. As we have seen, the Party is both legitimated by its access to this 
knowledge at the same time that it also operates to constitute this knowledge and its 
objectivity in its role as the master, S1. With regard to its relationship to subjects, the Party 
not only has the power to deprive them of everything, reducing them to the “waste” of 
History, but also, as we will see shortly, legitimate their actions. 
What gives the Party this incredible political and social force is its position. For 
Žižek, the Party occupies the role of the fetish in its relationship to the Other in the precise 
analytical sense of a signifier that operates as the repudiation of castration at the same time 
that it stands in for the Other. What differentiates the fetish from a “normal” master-signifier 
can be revealed by drawing a comparison with the phallic signifier. The phallic signifier also 
functions as a point of universality. It is the paradoxical point that both stands for universality
— in the discursive context, “meaning” — at the same time that it indicates a lack — a point 
of emptiness, or nonsense. As such, the phallic signifier is, in the last instance, always a 
signifier without signified.50 The fetish is a similar phallic element, however, the crucial 
difference between it and the phallic signifier is that it disavows this castrative dimension and
stands for the Other without lack or absence. That is to say, the empty place that the phallic 
signifier indicates is lost when the fetish occupies this position.  As such, the fetish enacts a 
direct “short-circuit” to the Universal without passing through the lack. As Žižek puts it: ‘[i]n
fetishism, the phallic signifier, is immediately established as All.’51 
50 Žižek, “Fetish,” pp.70-1.
51 Žižek, “Fetish,” p.71.
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For Žižek, then, the Party is a fetish insofar as it is a particular that is “immediately” 
the Universal, rather than the stand-in for the absent universal. Žižek contends that this is 
clear when we consider the political function of the Party and its relation to the elements that 
it represents and embodies.
[N]ext to and other than classes, social strata, social groups and subgroups, 
and their economic, political and ideological organizations, that constitute in
a group the different parts of the socio-historical universe ruled by the 
objectives of social development, existed, furthermore, the Party — the 
immediate and individual incarnation of these objective laws, the short 
circuit, the paradoxical intersection between the subjective will and 
objective laws.52
The position of the Party as a fetish is reflected at an epistemological level insofar as its 
members are assumed to have access to the perspective of what Žižek calls “metalanguage,” 
a form of “god’s eye view,” a “view from nowhere” inasmuch as the subject of the Party is 
conceived to be exempt from the universal substance of differences and able to preside over 
and pass judgement upon them, overlooking their own inherently ‘partial position of 
enunciation.’53 The Party, then, is thought to have a similar status to the traditional conception
of the Hegelian philosopher since it is believed to be the embodiment of the universal that 
also knows the totality of the objective state of social reality. In other words, it is the self-
knowing pinnacle and embodiment of the objective laws of History.54 
The crucial political point stemming from Žižek’s critique of Stalinism is that this 
amounts to the fundamental position, and mistake, of every totalitarian politics. As Žižek puts
it, totalitarianism ‘does not draw its legitimacy from some extra-societal body, but by 
52 Žižek, “Fetish,” pp.67-8, SH, p.186.
53 Žižek, FTKN, p.125.
54 Žižek, SH, p.186.
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granting an element of society itself (class, race, or even religion in the form of a force of 
society) the role of the immediate embodiment of the universal interests of Society.’55 In the 
case of Stalinism, this particular element is the fetish of the Party. While Žižek will later draw
back from the critique of totalitarianism as he is sceptical as to its value as anything other 
than part of a liberal democratic blackmail, he nevertheless continues to hold that the 
fetishistic position of the Party, or, for that matter, any other political actor or organisation, is 
inherently problematic and must be avoided by any future radical political project.56 
At this point, one might be ask what produces the totalitarian position? That is, why 
does a particular element think it can stand-in for the All? Ultimately, for Žižek what causes 
this misrecognition is the emergence of an all encompassing socio-political fantasy. Indeed, 
as Žižek writes in The Most Sublime Hysteric (2014[1988]), in totalitarianism it is the social 
fantasy ‘that is in power.’57
Following Lacan, Žižek argues that the purpose of fantasy is to fill out the lack in the 
Other. In terms of the sexual relationship of individuals, the fantasy would function to realise 
sexual rapport between two individuals, while concealing the impossibility of a wholly 
harmonious relationship.58 At the level of political ideology, social fantasy functions in a 
similar manner. Its primary function is to cover over the Real of antagonism — the essential 
rupture that characterises all socio-symbolic orders. To put it in different terms, in the 
ideological field socio-political fantasies realise the utopia of a class rapport, in which each 
group and element have a defined and specific place within a harmonious social totality. In 
Žižek’s paradigmatic example, the social fantasy of fascism realises the relationship of a 
55 Žižek, SH, p.191.
56 Žižek, PV, p.380.
57 Žižek, SH, p.155.
58 Žižek, SH, p.152.
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corporatist society by way of the displacement of antagonism onto the figure of the Jew, 
which in turn becomes a knot of obscene jouissance within the fascist community.59 
The Party’s fantasy works in a similar manner. It functions as the realisation of the 
impossible Other that legitimises the Party’s position. That is to say, the fantasy of the Party 
is the totality of History articulated as the objective laws of development that dialectical 
materialism describes, or, in a different context, the fantasy of the People that the Party 
embodies. What differs in the case of the Party’s fantasy in comparison to other social 
fantasies is that it does not only cover and obscure the lack, but, rather, through the Party’s 
position as a fetish comes to directly rule all aspects of society. As such, the Party’s fantasy is
a perverse fantasy, which Lacan describes as a fantasy with an “inverted” form.60 The 
inversion that Lacan speaks of can be seen with regard to how the subject relates to fantasy. 
With the perverse fantasy, the subject does not see itself as a subject but ‘determines [itself] 
as object.’61 For Žižek, the political implications of the perverse fantasy can be seen in how 
the subject determines itself as the instrument of the fantasy of the Other and, as a result, is 
ready to sacrifice all for the Cause. As a result, the Stalinist Communist is ready to undertake 
all kinds of otherwise horrible acts for the sake of the Other. As Žižek argues, the Stalinist 
Communist ‘adopts the position of the pure instrument of the big Other’s Will: it’s not my 
responsibility, it’s not I who am actually doing it, I am merely an instrument of a higher 
Historical Necessity.’62 The obscene jouissance of its sacrifice can be sustained and tolerated 
by the subject precisely because it is not their enjoyment; rather, it is displaced onto the 
fantasmatic Other. 
59 see Žižek, SOI, pp.140-4, IDLC, pp.260-2.
60 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 
London: Norton (1998) p.185.
61 Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, p.185.
62 Žižek, DSST?, p.112.
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For Žižek, the perverse fantasy empowers the Party to take the fetishistic position 
which leads to the disastrous character of Stalinism as a university discourse. With regard to 
its misrecognition of its performative function and its metalinguistic perspective, the fantasy 
operates to justify the Party’s position. On the basis of the fantasy, it is said that ‘[w]hen the 
communist speaks and acts as a communist, it is the objective necessity of history itself that 
speaks and acts through his body.’63 In both cases, fantasy thus provides a form of 
“ontological cover” justifying the Party’s horrific acts and its superegoistic demands on the 
basis of its supposed insight into historical necessity. Moreover, it gives to the Party what 
seems to be its extraordinary character, admitted by Stalin when he writes, citing Lenin: “We 
Communists are a people of a special mould. We are made of a special stuff.”64 From Žižek’s 
Lacanian perspective, this special stuff is objet petit a, the fantasmatic stuff that allows it to 
become the impossible incarnate of the non-existent Other.65 That is to say, as objet a, the 
Stalinist communist is the object misperceived as the Thing, as Žižek defines the sublime 
object of an ideological system.66 For Žižek, Stalin’s admission is not merely ideological 
propaganda or a matter of political aesthetics. Rather, it describes the fantasmatic support that
enables the disasters of Stalinism. 
2.4. Marx's Fantasy
For Žižek, the socio-political role of fantasy is pivotal for understanding Stalinism as an 
ideological phenomena and a discursive structure. As aforementioned, according to Žižek’s 
63 Žižek, SH, p.188.
64 Joseph V. Stalin, History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik): Short Course. (1939) 
[Online] accessed from: http://marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch04.htm accessed on 
29.3.11. Last accessed on: 13.2.2015.
65 Žižek, SOI, p.234.
66 Žižek, FA, p.30. The logic of the objet petit a, as Žižek writes, is ‘the original lost object which in a way 
coincides with its own loss, it is precisely the embodiment of this void,’ Žižek, SOI, pp.178, 54.
41
Žižek's Lacanian Critique
Lacanian analysis, its centrality to the Party’s power and the inverted form it took worked to 
produce some of the great tragedies of emancipatory leftist politics in the twentieth century. 
If Žižek is going to return to this tradition, then, it is crucial to identify the source of its 
previous errors. It is for this reason that an engagement with the work of Marx is vital for 
Žižek. He argues that the fantasmatic legitimacy of a revolutionary politics can be traced 
back to his work. While this does not mean that Stalinism can be wholly reduced to the texts 
of Marx, or Engels or Lenin, as some of Žižek’s contemporaries have argued,67 Žižek 
nevertheless thinks that Marx’s errors played a significant role in the disasters of Stalinism. 
Essentially, while Žižek has several issues with Marx’s work there is one error that results 
from Marx’s incomplete critique of Utopianism that is central to Žižek’s critique. We will 
call this “Marx’s fantasy.” 
For Žižek, Marxist theory is defined by its metapolitical character. Žižek takes this 
category from Jacques Rancière’s typology of political forms in Disagreement (1999).68 For 
Rancière, “metapolitics” is a deficient form of politicisation because it legitimises and limits 
the political moment on the basis of some objective knowledge. For Žižek, as with Rancière, 
metapolitics is deficient because it does not allow the politicisation of this knowledge. As a 
form of metapolitics, Žižek argues that “scientific socialism” politicised a whole field of 
previously apolitical relations, but, nevertheless, also limited this politicisation insofar as it 
reduced politics to merely the determined superstructure of an economic base. As such, Žižek
argues that it was characterised by a “cancellation” of politics at the very point at which it 
limited the political moment to an effect of certain objective socio-economic processes. As 
67 See for example, Michel Foucault, “Power and Strategies” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and 
Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, Kate Soper, 
New York: Pantheon (1980) pp.134-145.
68 For Rancière’s discussion of metapolitics within the typology of politics proper, archepolitics and parapolitics
see Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, trans. Julie Rose, London: University of 
Minnesota Press (1999) pp.81-93.
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Žižek argues, Marxist metapolitics reduced the political moment to a ‘shadow theatre for 
events on another scene.’69 A prime example of the repression of the political moment can be 
seen in how classical Marxism attempts to discredit the supposedly partial gaze of ideological
knowledge — limited by class position or role in the economic processes — with a 
revolutionary knowledge supposedly based upon an objective knowledge of the totality of 
socio-economic processes.70 The metapolitical thrust of Marxism was also reflected in the 
very premise of a “scientific socialism” which, as Žižek argues, aimed for ‘the transformation
of the “administration of people” into the “administration of things” within a fully self-
transparent rational order of collective will.’71 While Marxist theory did not directly institute 
the socialist university discourse, as we can see from its metapolitical character, its political 
form was wholly amenable to it. 
For Žižek, this metapolitical form was the result of the specific form of fantasy that 
was at its heart: the big Other of History. This fantasy can be traced back to a theoretical error
that resulted from the incomplete critique of utopianism in Marx’s work. Rather, according to
Žižek’s critique, the error of Marx’s work occurs at precisely the point at which the latter 
attempted to escape the idealism of utopian socialism. Marx’s critique of utopianism remains 
incomplete because it focuses upon only one form of utopianism. In the Communist 
Manifesto (2002) Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels argue that the mistake of utopian socialism 
resides in its failure to fully comprehend the historical tendencies that direct and set the 
parameters of the form and goal of political action. As a result of this mistake the utopians 
conceive of socialism as the realisation of a “true Idea,” some eternal and universal basis that 
is common to All humankind. As Marx and Engels put it, utopians attempt to realise 
69 Žižek, TS, p.224.
70 Žižek, TS, p.227.
71 Žižek, TS, p.224.
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socialism not on the basis of ‘true requirements, but the requirements of Truth; not the 
interests of the proletariat, but the interests of Human Nature, of Man in general, who belongs
to no class, as not reality, who exists only in the misty realm of philosophical fantasy.’72
For Marx and Engels, then, the problem with utopian socialism is a result of an 
epistemological and political error at its centre.73 Their failure to conceive of socialism on the
basis and as a consequence of already existing historical transformations and socio-political 
struggles leads utopian socialists to rely on a metaphysical truth as the basis of the future. As 
well as making it difficult to conceive of the transition to socialism, other than as a society 
created by some great parental figure and handed down to the people, the utopian position 
seems likely to base this future society on some historical bourgeois element that is 
misrecognised as eternal truth.
For Žižek, however, Marx and Engels do not push the critique of utopianism far 
enough. He argues that in their response to the utopian socialists there are two equally 
problematic forms of utopian thinking inherent to their own conception of socialism. The first
form of problematic utopianism in Marx and Engels’s work is found in the dialectics of 
revolutionary transformation that they employ to conceive of the passage to socialism. The 
passage that Žižek most frequently refers to in this instance is Marx’s necessitarian and 
evolutionist claim that Mankind ‘inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, 
since close examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the 
material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation.’74
72 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, trans. Samuel Moore, London: Penguin (2002) 
p.249-250. See also Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, in MECW, vol.5, New York: 
Progress Publishers (1976) pp. 455-7.
73 See Avineri Schlomo, Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
(1968) pp.148-9, 67-68.
74 Karl Marx, “Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,” in MECW, vol.29. New York: 
Progress Publishers (1987) p.263.
44
Žižek's Lacanian Critique
In this particular understanding of revolutionary transformation, Marx and Engels 
conceive of the forces of production as the drivers of historical development and the 
determinate factor of the form of the relations of production. In what was to become the basis
of the base-superstructure relationship that characterised the position of orthodox Marxism, 
increased productive capability was assumed to produce a conflict between the forces and the
relations of production found in the contradiction between private property and already-
socialised production, which produces the conditions for revolution and the basis for 
socialism, the social formation that resolves this problem by establishing the relations of 
production proper to the development of the forces of production. If the capitalist form of 
private ownership is responsible for capitalism’s crisis riven nature, then socialism will 
deliver a society which is rational, productive, without crisis or waste.
For Žižek, Marx and Engels’s conception of socialism is problematically utopian 
insofar as it assumes a big Other of History, in the form of some extra-historical logic that is 
presumed to work to produce the revolution that leads to socialism and determines its form. 
We have already seen the faith in this logic emerge in the fantasy of the Party as one aspect 
of the knowledge that operated in “really existing socialism” qua university discourse and as 
the basis of the perverse misrecognition of the communist revolutionary.  According to Žižek,
conceiving of socialism in this way is also problematic insofar as deriving socialism from the 
symbolic contents of capitalism produces an ideological utopianism by virtue of the fact that 
they are conceiving of the form of socialism on the basis of a central aspect of capitalism. As 
such, Žižek argues that the Marxist conception of socialism was ultimately a capitalist 
fantasy. We have already seen that fantasy describes an imaginary scenario that realises a 
totality without its necessary “impossibility” qua the Real of its antagonism. For Žižek, 
socialism was precisely such a fantasy insofar as it was conceived as the capitalist forces of 
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production without the fetters of private property. That is to say, as conceived by Marx, 
socialism was capitalism minus its “impossibilities,” the productive forces that guaranteed the
‘incessant development’ of productive capability without their contradictions.75 As Žižek 
writes:
in a way, the critics of Communism were right when they claimed that 
Marxian Communism is an impossible fantasy — what they did not 
perceive is that Marxian Communism, this notion of a society of pure 
unleashed productivity outside the frame of Capital, was a fantasy inherent 
to capitalism itself, the capitalist inherent transgression at its purest, a 
strictly ideological fantasy of maintaining the thrust towards productivity 
generated by capitalism, while getting rid of the “obstacles” and 
antagonisms that were - as the sad experience of “actually existing 
capitalism” demonstrates - the only possible framework of the actual 
material existence of a society of permanent self-enhancing productivity.76
The consequences of this fantasy were pervasive and lasting. In “Dialectical and Historical 
Materialism,” Stalin develops Marx’s standard schema, legitimating Soviet Socialism by 
arguing that it is ‘free from exploitation’ and the irrationalities and absurdities of capitalist 
crisis and waste as a result of the accelerated rates of development now that the capitalist 
fetters to growth have been removed.77 Of course, the image presented by Stalin is an attempt 
to both justify and obscure the reality of oppression, waste, exploitation and alienation that 
was all too patent in socialism. But it also confirms that “really existing socialism” did not 
represent a break from capitalism but, instead, an attempt to realise its own fantasy.78 This 
becomes all too evident when we look towards its productivity obsessed developmental 
75 Žižek, SOI, p.53.
76 Žižek, FA, pp.18, 19.
77 Stalin, “Dialectical and Historical Materialism,” p.39.
78 Žižek, LITET, p.188.
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policy, and the fetishisation of Stakhanovite figures, the work camp and the five-year plan. 
For Žižek, as a result, socialism was based on a fantasy that was little more than the symptom
of capitalism. 
The second form of utopian thinking that Marx and Engels failed to identify and 
overcome in their work is perhaps even more problematic insofar as it laid the ground for the 
totalitarian misrecognition of the Party. For Žižek, the problem with Marx’s utopianism was 
not only that it was a capitalist fantasy. Rather, Žižek argues we must also call into question 
Marx’s utopian thinking insofar as its very form was fantasmatic due to the fact that it 
conceived of the future society of socialism as a rational, harmonious whole, a society 
without a symptom.79 This fantasy is found, for example, in Marx’s belief that the end of 
capitalism will inaugurate a qualitatively new stage of history.80 For Žižek, on the contrary, it 
is impossible to overcome the dimension of the Real qua antagonism because all societies are
characterised by a point of historical excess and contestation. The belief that this Real can be 
abolished or that some social reality can escape from it is always the taking hold of fantasy in
the subject. For Žižek, the conception of socialism within Marx’s work that formed the 
utopian imaginary of orthodox Marxism and, ultimately, Stalinism exemplifies such a 
fantasy. Moreover, it was this form of fantasy of an All that was wielded by the Party to 
legitimate its rule and justify its position as a fetish. Only on these grounds could the Party 
conceive of itself as the direct embodiment of the interests of the People. As a result, Žižek 
conceives of the violence of Stalinism as, in part, a result of this initial mistake in Marx’s 
work. As Žižek rather dramatically puts it:  ‘“Real Socialism” is the price paid in blood for 
misunderstanding the dimension of phantasy in scientific socialism.’81
79 Žižek, SH, p.137.
80 Marx, “Preface,” p.264.
81 Žižek, SH, p.153.
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2.5. Conclusion
In this chapter we have outlined Žižek’s Lacanian critiques of Stalinism and Marxism, and 
have demonstrated the connection between Marxist theory and the social order it played a 
part in creating. Žižek’s analysis is not only important in terms of understanding Stalinism, 
however. Given Žižek’s subsequent return to Marxism and Communism, this critique should 
also be understood as part of the political conditions on which this return is based. In terms of
the Party, Žižek argues that its fetishistic character results in the destructive logic of Stalinism
on the basis that, like the fetish, it attempted to deny the antagonism that constitutes every 
social order. In his critique of Marxism, Žižek finds its theoretical error in a fantasy of a big 
Other that resulted from Marx’s incomplete critique of utopianism.  For Žižek, as we will 
eventually see, any future Marxism must avoid these errors. Indeed, after Žižek’s Marxist 
turn, his critiques remain in place, as does much of its Lacanian conceptual architecture. As 
such, Žižek will have to address and navigate around these problems if his work is to be taken
seriously alongside his critique of Marxism and Stalinism. Given the disaster of socialism and
the failures of Marxism in the twentieth century there can be no return to Marxist orthodoxy, 
according to Žižek. Žižek’s Marxism, thus, will have to find a way to offer a political vision 
that does not delimit the political moment in the way that metapolitics does, and he will have 
to offer a conception of an alternative society that does not think its primary purpose is the 
rational management of the whole. Moreover, Žižek will have to conceive of a theory and 
practice of revolutionary critique and transformation that operates without the reliance on 
fantasy, and that accepts the lack and antagonism of every social order.
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Chapter 3: Žižekian Radical Democracy
and its Discontents
3.1. Introduction
In the conclusion to the previous chapter we positioned Žižek’s critiques of Stalinism and 
Marxism as part of the conditions for his later return to and rejuvenation of Marxist 
philosophy and politics. I argued that any return to Marxism would have to navigate these 
problems if it was committed to avoiding the repetition of this emancipatory political 
tradition’s failures during the twentieth century. Yet, Žižek has not, strictly speaking, always 
been committed to this project of renewal. 
Prior to his Marxist-turn, Žižek’s Lacanian critique of Stalinism and Marxism was a 
key component of his argument for a “radical” democratic politics, which, he argued, was 
suitably equipped to resolve these problems. In The Most Sublime Hysteric and The Sublime 
Object of Ideology Žižek developed a theory of radical democracy that offered a way beyond 
the fantasmatic politics of totalitarianism. In these works Žižek argues that the great strength 
of democracy is that it is a form of political organisation that accepts and foregrounds the 
impossibility of occupying the position of universality and abolishing the antagonism that 
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characterises all social structures, the positions that Stalinism destructively attempted to 
realise through the Party’s position as a fetish. 
The question that this chapter attempts to answer is why this radical democratic 
position proved unsatisfactory for Žižek?  Writing in the years shortly before the victory of 
the movements for democracy within the socialist bloc, in these early works Žižek presents 
democracy as the final solution to our political troubles. But yet, by 1991 doubts begin to 
creep into his work. For They Know What They Do (2008[1991) and Tarrying With The 
Negative (1993) both indicate an increasingly sceptical view about whether a radical liberal 
democracy really is the final and only form of the organisation of political power, and, 
indeed, Žižek begins to suspect that democracy might be complicit in new forms of 
destructive political enjoyment and far less able to ensure that the lack in the Other is 
maintained than he initially thought.  
In this chapter I will consider Žižek’s radical democratic politics and explore why it 
became only a temporary solution to conceiving of an alternative mode of political 
organisation to totalitarianism. After outlining Žižek’s theory of radical democracy as a 
potential solution to the temptation of totalitarian politics, I explore the conditions for and 
reasons that lead Žižek to his stark political volte-face and return to a form of Marxism and 
the philosophy of dialectical materialism, which he announced initially in Metastases of 
Enjoyment. In order to achieve this I will trace the development of Žižek’s increasingly 
critical stance with regard to democratic politics in light of the limitations of really existing 
democracy and the political challenges that emerged in the post-socialist world. Alongside 
this, I will identify a certain deadlock in his own Lacanian position that characterises his early
work. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to outline the historical and inter-theoretical 
challenges that provide the additional conditions of his change of political allegiance and 
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philosophical re-framing. In doing so, I will address one of the central aims of this project by 
demonstrating that, far from a mere whim on Žižek’s behalf, his Marxism, and the 
subsequent development of a Marxist dialectical materialism was, contra Laclau (2000), 
based on a series of clearly locatable “political reflections” which guided and subsequently 
shaped the development and deployment of his dialectical materialism and new modes of 
critical analysis and political strategy. 
3.2. Žižekian Radical Democracy
In Sublime Object Žižek claims an allegiance to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's radical 
democratic political project articulated in their highly influential work Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy (2001). The support is reciprocated by Ernesto Laclau who writes an 
enthusiastic and complementary introduction to Žižek’s book. Žižek’s democratic politics 
demonstrates several points of overlap with that of Laclau and Mouffe’s, including the 
conception of the necessity of antagonism in every construction of social structure, the 
dismissal of the totalitarian position of a unified and singular conception of the good, and the 
critique of Marxist class essentialism in which it plays the role of the transcendental signified 
of all ideology. 
However, there were always clear and crucial differences between Žižek’s and Laclau
and Mouffe’s radical democracy. Most important among these was Žižek’s apparent 
scepticism with regard to the strategic pluralism of radical democracy proposed by Laclau 
and Mouffe. For Laclau and Mouffe, radical democracy was an attempt to deepen and 
expand1 the egalitarian and equivalential logics that characterise liberal democratic politics by
multiplying its spaces of contestation and by creating hegemonic blocks of diverse groups 
1 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, p.167.
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and interests.2 By way of contrast, Žižek retains a much more classically liberal democratic 
conception of democracy privileging the electoral process and its reduction of subjects to 
atomised individuals deciding the fate of society at the ballot box. The great strength of 
democratic politics, according to Žižek, is that it ensures that the place of power is rendered 
empty. 
In this sense, Žižek’s radical democratic position seems to be closer, in fact, to Claude
Lefort’s conception of democracy than Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of radical 
democracy. In The Political Forms of Modern Society (1985) Lefort argues that the 
recognition of the empty space of political power by democratic peoples can be considered as
the pivotal political shift in modernity. In democracy, every occupant of this space is a 
temporary and contingent incumbent whose power and authority has no transcendent 
guarantee.3 As Claude Lefort puts it: ‘The legitimacy of power is based on the people; but the
image of popular sovereignty is linked to the image of an empty place, impossible to occupy, 
such that those who exercise public authority can never claim to appropriate it.’4 The 
Lefortian conception of democracy proves eminently useful to Žižek because it directly 
addresses what his critique of totalitarianism found problematic within it. Democracy ensures
that no one, not even the People, can occupy the place of Power. Re-purposing St. Just’s 
famous quip, Žižek argues democracy is the society in which “one cannot rule innocently”5 
whereas the function of the notion of “the People” in the “People’s democracies” of the 
socialist states was precisely to ensure that the Party could “rule innocently.” In these states, 
as Žižek writes, ‘Power is exercised in the name of the People as a positive, existing entity, 
which means that the person wielding Power no longer occupies a necessarily empty 
2 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, pp.105, 133.
3 Claude Lefort The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism, ed. J.B. 
Thompson, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1985), pp.303-4.
4 Lefort, The Political Forms of Modern Society, p.279.
5 Žižek, SH, p.192.
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position.’6 According to Žižek, the pivotal feature of actual existing democracy, on the other 
hand, is that the person who occupies the place of power is no more than a “place-holder” of 
an empty, open space. 
It is here that genuine open elections become a pivotal part of Žižek’s conception of 
democracy. Their function is to ensure that the empty place of power remains empty and 
demonstrate the non-existence of the People as a homogenous, unified mass. How is this so? 
For Žižek, while there is a sovereign moment in democratic elections the way that they are 
conducted means that we do not get “the People” but its dissolution in to a ‘dispersed 
collection of “citizens,” atomized individuals.’7 “The People” of a democratic society, thus, 
retains a negative moment even as it expresses a certain sovereign will. As a result, while 
elections coordinate and ensure the legitimacy of a particular body and set of interests by 
giving them the right to occupy the place of Power, they also demonstrate that the occupant’s 
legitimacy is contingent, incomplete and temporary. 
For Žižek, the key feature of democratic society is this moment of legitimation-
dissolution. Democratic society names ‘a society that has an institutional structure whose 
“normal,” “regular” cycle of reproduction includes a moment when symbolic ties disappear, 
and therefore when the Real erupts: elections.’8 Žižek conceives of this moment of eruption 
as the intervention of pure chance, contingency, a fundamentally irrational awakening when 
society puts itself at risk. That is to say, compared to the totalitarian suppression of the Real, 
which we have seen Žižek criticise at a number of levels, the key strength of liberal 
democracy is that it has found a way to ensure that this Real is foregrounded in the 
6 Žižek, SH, p.192.
7 Žižek, SH, p.192.
8 Žižek, SH, p.193. 
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institutional arrangement of a society. From his Lacanian perspective, liberal democracy is a 
far more effective political system. 
Žižek’s focus on liberal democratic elections, however, raises a question as to why he 
considers his position “radical” in any usual sense of the term? That is, why is Žižek’s 
Lacanian conception of democratic elections considered “radical,” as opposed to a mere 
variation of the standard liberal democratic kind? Žižek does not address this question 
directly, but as he develops his position it would seem that two aspects of his conception of 
democracy could plausibly be considered as candidates for his claim that it is “radical.” First, 
Žižek argues that the “risk” inherent to liberal democracy is necessary. We must have the 
most liberal and open forms of elections possible so that this moment of “irrationality” can be
fully felt, and power left to the absolute whim of isolated individuals.9 To do this, Žižek 
suggests that regulation of the democratic moment must be minimalised as much as possible. 
Second, Žižek makes an argument for the propagation of a certain radical democratic attitude 
and ethics among subjects. We might call this Žižek’s “democratic imaginary”, that is, the 
acceptance at an ideological level of the constitutively irrational and contingent nature of the 
democratic moment as well as the empty space of power. As Žižek argues with regards to the 
danger that the democratic imaginary is set up to combat, we must accept that ‘we always 
live in an interspace and in borrowed time; every solution is provisional and temporary, a 
kind of postponing of a fundamental impossibility.’10
3.2.1. The Totalitarian Temptation and the Democratic Imaginary
The democratic imaginary is important within Žižek’s radical democratic theory, because it 
combats what Laclau and Mouffe describe as the Jacobin Imaginary qua the belief in 
9 Žižek, SH, p.193.
10 Žižek, SOI, p.xxix.
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realising the illusory prospect ‘of a perfectly unitary and homogenous collective will that will
render pointless the moment of politics.’11 For Žižek, this belief also characterises the 
metapolitical tendency of Marxism and is at the root of the efficacy of Marx’s fantasy that 
also characterised Stalinism. More generally, Žižek characterises the Jacobin position as a 
belief that ‘the global solution-revolution is the condition of the effective solution of all 
particular problems.’12 
We can address here a question regarding Žižek’s concern about the political efficacy 
of socio-ideological fantasy. We have already seen the disastrous results that occur when this 
fantasy takes hold at a political level, but it bears asking why precisely this fantasy is so 
attractive to subjects? Whereas for Laclau and Mouffe the political fantasy that characterises 
the “Jacobin Imaginary” was a kind of political naiveté, a miscalculation of past pre-
deconstructive Reason, for Žižek it is a constant danger because it has a connection with the 
fundamental structure of subjectivity. The subject is always tempted to embrace a fantasy of 
wholeness or unity because of their fundamental libidinal structure.
Thus far, we have associated the subject and the signifier with castration and its 
disavowal through fetishism. At a libidinal level, however, castration describes the “loss” of 
jouissance — qua the substance of the subject’s being — that the subject is forced to forego 
upon becoming a “parlêtre”, a being of language. Following Lacan’s account of the subject, 
Žižek argues that the subject emerges only through the evacuation of their libidinal substance.
As Žižek puts it, access to life ‘is paid for with the loss of enjoyment.’13 Upon entry into the 
symbolic order, the subject must accept the impossibility of jouissance as substantial pre-
symbolic Real qua Thing. In the paradigmatic example of the male child’s entry into the 
11 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, p.2.
12 Žižek, SOI, p.xxix.
13 Žižek, SOI, pp.73, see also p.136-8.
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heteronormative family unit, the maternal Thing is prohibited, along with other female family
members, thereby ending the subject’s pre-symbolic unity with the Mother. The upshot of 
“successful” castration is that the initial “loss” is partly compensated for at the level of desire.
In the same way that if the prohibition of incest is accepted the male child has access to all 
other females as objects of desire, the subject is compensated for the prohibition of the 
‘Thing-jouissance’ by certain substitute objects, objet petit a, so that enjoyment is ‘regained 
on the ladder of desire.’14 These objects are the embodiment of the subject’s lack, and 
function as a kind of absent Cause that delivers to the subject some modicum of “surplus-
jouissance.” However, as Žižek emphasises, despite this compensation the subject is always 
haunted by this original loss which persists in the form of a ‘traumatic kernel’ a dimension in 
the human subject that, following Lacan, Žižek names the “death drive.” The death drive is a 
form of repetition of this initial loss and emerges as ‘a fascination with a lethal Thing.’15 The 
death drive can be associated with death because embracing the promise of the lethal Thing 
leads to the destruction of the subject at a symbolic level. If the subject of the signifier is 
based on the initial castrative process, then reversing this process leads to the return to the 
pre-symbolic, a-social state that is understood in psychoanalytic terms as psychosis. Žižek 
describes the Thing in terms of a horrible and horrifying plenitude of jouissance.16 At the 
level of the subject it leads to catastrophe, ‘radical self-annihilation,’17 and the destruction of 
‘the symbolic texture through which so-called reality is constituted’18
For Žižek, this fascination with the Thing has a political correlate in the Jacobin 
Imaginary. We can see here how Žižek goes beyond Laclau and Mouffe’s critique of 
14 Žižek, TWN, p.170.
15 Žižek, SOI, p.204.
16 Žižek, SOI, p.146.
17 Žižek, LA, p.64.
18 Žižek, SOI, p.147.
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totalitarianism, and why he conceives of the totalitarian temptation as one that always stalks 
the political realm. This “imaginary” is not just a mistaken political calculation or a result of 
a faulty pre-deconstructive rationality, but, rather, a consequence of the constitutive nature of 
desire in the human subject that results in the death drive qua fascination with a deadly, full 
enjoyment or jouissance. For Žižek, in other words, the desire for utopia is always the desire 
for the utopia of desire as the satisfaction and resolution of the constitutive loss that 
characterises the subject. 
To return to Žižek’s critique of Stalinism, he suggests that the psychotisation of the 
Stalinist discourse and the disaster of “really existing socialism” was a result of a similar lust 
for the Thing. Within Stalinism this attraction to the lost Thing can be seen most clearly in 
the incestuous structure of the relationship of the Party to the People through the rejection of 
lack. The incestuous logic of Stalinism is highlighted by Žižek in the following passage in 
The History of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course (2008) 
where Stalin refers to the People as the Mother from which the Party obtain their power and 
their legitimacy.19 
I think that the Bolsheviks remind us of the hero of Greek mythology, 
Antasus. They, like Antasus, are strong because they maintain connection 
with their mother, the masses, who gave birth to them, suckled them and 
reared them. And as long as they maintain connection with their mother, 
with the people, they have every chance of remaining invincible.20 
In Mastering Bolshevism (1945), the pamphlet from which the quote comes from, Stalin 
recounts how the only threat to Antasus was the separation from his Mother. In the 
mythological tale, this was achieved by Hercules who deprived Antasus of the possibility of 
19 Žižek, SH, p.190.
20 Stalin, History of the Communist Party of The Soviet Union (Bolshevik) n.p.
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touching the Earth — of which his Mother was Goddess — by raising him up in the air.21 The
passage is “incestuous” not only in the choice of terms but in the structure between the All —
of Earth, the Mother — and the subject. Moreover, the allusion to “invincibility” suggests an 
access to the All in the form of a plenitude of jouissance that the subject lacks. For Žižek, in 
other words, the totalitarian temptation realised in the totalitarian fantasy and the structure of 
Stalinism is a political attempt to overcome the lack that is constitutive of subjects at both an 
individual and collective level. 
We can now understand with greater clarity why democracy was so important to 
Žižek. The great strength of democratic politics, in comparison to totalitarianism, is that it is a
form of political organisation that maintains the ‘distance toward the Thing.’22 For Žižek, 
democracy is the only social order that achieves what Žižek outlines in Sublime Object as the 
necessary task of all political theory: finding a ‘modus vivendi,’23 with the death drive as a 
constitutive element of the human condition. At the level of political organisation this is 
achieved through democratic elections. This is reflected at the ideological level by the 
democratic imaginary, which, emphasising the lack and the empty nature of the space of 
political power, fosters the acceptance that the Thing ‘is “too hot” to be approached 
closely.’24 In other words, by emphasising lack the democratic attitude accepts the 
impossibility of das Ding and, as such, is seen by Žižek as providing an effective defence 
against the temptation that leads to totalitarianism by relinquishing the lust, at a political 
level, for the maternal Thing.
Žižek’s equation of the political aims of certain ideologies with the libidinal 
dimension of the subject brings into sharper focus the role of the democratic imaginary in 
21 Joseph Stalin, Mastering Bolshevism, New York: New Century Publishers (1945) pp.43-5.
22 Žižek, LA, p.169.
23 Žižek, SOI, p.xxvii-xxviii.
24 Žižek, LA, p.169.
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Žižek’s conception of democracy. The democratic imaginary, in fact, is not only a political 
ideology but an attempt to address the fundamental deadlock of subjectivity. It raises the 
question as to whether the democratic imaginary is really capable of achieving this task. In 
fact, when we consider the democratic imaginary in Žižek’s work more closely, we see that it
clearly mirrors nothing less than the post-fantasmatic perspective of the subject after 
successful psychoanalytic treatment. In terms of psychoanalytic practice within the clinical 
setting “traversing the fantasy” has two aspects. First, confronting the symptom, those 
exceptional objects of desire that point towards some underlying non-knowledge structured 
by fantasy. Second, “going through the fantasy,” where the subject realises ‘how the fantasy-
formation just masks, fills out a certain void, lack, empty place in the Other.’25 The post-
fantasmatic subject, then, can assume the non-existence of the Other and the impossibility of 
resolving the constitutive loss of libidinal substance. If the democratic imaginary is to guard 
against this libidinal danger at the political level, it would seem that it would have to achieve 
what Lacanian psychoanalysis has long conceived to be the result of clinical practice. 
3.3. The Trouble With Democracy...
While Žižek’s theory of democracy seems to effectively address the problems inherent to 
totalitarian politics as well as offer an alternative to them, after 1991 the term radical 
democracy disappears from his work altogether. Alongside this, even in the works that 
immediately follow Sublime Hysteric and Sublime Object, we find Žižek waver and take an 
increasingly critical stance with regard to actually existing liberal democracy. For example, 
while still advocating a democratic position in For They Know Not Žižek nevertheless 
wonders aloud, after reflecting on the process of democratisation after the defeat of socialism 
25 Žižek, SOI, p.80.
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in the German Democratic Republic, whether the Left is ‘condemned to pledge all its forces 
to the victory of democracy?’26 That said, our task for the remaining sections of this chapter is
to attempt to answer the question: why did Žižek find the democratic position he adopted in 
Sublime Object so problematic? In essence, I contend that there are two sets of problems with
Žižek’s conception of radical democracy that are important for understanding both Žižek’s 
change of political allegiance and the re-framing of his Lacanian-Hegelian project as a re-
articulation of dialectical materialism. The first set of problems are internal to his own 
Lacanian-Hegelian understanding of democracy, and touch on some of the conceptual and 
practical difficulties of an effective “Žižekian” radical democracy. The second set emerge as 
a result of Žižek’s reflection on what happened in the new liberal democracies of Eastern-
Europe, which undermines his faith in democratic politics.
3.3.1. The Theoretical Issues With Radical Democracy From a Lacanian 
Perspective
At a theoretical level, the primary problem with Žižek’s theory of radical democracy is its 
equation of democratic elections with the category of the Real. This notoriously tricky 
category has two dominant uses within Žižek’s writing, which he draws attention to when 
speaking of ‘a certain fundamental ambiguity’ that pertains to the notion of the Real.27 As he 
describes this ambiguity: ‘the Real designates a substantial hard kernel that precedes and 
resists symbolization and, simultaneously, it designates the left-over, which is posited or 
produced by symbolization itself.’28 Clearly, democratic elections cannot be conceived of as 
Real in either of these two senses of the term, because they, albeit in different ways, indicate 
26 Žižek, FTKN, p.270.
27 Žižek, TWN, p.36.
28 Žižek, TWN, p.36, see also, SOI, pp.xxvi, 74, 86, 195.
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something that resists or lies beyond the symbolic. The Real of the elections instead is 
something that happens, something that is Real. There is a third sense in which Žižek 
conceptualises the Real which, as we will see in the following chapters, is integral for Žižek’s
project to think through revolutionary political practice, where the symbolic itself is rendered
Real as dispersed, open, inconsistent and without the support of the Other. That is to say, 
where the symbolic rather than an All, is rendered not-all. It would seem this would allow a 
much clearer understanding of what Žižek means when he describes elections as Real and in 
terms of a “dissolution of symbolic ties.” When understood according to this conception of 
the Real, elections would bring about a severing of the connections of structured political 
power and the hierarchy of differences that characterise a social order when the place of 
Power is emptied of its temporary occupants.29 However, to what extent do elections really 
function as Žižek suggests? In the liberal democratic mode that Žižek seems to be alluding to 
with his conception of radical democracy, far from a moment of dissolution, elections are 
always part of a stable set of institutions and social arrangements. Moreover, democratic 
elections work because they are bound by certain symbolic rules and regulations. If these also
dissolved we would no longer be talking about electoral democracy — although a “purer” 
form of democracy might be conceived in this sense. While certain sections of authority and 
power are replaced with each election the wider set of institutional interests and structures 
inherent to democratic societies most certainly still remain in an effective democratic society.
Indeed, Žižek suggests as much when he describes democratic society as “a society that has 
an institutional structure whose “normal,” “regular” cycle of reproduction includes a moment 
when symbolic ties disappear.” As such, it is very difficult to see how Žižek can describe 
elections as Real in the sense that we have suggested — the dissolution of social ties — if this
29 Žižek, SH, p.192, 194.
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Real also relies on maintaining certain social ties. Approaching the problem from another 
angle, when Žižek describes democracy as Real he might mean it in a more normatively 
inclined manner, as in elections should be more like the Real. However, here problems still 
remain. If democracy is supposed to maintain an empty place of power, it is not certain how, 
when understood as a more extensive dissolution, the Real protects the empty seat of power 
becoming occupied permanently. As a result, it becomes very difficult to see how the empty 
place of power is maintained in any meaningful way by an evocation of the Real.30 
The second problem with Žižek’s theory of radical democracy concerns the 
connection of the democratic imaginary with the subject after “going through the fantasy.” As
I suggested above, the connection between the democratic imaginary and the subject’s 
libidinal deadlock seems to suggest that the former resolves the latter at a political level. 
However, given that Žižek suggests that the libidinal deadlock is crucial in the emergence of 
totalitarian fantasies it would seem that the effectiveness of the democratic imaginary could 
only be ensured if it was accompanied by the subject’s successful clinical treatment. The 
effectiveness of the democratic imaginary would require the clinical treatment of the masses. 
If this is what democratic society requires to be successful, it would seem a highly 
unworkable system. 
Alternatively, Žižek might be suggesting that democracy itself serves to institute the 
kind of post-fantasmatic subjectivity that the democratic imaginary is supposed to cultivate. 
But, once again, this seems highly unlikely. In fact, if we consider the relationship between 
political power and political enjoyment, it seems that Žižek’s conception of radical 
democracy has overlooked a key facet of liberal democracies. Far from producing the 
dissolution of socio-political libidinal attachments, in really existing democracies democratic 
30 See also Adam Kotsko’s excellent critique in Žižek and Theology, pp.14-6.
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elections frequently operate to produce and encourage them. Politicians wield fantasies of 
“Nation” or “People,” or their “Enemies,” for the purpose of winning elections. Similarly, far 
from rational debate and the freeing of irrational attachments to political actors, democratic 
elections seem to foster these libidinal attachments in the “political tribalism” and 
“personality cults” that they encourage. On this level, it seems that Žižek is too closely 
wedded to the primarily symbolic conceptions of democratic practice that characterise 
Lefort’s and Laclau and Mouffe's respective conceptions of democracy. For a Lacanian 
politics, surely there must also be a confrontation with the libidinal dimension of the subject’s
relation to political power and authority. This seems to be absent in Žižek’s model of radical 
democracy.
3.3.2. Really Existing Democracy and its Discontents
Žižek’s change in political position and his increasing scepticism towards liberal democratic 
politics was not only the result of the realisation of the theoretical limitations of a Lacanian 
conception of a radical democratic position, however. Žižek’s political reorientation was also 
the result of confronting the reality of “really existing” liberal democracy in light of the 
process of democratisation in Eastern Europe after the fall of socialism. As we have already 
seen, Žižek begins to question the limitations of democratic politics as this process occurs. 
Indeed, the context of the work in which he first raises these questions is telling. For They 
Know Not is composed from a series of lectures that Žižek delivered over the winter of 1989-
1990 in Slovenia to an audience of radicals and academics during the drive for 
democratisation. Žižek raises the question with reference to what was happening in the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR) where he suggests that the greening of democracy 
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appeared as a mere ‘façade’ behind which lay the ‘grey flesh of capital.’31 Citing the GDR 
once again, Žižek states that the democratic moment and the victory of the movements 
against socialism seemed to be only an interregnum for the integration of the territory of 
Eastern Europe ‘into the flux of capital.’32 Reflecting on this process today, Žižek’s concerns,
indeed, seem well founded. The IMF enforced a restructuring of much of Eastern Europe 
during this period, which led to a fire sale of public assets, mass privatisation, hugely 
favourable terms for foreign capital and the introduction of restrictive and repressive labour 
laws. Moreover, it has become evident that many of these decisions took place long before 
the democratic rights and structures demanded by the people had been assured, let alone the 
first elections held.33 As a result, the hopes and optimism regarding what a liberal democratic 
politics might mean — a view that seems to have been shared by Žižek — has now been 
shown to have been wildly misplaced. Dean (2006) explains the situation as follows:
Democracy held out promises of hope and freedom, of arrangements that 
would enable people to determine collectively the rules and practices 
through which they would live their lives. But instead of collective 
governance in the common interest, people in the new democracies got rule 
by capital. Their political choices became constrained within and 
determined by the neoliberal market logics of globalized capitalism already 
dominating Western Europe, Great Britain, and the United States.34 
With regard to Žižek’s previous optimism concerning the possibility held out by liberal 
democracy, the experience of democratisation in Eastern Europe could be said to demonstrate
that, far from empty, the space of political power was already hegemonised by global 
31 Žižek, FTKN, p.271.
32 Žižek, FTKN, p.271.
33 Michael Williams and Geert Reuten “After the rectifying revolution: the contradiction of the mixed 
economy?” in Capital and Class no.49 (1993) p.81.
34 Dean, Žižek’s Politics, p.103.
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capitalism and its agents. Moreover, given the power of transnational capital’s institutions 
and agents, this experience would seem to call into question the effectiveness of the 
democratic “dissolution” that Žižek had previously believed to be a key moment in 
democratic societies. 
In the years that followed Žižek saw further limitations with democratic politics. As 
Žižek experienced first hand in the Balkan nations, the democratisation process saw the rise 
of nationalisms, ethnic hatred and interregional rivalry across former socialist states. This 
socio-political context seems to have focused his perspective on the limitations of liberal 
democratic politics. Writing about the situation in Yugoslavia in 1992 Žižek raises the 
question: ‘Why does authoritarian nationalism overshadow democratic pluralism?’35 
Radically departing from his former position, Žižek highlights how anti-democratic forms of 
libidinally charged ideology were an effective, and frequently necessary supplement, to the 
formal universality of democratic rights.36 In doing so, Žižek appears to confirm our previous 
concern regarding the neglect of questions of the libidinal dimension of politics in his prior 
conception of democratic organisation and practice. 
In his subsequent analysis of Eastern European democracy, Žižek concludes that 
liberal democratic politics is not only insufficient in the face of the power of transnational 
capital, but that it also enables and encourages the mobilisation of “authoritarian” and 
“fundamentalist” forms of fantasy. For Žižek, democratic nations also produce and propagate 
fantasies of wholeness, unity and homogeneity, most commonly in terms of “the national 
Thing”, that is, the fantasies of collectively practiced myths and modes of life that 
characterise the unity of the nation. Far from innocent, Žižek argues that it is the possession 
of the jouissance from the national Thing that plays a key role in the “ethnic tensions” and 
35 Žižek, “Eastern Europe’s Republics of Gilead,” p.59.
36 Žižek, TWN, p.220.
65
Žižekian Radical Democracy
rivalries in Easter Europe. Revising his theory regarding the liberal polis, Žižek argues that 
the modern nation is not in fact able to institute the Real of the democratic process, even if 
liberal democracies successfully reduce individuals to abstract citizens, because the ‘“nation” 
can never be reduced to a network of purely symbolic ties.’37 Rather, the nation is defined by 
‘a kind of “surplus of the Real” that sticks to it’38 and which gives to it its provisional unity. 
In Eastern European liberal democracies Žižek finds this “surplus” in a “national identity” 
coordinated around the national Thing that appeals ‘to the contingent materiality of “common
root,” of “blood and social.”’39 What Žižek’s analysis of Eastern Europe reveals is that liberal
democracies, including radical democracy, overlook this at their peril. It also, however, calls 
into question his prior strict opposition between democracy and totalitarian politics. Far from 
opposites, Žižek’s experience of democratisation in Eastern Europe and the early years of 
democratic life in this region suggests that democracy includes an authoritarian moment in 
the forms of national unity that it evokes which has more than a passing resemblance to the 
totalitarian fantasy that characterised the most disastrous episodes under socialism. 
3.4. Conclusion: Žižek's Theoretical and Political Deadlocks
Žižek proposes his return to the Marxist project of dialectical materialism in 1995 shortly 
after reformulating his position on liberal democracy. Why did he make this move? It is my 
contention that it was precisely a response to the theoretical and political deadlocks that his 
own work faced at this point given the relative failures of his attempt to construct a theory 
and argument for a radical democratic politics.
37 Žižek, “Eastern European Liberalism,” p.38.
38 Žižek, “Eastern European Liberalism,” p.38.
39 Žižek, “Eastern European Liberalism,” p.38.
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Between 1991’s For They Know Not What They Do and 1993’s Tarrying With The 
Negative Žižek comes to the end of what appears to be a theoretical-political cul-de-sac. 
Žižek developed a democratic politics in order to escape the consequences of totalitarianism. 
Yet, after his critique of democracy that alternative is no longer available to him. At a 
political level, while he maintains the importance of the critique of Marxism, the radical 
democratic alternative no longer seems feasible. Moreover, his early analysis of democracy 
that justified his position now appears severely limited, while new issues seem to also 
emerge. Most patently, the explosion of new forms of authoritarian political enjoyment, 
experienced in the flourishing of nationalism in Eastern Europe and elsewhere flooded the 
political form that was supposed to limit them. The limitations of liberal democracy also 
brought with it questions regarding the nature of the liberal democratic state, and its 
relationship to capital and class, which were wholly absent from his analysis during his short-
lived radical democratic phase. 
Yet, if the failure of his radical democratic position meant it was necessary to imagine
political alternatives — as Žižek himself put it: is the Left ‘condemned to pledge all its forces
to the victory of democracy?’40 — at this stage of his work there seemed to be no way to 
imagine and formulate these. For Žižek, the point of democratic politics was that it accepted 
the lack of the Other against the totalitarian Thing. Yet, while he remains resolutely critical of
classical Marxism, he is no longer able to tread a path away from the forever looming 
disasters of totalitarianism via a liberal democratic politics, since, as we have seen, it does not
resolve the problem of the subject’s deadly obsession with jouissance at a political level — 
rather, as we have also seen, democracy seems to manipulate it and even encourage it in some
instances. The alternative to democratic lack, however, is equally problematic. There is, thus, 
40 Žižek, FTKN, p.270.
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a certain theoretical deadlock in Žižek’s early work that seems to leave him unable to 
formulate any viable political alternative. At a theoretical level, the opposition between 
democratic lack and Thing appears insurmountable. The death drive, as the lethal dimension 
of subjectivity, appears the only alternative to the limitations of democratic lack but one that, 
as we have seen, is wholly unpalatable.  
As a result, at both a theoretical and political level Žižek appears caught in an 
intractable deadlock. He is caught between the Scylla and Charybdis of lack and das Ding, 
that is, between limited democratic politics and a catastrophic revolutionism, liberal 
democracy and the fundamentalist Thing, capitalism or catastrophe. Can these positions end 
in anything other than conservatism or political quietism? 
It is my contention that Žižek’s choice of a third-option, a dialectical materialist 
Marxism, represents an attempt to escape from precisely these deadlocks. In doing so, 
however, Žižek sets himself a series of challenges that are staggering in scope. At a 
theoretical level, dialectical materialism would require a re-casting of the opposition between 
death drive and lack in order to overcome this paralysing binary, while he would also have to 
conceive of a new mode of political practice that escapes the opposition of conservatism and 
catastrophe that this binary seems to inevitably invoke. At an analytical and critical level, 
Žižek requires an analysis of late-capitalism at a libidinal, political and economic level to 
explain these new forms of jouissance, the nature of the liberal democratic state, and 
capitalism as such. And, at a political level, if he is going to argue that neither totalitarianism 
nor capitalist liberal democracy are tenable socio-political systems or forms of politics, then, 
Žižek will need to develop an alternative to them that will have to avoid repeating the failures
of traditional Marxism. Moreover, Žižek sets himself these tasks in an era in which it is 
supposed to be impossible to imagine an alternative to capitalism. Far from lacking any 
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meaningful political reflection, Žižek’s Marxism seems immediately overloaded by these 
political and theoretical challenges. 
We have now come to the end of the first part of this thesis and in doing so have laid 
out the deadlocks and challenges that Žižek’s Marxism is an attempt to respond to. The rest 
of this thesis is dedicated to considering these responses. The next section outlines his 
dialectical materialism, with a specific focus on how it addresses the theoretical challenges of
the above deadlock by reinventing a form of theory and practice with these and the failures of
traditional Marxism in mind.
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Chapter 4: Žižek’s Dialectical Materialism
4.1. Introduction
In the politically charged introduction of Parallax View Žižek outlines the role of his Marxist
dialectical materialism with the suggestion that it has been left to philosophy to transform the
recent fortunes of Marxism. Reflecting on Marxism’s continuing travails, he argues that its 
cause has been undermined by a key philosophical deficit. “The crisis of Marxism” Žižek 
states ‘is due not only to the sociopolitical defeats of Marxist movements; at an inherent 
theoretical level, the crisis can (and should) also be indexed through the decline (virtual 
disappearance, even) of dialectical materialism as the philosophical underpinning of 
Marxism.’1 
Coming shortly after Žižek introduces his own strand of dialectical materialism while 
delineating its differences from the materialist “negative” dialectics of an Adornoian 
persuasion – subversive but not revolutionary – and brashly dismissing any associations with 
“classical” diamat – ‘philosophically speaking, Stalinist “dialectical materialism” is 
imbecility incarnate’2 – the suggestion that runs through these passages is the altogether 
1 Žižek, PV, p.6.
2 Žižek, PV, p.5.
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provocative one that it is Žižek’s own form of dialectical materialism that is capable of 
helping Marxism escape from its most recent failures.
In this chapter and the one that follows I will examine Žižek’s dialectical materialism 
as a critical dialectical practice and a theory of revolutionary politics. My argument is that by 
developing a dialectical materialism Žižek is able to navigate out of the dead-end of the 
theoretico-political deadlock of his radical democratic period that I outlined towards the end 
of the last chapter. As a dialectical practice dialectical materialism is a mode of knowing that 
aims to produce a liberating Tuche with the Real that does not produce catastrophe but a 
shocking moment of insight that awakens the subject with a discomforting insight into the 
inexistence of the Other. In the chapter immediately proceeding this one, we will see that this
ambitious dialectical practice is supplemented by a politics of Truth inspired by Alain 
Badiou’s work, that conceives of a politics of the Event, or Act, that similarly navigates the 
dead-end of lack and das Ding.
After outlining the conditions and challenges for the return to Marxist philosophy, 
this chapter outlines how Žižek’s philosophy avoids the metalinguistic problem of classical 
Marxism by adopting the position of the analyst. I then turn to consider Žižek’s dialectical 
practice as a mode of symptomal analysis, identifying three forms of symptom that are 
important in Žižek’s work and the effect that he aims to produce with this practice. Finally, I 
turn to examine how Žižek’s dialectical materialism breaks out of the deadlock of his radical 
democratic phase with a conception of transformation that does not involve a confrontation 
with the abyssal Thing.
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4.2. Learning the Lessons of Marxism Past
Žižek’s dialectical materialism returns to a number of old problems in need of new solutions. 
Even prior to its Stalinist transformations Marxist philosophy was besieged with problems. 
As I demonstrated in chapter 2, the metapolitical stance of Marxism demonstrated an 
unreconstructed presupposition of the continuing existence of the big Other that reduced 
political conflict to a “shadow-theatre” of economic processes.3 In the classical dialectical 
materialism of Stalin and Engels this fantasy of the Other only takes a more explicit and 
wide-ranging form in the dialectical laws of nature and History.4 The conclusion of Žižek’s 
critique of Marxism and Stalinism is that philosophy must avoid the position of the fetish, in 
which a particular — the Party, Marxist theory — stands-in for and embodies the All. 
In a similar way, Alain Badiou, Žižek’s comrade in the attempt to rejuvenate 
dialectical materialist philosophy, concludes that a revolutionary politics can no longer be 
based on an “expressive dialectics.”5 In the conception of revolutionary action that this 
dialectic produces, each moment is a necessary expression of the All qua big Other, in the 
same way that Žižek conceived of the revolutionary pervert as someone who sees their 
practice as legitimated by, and as form of duty towards, the Other of History.6 Consequently, 
for Žižek, the re-articulation of dialectical materialism must begin from a radically different 
understanding of Hegel, one that avoids conceiving transformation as an expression of the 
All of historical necessity.7 That is to say, a dialectics that does not ground itself in the big 
3 Žižek, TS, p.224.
4 As such, it has been argued that Marxist philosophy becomes a “political cosmology.” See Z.A Jordan, The 
Evolution of Dialectical Materialism:A Philosophical and Sociological Analysis, New York: St. Martins Press 
(1967) p.394.
5 Alain Badiou, Philosophy For Militants, London: Verso (2012) p.61-63.
6 See also Alain Badiou, “The Idea of Communism,” in The Idea of Communism, eds. Costas Douzinas and 
Slavoj Žižek, Verso: London (2010) pp.1-14, pp.5-6.  Badiou’s and Žižek’s critique of an “expressive” 
dialectics describes a problem with Hegelian politics that was noted, in a different form, by Nietzsche. Freidrich
Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, New York: Random House (1967)
p.233.
7 Žižek, AR, p.36.
73
Žižek's Dialectical Materialism
Other, whether in terms of socio-economic processes, “sublime dialectical materialist 
formulas,” or even “History” itself.8 If a dialectics that conceives of historical transformation 
as an expression of the big Other is thus no longer possible given the history of Marxism, 
then, what is the alternative? For both Žižek and Badiou only a dialectics that has been 
combined with Lacanian psychoanalysis can offer an antidote.9
4.2.1. Dialectics without the Other: Hegel through Lacan
Long before Žižek returned to Marxism or framed his project as a re-articulation of 
dialectical materialism he placed the revival of Hegel, via an encounter with Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, at the very centre of his theoretical project.10 As Žižek puts it in Sublime 
Object ‘the only way to “save Hegel” is through Lacan.’11 Although the figure of Hegel that 
Žižek produces through this re-reading is not only heavily stylised but also highly particular, 
inasmuch as it breaks with nearly every Hegelian doxa, it is eminently useful for his 
reformulation of dialectical materialism. 
While Žižek often suggests that his Hegel is the “true” Hegel, he talks elsewhere of a 
practice of philosophical “buggery,” which is a much more accurate depiction of the violence
of his reading.12 To extend the metaphor Žižek’s philosophical buggery produces a victim 
with some recognisable similarities to the figure we know but clearly bearing the scars of a 
significant trauma. When read through Lacan, the Hegel that emerges might be called a post-
fantasmatic Hegel insofar as this new dialectics has no support in the Other. This is Hegel 
after he has “traversed the fantasy.” To put it in Žižek’s own words, this Hegel rejects ‘the 
fetish of “objective historical progress”’ and denies that there is any ‘underlying rational 
8 Žižek, YDD, p.8.
9 See Badiou, “The Idea of Communism,” p.6, n.1.
10 Žižek, SH, p.2, SOI, pp.xxx-xxxi; FTKN, p.3.
11 Žižek, SOI, p.xxxi.
12 Žižek, OWB, pp.41-42.
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necessity which “runs the show” behind the subject’s back.’13 Once this big Other has been 
dismissed, Žižek argues that the dialectic is a form of ‘radical anti-evolutionism’14 that rejects
all conceptions of “progress” and “development.”15  In his new understanding of Hegel, Žižek
conceives of these commonplace Hegelian positions as problematic precisely because they 
suggest hidden evolutionary or teleological logics that presuppose and rely on a form of big 
Other that oversees the process of change. In contradistinction to this perspective, Žižek’s 
Hegel confronts change by way of the point of negativity in terms of a form of contingency 
that can never be contained. 
The basis of Žižek’s understanding of Hegel’s dialectic is the Lacanian logic of the 
signifier – Žižek recognises the same structure in Hegel’s logic of reflection, from the 
“Doctrine of Essence” in The Science of Logic (2010).16 Like the emergence of the master-
signifier, Žižek argues that for Hegel all necessity is contingent and always continually 
haunted by this contingency. Just as the signifier is always an attempt to plug an absence 
given the radically self-referential nature of language according to Lacan’s re-reading of de 
Saussure, Žižek argues that contingency can neither be contained nor sublated by necessity. 
Herein resides the political importance of Žižek’s Lacanian re-reading of Hegel.  It allows 
Žižek to conceive of necessity as caught within a dialectic of in-erasable contingency, which 
means that every ordering, every totality, is viewed as a desperate attempt to prevent the 
realisation of this absence in the same way that signification operates to efface the Real. 
Indeed, on this basis, Žižek claims that for Hegel every order is a desperate attempt to avoid 
13 Žižek, FTKN, p.189.
14 Žižek, SOI, p.162.
15 Žižek, SOI, p.162.
16 Žižek, ME, pp.47-49, FTKN, pp.xviii, 42-6, 165-6. LTN, Ch.9 especially pp.581-603. Peter Dews unpicks 
Žižek’s reading of Hegel, revealing how it does not move beyond the subjective moment of Hegel’s reading, 
thereby cutting of the dialectic before it reaches the point where the subjective moment is reflected back into the
object, which for Hegel leads to a much more balanced end-point. See Peter Dews, “The Tremor of Reflection: 
Slavoj Žižek’s Lacanian Dialectics”  in Radical Philosophy, vol.72 (2005)
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the fact that there is no substantial necessity “pulling the strings” behind the stage.17 Without 
this necessity, Žižek can quite legitimately claim that this is a dialectic that is neither 
expressive of nor grounded by an Other. As a result, if we were to be directed in our political 
practice by this post-fantasmatic conception of the dialectic, we would be guided, not by 
necessity, but its failure, that is to say, the points at which contingency erupts given the 
insufficiency of every order.
Comparing Žižek’s Hegel to the famous Marxist “reversal” of Hegel — Žižek holds 
little back in his dismissal of this ‘(in)famously stupid’ position18 — one does not separate the
revolutionary rational kernel from the mystical shell by conceiving of transformation as a 
result of contradictions inherent to material reality, rather than as the result of the Idea.19 As 
Žižek points out in Less Than Nothing, this “reversal” of Hegel’s dialectic might seem to free
it from an idealist form, but, in fact, it only produces a form of proto-idealism in the guise of 
materialism since the idealist logic of necessary development is now transposed into material 
reality.20 Instead, for Žižek, the truly “revolutionary kernel” of Hegel’s thought resides in 
how it recognises the limitation of every idealist logic, of how every articulation of necessity 
is not only historical but founded on a Real that indicates its radically contingent emergence. 
4.3. The Dialectical Materialist as Analyst
Here however we need to take care not to mistake Žižek’s reading of Hegel for his own 
dialectical materialism. While the former is certainly a condition of the latter, they are 
nevertheless not quite the same thing. This is because Žižek’s dialectical materialism is not a 
17 Žižek, LTN, p.217.
18 Žižek, LTN, p.260.
19 See Friedrich Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy in MECW. Vol. 26. 
London: Lawrence and Wishart (1990) p.383.
20 Žižek, LTN, p.260.
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philosophical doctrine in the traditional sense of an ontology or metaphysics but a form of 
practice. In the introduction to Absolute Recoil Žižek tells us as much, reminding the reader 
that the book is not a book “on” dialectical materialism but “of” dialectical materialism. It ‘is 
not the book’s topic; it is, rather, practised, within these pages.’21 Žižek makes a similar point
in Parallax View regarding universality when he says that “concrete universality” is the 
practice of the dialectic.22 As a result, the dialectic does not “represent” contingency but 
produces it in its ‘becoming’ from within and against necessity.23 As Žižek puts it, dialectical 
materialism does not function to ‘close the gap, but, on the contrary, to open up a radical 
gap, in the very edifice of the universe.’24
Žižek understands dialectical materialism as a philosophical practice akin to that of 
the Lacanian analyst. As Žižek describes the latter in the context of the clinic, the analyst 
does not offer positive knowledge to the subject, telling them what their words really mean. 
Neither, for that matter, do they attempt to contain or limit the subject. The role of the analyst
is to embody or stand-in for the lack in the Other. As such, the analyst’s act consists in 
‘showing the […] positive side of symbolization’s failure […].’25 In terms of the difference 
between the successful speech act and the analyst’s act:
[…] he [sic] presents a negative act, an act that coincides with the non-act 
and in this way fixes the location of the foreign body inside “speaking” 
itself. As such, the analyst’s act is the opposite of the performative gesture, 
of the “successful” speech act.26 
For Žižek, the dialectical materialist occupies a similar position and attempts to produce a 
similar result. It operates at the intersection of universality and its failure, the point of the 
21 Žižek, AR, p.1.
22 Žižek, PV, p.13.
23 Žižek, PV, p.6.
24 Žižek, OWB, p.x-xi. My Italics.
25 Žižek, SH, p.220.
26 Žižek, SH, p.220.
77
Žižek's Dialectical Materialism
universal singular, the element that demonstrates the failure of a specific universality. Žižek 
calls this the ‘place of displacement.’27 From this site, philosophy does not offer answers, but,
rather, reveals the site of a burning question: the deadlock of the Real that an order or 
necessity is grounded on and attempts to efface. The dialectic, then, is something like the 
“analyst’s act”, politicising a totality by producing its remainder, the “foreign body” within it.
The most important difference is found in how this is practiced. While the analyst achieves 
this “end” through occupying the place of the symptom, the dialectic confronts the subject 
with the symptom by way, as we will see in the next section, of a practice that consists of 
bringing together two elements that for structural reasons are radically incommensurable. 
The difference between the analyst and the master demonstrates why the dialectic that
Žižek develops escapes being grounded in the Other. While the master and the analyst both 
occupy the place of the Other they do so in wholly opposed ways. Whereas the master 
occupies and attempts to fix the lack in the Other by offering a signifier that stands in for that
lack, the analyst, on the contrary, stands for the lack as such.28 Žižek’s dialectical 
materialism, as a result, is characterised by what Lacan calls “the desire of the analyst.” For 
Lacan, the analyst seeks neither to cure,29 or to produce a point of positive identification30 — 
that would bring the analyst back into the domain of the master — but, rather, to produce a 
confrontation with the Real. With this in mind, we can understand the role of the philosopher 
in terms of the distinction between Truth (vérité) and knowledge (savoir). For Lacan, Truth is
incompatible with knowledge insofar as it is opposed to the communicable and quotidian. In 
terms of the subject, Lacan argues that it is not always advantageous for the subject to learn 
the Truth31 since it is something that the subject frequently cannot bare to confront. Why is 
27 Žižek, “Dialogue,” p.71.
28 Žižek, SH, p.211.
29 Lacan, Seminar VII, p.218.
30 Dylan Evans, Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, London: Routledge (1996) p.57.
31 Lacan, Seminar XVII, p.122.
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Truth uncomfortable for the subject? Truth marks the confrontation with a certain “non-
knowledge” or lived ignorance that exists on that other scene which is the unconscious. This 
non-knowledge must remain there if the subject’s identifications and pleasure is not to be 
disrupted. The confrontation with Truth, thus, has the effect of “boring” a hole in the 
consistent and smooth surface of what we know given that it is based upon the exclusion of 
that “non-knowledge.” Here, however, we have to be careful to assert the non-
representational and non-hermeneutic nature of Truth. The type of Truth that the dialectic 
produces is beyond meaning, not only because it is revealed by way of something that we do 
not yet know, but also in the sense that we cannot know it without it having a radical effect 
upon us. Truth, then, is the “unbearable” effect this confrontation has, as when we are made 
to admit some dumb fantasy or some discomforting tick. 
The claim that Žižek makes of his dialectic as a mode of critical knowing is that it is 
possible to produce a similar effect at a socio-political level when public discourse is made to
confront its inherent irrationality, its injustices, or some “unbearable” historical trauma that 
cannot be admitted. Žižek equates the effect of this to a shock that activates the contingent 
nature of a socio-historical totality and disturbs the subject’s previous identity with it. For 
Žižek, then, dialectical practice has the same end as that of analysis: ‘a momentous insight 
into the abyss of the Real.’32 Or, in other terms, the disturbing realisation for the subject that a
particular hegemonic power or socio-political totality is not-all, that it is sustained only 
through the repression, disavowal or foreclosure of its contingent basis.
Žižek’s dialectical materialism, thus, is different to a traditional Hegelian Marxist 
dialectic in one crucial way. Far from overcoming the gap between being and consciousness, 
re-uniting the subject with their historical substance, which is the purpose of the dialectic for 
Georg Lukács (1971), for example, Žižek’s dialectical materialism attempts to open up this 
32 Žižek, “Four Discourses,” p.81.
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gap as a gap in the Other itself. This difference can be explained in terms of how Žižek 
understands Hegel’s conception of the relationship between “Subject and Substance.” 
Reflecting on the passage from the “Preface” of Phenomenology of Spirit (1977) where 
Hegel states that ‘everything turns on grasping and expressing the True; not only as 
Substance, but equally as Subject’33, Žižek argues that this does not mean reconciliation in 
the normal sense of the term. What the analyst wants to produce in the subject, and the 
dialectic aims at in a socio-political context, is the realisation of the very inconsistency of its 
social substance. In this way, while Žižek’s Hegelianism has the same aim as that of 
Lukács’s insofar as the dialectic indicates the moment of consciousness in theory and 
practice — for Lukács, revealing to the subject their historical role and how, with this 
recognition, they transform from a reified worker to a practical revolutionary proletarian — 
there is nevertheless a pivotal difference: the analyst’s historical materialism does not attempt
to “bridge” the gap between being and consciousness, but, rather, wrench it open, revealing 
the gap in being, the empty place in the ruptured structure. If in the clinical setting the analyst
attempts to embody the possibility of freedom and autonomy in the form of the lack of the 
Other, the historical materialist dialectic attempts to demonstrate the possibility of social and 
political freedom at specific points within the system where its smooth functioning splutters 
and it reveals its excessive and overtly political nature. As Žižek argues, reconciliation occurs
not through a subsumption or re-unification but an opening in the very core of substance. 
‘“Substance as Subject” ultimately means that a kind of ontological “crack” forever 
denounces as a semblance every “world-view,” every notion of the universe qua totality of 
the “great chain of being.”’34  Despite these differences, however, Žižek’s dialectic shares the
same proposed end of Lukács’s dialectic: freedom and the possibility of transformation. In 
33 G.W.F Hegel The Phenomenology of Spirit translated by A.V. Miller Oxford: Oxford University Press (1977)
pp.9-10.
34 Žižek, TWN, p.26.
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Žižek case, the purpose of the dialectic is to demonstrate ‘the inaccessibility of the Thing is a 
positive condition of our freedom.’35 In this regard, Žižek frequently cites Herbert Marcuse’s 
quip that “Freedom is the condition of liberation,”36 which is to say that in order to liberate 
yourself you must already be, in a sense, free. It is this freedom that dialectical practice 
attempts to produce.
4.4. Totality and its Failures
Žižek’s dialectical practice is underpinned by a methodological postulate. In Parallax View 
(2006), evidently aware of the historical precedent of describing “laws” of dialectical 
materialism, and with a good dose of irony it would seem given that a “law” is the anti-
dialectical figure par excellence, Žižek describes the “law” of dialectical materialism as ‘the 
inherent “tension,” gap, non-coincidence, of the One itself.’37 This “law” informs Žižek’s 
dialectical practice, which in this particular text he calls the parallax. What it consists of is an
attempt to try to produce the inconsistency of an order by connecting it to its “unbearable” 
other, its symptom.38 To use a different name for this practice, one that connects it to certain 
forms of Marxist-Hegelian practice, it can be understood as a producing a “totality with 
failures”.39 For Žižek, the wager of Hegelian epistemology is that totalisation and failure are 
irreducibly connected.  In attempting to make a “rational totality,” then, Žižek’s dialectical 
practice consists in ‘“making a system” out of the contents of a totality and a point within it 
that “sticks-out” and, thereby subverts the rational whole.40 By way of this seemingly 
aberrant excess, Žižek posits that we stumble upon the existence of an antagonism that can 
35 Žižek, TWN, p.195.
36 Žižek, LITET, p.290, IDLC, p.343.
37 Žižek, PV, p.7.
38 Žižek, PV, p.13.
39 Žižek uses this name in the section “How to do a totality with failures” in For They Know Not, p.99.
40 Žižek, FTKN, p.99.
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never be resolved within that totality.41 For Žižek, then, the purpose of producing a totality is 
that we find a point that indicates the very limits of collective experience.42 In this sense, 
“rational totalisation” must be understood as a reductive synthesis. The process of 
“downward synthesis” aims to isolate some kind of disturbing, unfathomable X, within a 
socio-political totality or an ideological system that will eventually reveal the contingency of 
that order. What it produces, thus, is not multiplicity and complexity but the confrontation 
with a certain deadlock within a given ideological system.43 
4.4.1. Socio-Political Symptoms
What this reductive process ultimately attempts to isolate is the symptom. When Žižek 
describes the symptom of a totality he is referring to the Lacanian sense of the term, rather 
than the traditional Left-Hegelian understanding. The latter views the symptom as the 
incomplete realisation of Reason and, by implication, evidence that the world is still to realise
the advances that have been revealed to rational thought. The Lacanian symptom, on the 
contrary, is demonstrative of what we might think of as the failure of Reason tout court. 
Žižek describes its formal character in Sublime Hysteric as such: ‘the “symptom” is an 
exceptional element […] that subverts the Universal of which it is part.’44 Žižek’s favoured 
example is that of Marx’s analysis of the universality of bourgeois freedoms.45 It finds that 
the “rational totality” of this field is only achieved through an anchoring and closure 
performed by something that, while seemingly part of that totality, stands out and disturbs it. 
41 Žižek, FTKN, p.100.
42 Žižek, here, even risks returning to Hegelian absolute knowing to indicate this totality structured around a 
historical limitation on the basis of understanding absolute knowing as ‘the explication of this historically 
specified field that absolutely limits our horizon.’ Žižek, FTKN, p.218.
43 Žižek, FTKN, p.102.
44 Žižek, SH, p.136.
45 Following Lacan, Žižek provocatively claims that Marx invented the symptom, as is evident in his analysis of
the universality of bourgeois freedom. Žižek, SH, p.136, SOI, p.3.
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In terms of bourgeois freedom, its particular species — freedom of speech, consciousness, 
political freedom, etc. — have as their basis the freedom of the worker to sell his labour, 
which as Marx demonstrated is, in fact, the opposite of freedom: it reveals, in fact, the 
workers enslavement to capital. From the perspective of S1, then, bourgeois freedom, the 
freedom to sell one’s labour, is just a particular form of freedom, one among others. Looked 
at askance, however, we see that it, simultaneously, is also something that undermines all the 
other freedoms while also being constitutive of those freedoms and bourgeois society as such.
By identifying this symptom, the dialectic demonstrates a pathological imbalance that 
characterises a totality. What is key, however, is that these symptomal points also function to 
effect the closure of a totality. Within Žižek’s work we can see two further varieties of 
symptoms.
 
4.4.2. Vanishing Mediators
The constitutive limit points of a totality can be viewed from the effect of the vanishing 
mediator, a term that Žižek borrows from Fredric Jameson’s (1973) account of Max Weber’s 
theory regarding the role of Protestantism in the rise of Capitalism.46 In essence, the 
vanishing mediator functions as a kind of fulcrum in the passage between two synchronously 
structured series. After its work is done, this point of mediation vanishes, or perhaps more 
accurately, is ‘erased from memory’47 through a process of gentrification whereby it is given 
an acceptable form within the contents of a totality.48 Žižek cites the process of expropriation 
and enclosure that characterised the emergence (and continued existence of) capitalism as an 
exemplary form of vanishing mediator. Marx ironically refers to this process as “primitive 
46 Fredric Jameson, “The Vanishing Mediator: Narrative Structure in Max Weber,” in New German Critique, 
no.1, Winter (1973)
47 Žižek, FTKN, p.3. Jodi Dean very carefully emphasises that it is still always present, even if indiscernible. 
(Dean, Žižek’s Politics, p.111.)
48 Žižek, FTKN, pp.179-193, OWB, p.100.
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accumulation” given that it was ideologically designated as just that: a primitive 
accumulation by some diligent, hard-working, self-sacrificing individuals who accumulated 
capital before capital existed.49 The vanishing mediator disappears because, to put it in 
technical terms, while an “external presupposition” within a totality it is “re-posited” as an 
inherent moment of a totality. In this case, primitive accumulation takes an “ideal form.” Its 
effect is that the traumatic origins of a totality disappear from sight. What disappears with 
them are the contingent nature of the process of totalisation, as well as the forces that made it 
possible. For example, Žižek writes of the “primitive accumulation” of democracy in Eastern 
Europe where the actors who triggered the process — the new Left, new social movements 
— ‘became invisible the moment the new system established itself’ usurped and deceived by 
the present order. The structure of the totality is erected through a process in which its 
“detonators” are buried.50 In doing so, the totality can normalise these practices into an 
appropriate form. The direct democratic power of the new Left and new social movements —
wielded in occupations, protests, direct action committees — are all institutionalised so that 
this power is mediated and reallocated through the state apparatuses. This “re-positing” does 
not only “de-fang” this power, it also transforms it into part of the system itself. As the 
example of primitive accumulation demonstrates, while this process of expropriation and 
violence was revealed by Marx in all its horror, the true horror is arguably that it is now part 
of the very fabric of capitalism as a set of processes that are continuous and legitimised by 
the State and in Law.
49 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. I, trans. Ben Fowkes, London: Penguin (1990). one
could also see Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Times, 
Boston: Beacon Press (2001).
50 Žižek, “Eastern European Liberalism,” p.27.
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4.4.3. The Law and its Obscene Undersides
The closure of a totality can also be understood by way of what appears at first sight to be a 
form of transgression. Žižek refers to this as an inherent transgression.  If we take the 
example of Law, Žižek argues that it always relies on a form of enjoyment that denotes its 
point of fundamental irrationality. Alongside the public side of the Law there is what Žižek 
calls the “spirit of the community” that violates and goes beyond the Law but acts as its 
support.51 We have already seen one example of this with “irrational” Nationalism which 
appears as if it is a pre-modern remnant of the universal realm of abstract, bourgeois rights. 
As we saw with Žižek’s critique of liberal democracy, this irrational remainder functions to 
anchor what is otherwise a precarious ideological structure.  To demonstrate how these two 
seemingly opposed levels operate to support one another, Žižek frequently refers to the 
military where the obscene practices of “hazing” function as a pivotal point of identification 
alongside the explicit military code. While seeming to go against it, the function of the 
irrational ritual reinforces the community relationship to the law, even if it appears to go 
beyond or, on occasion, break the military codes as such. 
For Žižek, the key to the inherent transgression is that it denotes a symptom that 
demonstrates an ideological system that has been able to incorporate its own antagonism or 
split to such an extent that it reinforces that system. To cite an example that is perhaps more 
commonly acknowledged, the function of debt in contemporary society demonstrates a very 
similar logic in which the self-proclaimed objective of the debtor-creditor relationship — that
the debtor pays the creditor back — is effectively supplemented by its opposite — the 
“extend-and-pretend” strategy — where the debt is not expected to be paid back but 
continually extended. Moreover, this perverse logic functions to reproduce and reinforce the 
system of debt and the debt-creditor nexus. As Žižek writes, ‘the true aim of lending money 
51 Žižek, ME, p.54.
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to the debtor is not to get the debt reimbursed with a profit, but the infinite continuation of 
the debt which keeps the debtor in permanent dependency and subordination.’52 As is well 
known to anyone who has had the misfortune of missing a credit-card payment only to 
subsequently find themselves bombarded with offers for increased credit limits and new 
credit cards, the debt-creditor relationship is one that is reinforced by what it also claims to 
prohibit. 
To understand a totality, then, Žižek argues that we must be aware of how what may 
seem like a subversive activity can, in actual fact, function to support the hegemonic power 
of a system. Žižek describes this as the superegoistic dimension of power. Alongside the 
explicit set of ideological norms and rules, there exists an “unofficial,” “unacknowledged” 
support in the form of a paradoxical “permitted prohibited.”53
4.4.4. The Infinite Judgement
What differentiates the symptom from its otherwise diverse contents is that it demonstrates ‘a
point of breakdown heterogeneous to a given ideological field and at the same time necessary
for that field to achieve its closure, its accomplished form.’54 In the symptom, then, we find 
universality in ‘the form of its opposite,’55 or the point of totalisation of an ordering. The 
wager of Žižek’s dialectical practice is that in locating this element we can potentially effect 
the dislocation of a socio-political totality and open up a space for the subject’s freedom. For 
Žižek, the “infinite judgement” names the practice of bringing together the incommensurable 
opposites of an ideological structure to produce this effect. The infinite judgement is not only
‘the last secret of dialectical speculation’56 because it demonstrates the completion of the 
52 Žižek, TIP, p.46.
53 Žižek, ME, p.54.
54 Žižek, SOI, p.16. My italics.
55 Žižek, SOI, p.17.
56 Žižek, SOI, p.234.
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practice of a totality with its failure. Rather, Žižek prioritises this moment because of the 
devastating effect it might have on the totality and its subjects.57 
Confronting an ideological order with its symptom reveals the limits of explicit and 
conscious ideological knowledge. In the case of our first example, the bourgeois conception 
of freedom, the infinite judgement – “bourgeois freedom as destitution” – reveals the 
unacknowledged support of bourgeois values in the destitution that the “freedom” to sell 
one’s labour creates. The effect of the infinite judgement is not limited to epistemology, 
however. What it demonstrates is not only a prior limit to the horizon of knowledge but, also,
the disruption of the smooth consistency of a socio-political field. This consists in 
demonstrating that, as constitutive, the exception can be ameliorated but never overcome – 
bourgeois freedom will always produce this disastrous consequence for certain individuals. 
By bringing this aberrant element into contact with the other particulars within a field, the 
totality becomes perforated, inconsistent. To continue with the previous example, in the 
infinite judgement the subject glances upon the unsettling knowledge of the nature of 
capitalism before realising this initial unease is inerasable because its violence is structural. 
The system itself is founded on an exploitation and oppression which continues to haunt its 
existence. The smooth surface of the totality is ruptured when the violence on which it is 
founded becomes visible. 
What this practice does is deny to the symptom its exceptional position. If this 
symptom has to be displaced in some way – repressed, foreclosed, disavowed – in order for 
the system to operate, despite the constitutive nature of the symptom, then, by thrusting it in 
to view, that is, denying it its external position, dialectical practice awakens the trauma that it
indicates. For Žižek, this practice can have a shattering effect upon the subject whose 
previous sense of a secured and integrated self was based upon an ignorance of the symptom 
57 Žižek, SOI, p.208, ME, pp.135-6, n.18.
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and their ideological enjoyment in it. In terms of the subject’s knowledge, Žižek argues that 
confronting the failure of a totality ‘brings about a dizzying experience of how [a] given 
positivity exists and retains its consistency only insofar as somewhere else [...] some 
fundamental non-knowledge insists.’58 Žižek outlines how, like the confrontation with their 
own symptom, confronting a socio-political symptom is unnerving. In Parallax View Žižek 
describes this as the ‘unpleasant’ and ‘weird’ effect that results from connecting two 
elements that were previously kept apart on the basis of the boundaries of an ideological 
system that structure the subject’s expectations and identity.59 
Žižek understands the disruptive effect of this confrontation with the symptom in 
terms of the symptomal torsion it creates between the excessive element and its given place 
in the system.60 Žižek uses this term in his more recent work, seemingly in reference to Alain 
Badiou’s Theory of the Subject (2009). There, Badiou develops a notion of torsion as the 
discontinuity in the structure. What is crucial for Badiou is that the subject also emerges in 
this break.61 In Žižek’s understanding of the symptomal torsion the two features overlap. It 
indicates a form of inner discontinuity that dislocates a totality at the point of closure. But far 
from being an inert blockage to the structure, the symptomal point is the very inner fracture 
of a system that also indicates the place of the subject. The subject experiences itself as the 
lack in the Other. For Žižek, the “real effect” of the shocking and reductive nature of the 
contradiction produced by the downward synthesis is a political discord that cuts through the 
Other and the subject that was previously anchored within it.62
58 Žižek, SOI, p.73.
59 Žižek, PV, p.13.
60 See Žižek, IDLC, p.389.
61 see, for an example of Badiou’s use, pp.149-151. Alain Badiou, Theory of the Subject, trans. Bruno Bostells, 
London: Continuum (2009)
62 Žižek, FTKN, p.103.
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4.5. Breaking the Theoretical Deadlock I: Transformation, The 
Real, Historicity
For Žižek, as a dialectical practice dialectical materialism has a key political role. Locating 
the symptom and thrusting it into view through the practice of the totality with failures 
dislocates the structure and renders visible the potential for transformation on the basis of the 
resulting inconsistency. While not strictly a unity of theory and practice, Žižek argues that the
role of dialectical materialism and revolutionary practice “overlap” for a brief moment in 
social and political transformation, when a particular socio-political necessity is dislocated 
and the structure is opened. In Tarrying With The Negative (1993), the work that stalks out 
the initial territory of his post-democratic position prior to his embrace of the dialectical 
materialist Marxist problematic, Žižek refers to the overthrow of Ceauşescu in Romania as an
example of the coming together of theory and practice. Žižek argues that despite the violence 
of Ceauşescu’s removal and the limited political ends that were achieved — the Communist 
secret police were the ones who ultimately grabbed power — ‘what really matters is that the 
masses who poured into the streets of Bucharest “experienced” the situation as “open,” that 
they participated in the unique intermediate […] when, for a brief, passing moment, the hole 
in the big Other, the symbolic order, became visible.’63 The overlap between the role of 
philosophy and the masses become clear with the example Žižek uses to explain the result of 
rendering the hole in the Other. He argues that the political openness that resulted from the 
revolt was reflected in the image of the ‘rebels waving the national flag with the red star, the 
Communist symbol, cut out.’64 Understood in Žižek’s terms, the subject’s freedom is 
correlative to the confrontation with the inadequacy of the symptomal element. In this case, 
63 Žižek, TWN, p.1.
64 Žižek, TWN, p.1.
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that symptom was the ‘organising principle of the national life,’65 objet a qua the irrationality
of the Communist symbol. Once this element had been dislocated, confronted and removed 
from its structured place, the whole socio-political edifice became inconsistent and the 
subject glimpsed a moment of freedom. At the point of realising the total inadequacy of the 
symptom, the absurdity of the Real, the subject could render open the structure of the totality 
and thereby create the conditions of possibility for transformation. As Žižek argues, ‘[t]he 
enthusiasm that carried them [Communist rebels] was literally the enthusiasm over this hole, 
not yet hegemonized by any positive ideological project […]’66 The over-lap with dialectical 
materialism resides in a similar enthusiasm for the “hole.” To refer to the subjective position 
of the analyst, at a socio-political level this is what the “desire of the analyst” means. It is this
internal reflexive distance from the master-signifier, a desire for the displacement enacted 
through the pursuit of the symptom. In terms of the image of the flag, the gap within it where 
the Communist symbol used to reside demonstrates the space of the symptomal torsion, the 
dislocation that results from confronting the exceptional element. 
As I have demonstrated, Žižek’s radical democracy also advocated a certain openness
in the socio-political field. What has changed in between Žižek’s democratic position and his 
dialectical materialism in this regard? In a certain respect, very little it must be said. We have
seen a similar position in Žižek’s democratic period in terms of the role that he thought 
elections could play in dissolving the symbolic ties of a social order. There, I argued that this 
conception of change was ultimately flawed on the grounds that liberal democracy simply did
not work like this. We see a return to this conception of the Symbolic as Real with Žižek’s 
dialectic; however, it is here not understood as an institutional arrangement. It emerges 
instead as the result of a rebellion over and rejection of the way that society is organised, a 
65 Žižek, TWN, p.1.
66 Žižek, TWN, p.1.
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position that Žižek worried about the implications of for totalitarian politics. Here, however, 
we see a democratic explosion that interrupts the texture of the socio-political totality through
the rejection of the role of the symptom. 
What has allowed this change of position? Why does Žižek argue that his original 
warning against this position was misplaced? In dialogue with Ernesto Laclau and Judith 
Butler in Contingency, Hegemony and Universality (2000), just as the full extent of Žižek’s 
break from his radical democratic past was coming to light, Žižek argues that there is an 
“illegitimate” short-circuit in the radical democratic position. Whereas Žižek previously 
argued that “ideology” consisted in offering an image of post-revolutionary society as an 
impossible fullness — like Marx’s fantasy — he now argues that the opposite gesture, of 
offering an image of the impossibility of every revolutionary politics, might be equally 
“ideological” in the sense that it blocks all radical change and prevents radical politics that 
continues to acknowledge the inescapability of antagonism. As Žižek writes apropos the 
limitation of Laclau’s position, and also his own earlier radical democratic position:
the basic operation of ideology is not only the dehistoricizing gesture of 
transforming an empirical obstacle into the eternal condition […] but also 
the opposite gesture of transposing the a priori closure/impossibility of a 
field into an empirical obstacle. Laclau is well aware of this paradox when 
he denounces as ideological the very notion that after the successful 
revolution, a non-antagonistic self-transparent society will come about. 
However, this justified rejection of the fullness of post-revolutionary 
Society does not justify the conclusion that we have to renounce any project
of a global social transformation […]67
67 Žižek, CHU, p.101. See also: Žižek, CWZ, pp.70-71.
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What Žižek has in mind is the problematic conservative implications of his previous 
Lacanian position, which appeared increasingly as an argument for the status quo given the 
limitation of democratic politics. Alternatively, Žižek’s concern with this illegitimate short-
circuit might be viewed in Laclau and Mouffe's “renunciation” of the category of the 
Universal. If society is already disorganised and fragmented, the pluralist democratic 
response is a conceivable political project; however, if society, as Žižek contends, is still 
dominated by general or universal structures, this renunciation risks barring the possibility of 
a collective contestation of those structures. Ultimately, the difference between Laclau and 
Mouffe and Žižek is at a descriptive level as well as a theoretical level. Žižek’s recognition of
its limitations within capitalism demonstrates that capital and class still had a central role in 
“organising” society. On this basis, questions regarding universal and global social 
transformation become pivotal once more. It is, thus, necessary to be aware of the opposite 
ideological gesture in which this general level is obscured.
However, the transformation in Žižek’s position ultimately comes down to a small but
crucial theoretical modification. How can Žižek now conceive of a politics of transformation,
revolution, of a liberating and exciting form of freedom akin to that found in the example of 
Romania and which in his disagreement with Laclau he suggests remains possible? Or, 
phrased differently, why do we get the symptomal torsion and the possibility of openness by 
isolating objet a, where previously Žižek’s position was defined by inert hard-rock of the 
Real, das Ding in all its horror? What underlies these transformations is a pivotal theoretical 
shift in Žižek’s work outlined in the foreword to the second edition of For They Know Not in 
a section called “the Hard Road To Dialectical Materialism.” There, Žižek writes of his 
attempt, subsequent to his earliest work, to ‘identify and liquidate […] dangerous residues of 
bourgeois ideology’68 in his Hegelian-Lacanian philosophy, his understanding of democracy 
68 Žižek, FTKN, p.xii.
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and his conception of the Act — the topic of the next chapter. At the centre of these is a 
reconceptualisation of the Real and its connection to the abyssal dimension of the objet. 
Žižek pin-points the theoretical weakness of his earliest work as a ‘quasi-transcendental 
reading of Lacan, focused on the notion of the Real as the impossible Thing-in-itself.’69 As he
explains in the same foreword, this misreading led to the political dead-end that we identified
in the previous chapter, and, as he puts it, ‘the celebration of failure.’70 For Žižek, the flaw in 
this position is that it misses the ridiculous inadequacy of the object,’71 which is not a ‘pre-
reflexive reality’ but something that is forever lost.72 The Real is no longer then a 
confrontation with an abyssal Thing qua materialisation of the thicket of horrifying 
jouissance, but, rather, a certain insubstantiality. In the same foreword, Žižek continues on to 
describe the reformulation as one of moving from a Kantian conception of the Real — 
although given the substantiality of the Real, it is perhaps closer to Schelling, as we will see 
in chapter 6 — to a Hegelian one. Whereas for Kant the noumenal dimension was that which 
was beyond phenomena, Žižek argues that for Hegel the noumenal dimension is immanent to
and produced within the phenomenal realm itself. Translated into Žižek’s Lacanian terms, 
Žižek goes from a Kantian position to a Hegelian one by moving from the Thing as pre-
symbolic maternal plenitude that persists beyond the symbolic to the Thing as a fantasy that 
emerges from the inconsistency of the symbolic itself.73 As a result, the Thing is 
reconceptualised as an immanently produced threat, an ideological impossibility grounded in 
the fear of confronting the true “horror”: that there is nothing preventing social 
transformation, that there is nothing beyond the fragmentary, fragile, inconsistent symbolic 
69 Žižek, FTKN, p.xii.
70 Žižek, FTKN, p.xii.
71 Žižek, FTKN, p.xvii.
72 Žižek, FTKN, p.xvii.
73 Žižek, FTKN, p.xxix.
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order that constitutes the horizon of our experience. Or, as Žižek puts it with regard to the 
role that dialectical materialism plays in his work
“dialectical materialism” is a negative reminder that the horizon of 
historical -symbolic practice is “not-all”, that it is inherently “de-centred”, 
founded upon the abyss of a radical fissure - in short, that the Real as its 
Cause is forever absent.74
When reformulated in this way, Žižek is now able to rethink the nature of the subject’s 
confrontation with the void. Previously, Žižek warned of the psychotic experience emerging 
out of an embrace of the Thing, posing it as beyond the subject and “too hot” for them to 
touch without risking symbolic death. The void in this case was a total limit, one that must be
avoided at all costs. According to the democratic Žižek, it was to democracy’s great credit 
that it did this. Seemingly referring to his prior position he now dismisses the ‘old notion of 
phenomenal objects disappearing/dissolving in the vortex of the Thing.’75 Instead, the Thing 
is an illusion that emerges from the fissures of the symbolic. Žižek argues that by confronting
the void, we find that phenomenal objects ‘are nothing but the Void of the Thing embodied 
[…], objects in which negativity assumes a positive existence.’76 I understand this as the 
realisation of the not-all, of the radically de-centred nature of the symbolic itself that emerges
when we interpret the symptomal torsion as the effect of the absence of the hard-Real. 
For Žižek, this is key to understanding dialectical materialism. The materialist 
experience is not one with some noumenal core or some hard-rock that warns the subject of a
socio-political impossibility. Rather, the materialist experience is one in which the subject 
realises that there is no security, no ultimate guarantees to the structure of society. At a 
political level, materialism means that there are no limits to the possibility of change and no 
74 Žižek, ME, pp.135-6, n.18.
75 Žižek, FTKN, p.xxx.
76 Žižek, FTKN, p.xxx.
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object that can ultimately prevent this change. As Žižek summaries the materialist position in
Parallax View
for the idealist, we experience our situation as “open” insofar as we are 
engaged in it, while the same situation appears “closed” from the standpoint
of finality, that is, from the eternal point of view of the omnipotent and all-
knowing God who alone can perceive the world as a closed totality; for the 
materialist, the “openness” goes all the way down, that is, necessity is not 
the underlying universal law that secretly regulates the chaotic interplay of 
appearances — it is the “All” itself which is non-All, inconsistent, marked 
by an irreducible contingency.77 
Formulating the difference between idealism and materialism in terms of the difference 
between religion and atheism, Žižek argues that ‘religion is the Real as the impossible Thing 
beyond phenomena, the Thing which “shines though” phenomena in sublime experiences; 
atheism is the Real as the grimace of reality — as just the Gap, the inconsistency, of 
reality.’78 He continues: ‘the experience of this Void is the original materialist experience, 
and religion, unable to endure it, fills it in with religious content.’79 By implication, the 
materialist position must accept the non-existence of the All, must prevent at all costs “filling
it in” with some content or substantiality that it perceives to prevent or effect change. The 
materialist “wager”, then, is that large-scale transformation is possible and is without limit. 
The final consequence of this re-formulation of the void is the re-introduction of the 
possibility of historical thinking. Prior to this dialectical materialist reformulation, Žižek had 
bound History to the Thing as a substantial beyond that resisted every historical 
transformation. In this regard, Žižek compared historical thinking to a form of hysteria, 
77 Žižek, PV, p.79.
78 Žižek, FTKN, pp.xxviii-xxix.
79 Žižek, FTKN, p.xxix.
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which, within the Lacanian context, consists of a constant questioning of every authority on 
the basis of its ahistorical Real. Hysteria, however, never makes the leap from this critical 
position to the revolutionary position in which the lack in every authority is also considered 
the positive condition for freedom from that authority. In Žižek’s early democratic position, 
the conception of Real as a hard-rock prevented this realisation. Genuine historicity was, as a 
consequence, not possible given that every historical formation was characterised by the 
same rock of the ahistorical Real. As a result, Žižek was unable to conceive of the historicity 
of antagonism and the different forms that it might take. At the level of the subject, this 
problem was repeated in an inability to conceive of the confrontation with this ahistorical 
core of History in any way other than through the destruction of the symbolic and psychosis, 
which stands for the absence of any symbolic structure.80 
By reconceptualising the Real Žižek introduces the possibility of historicity. If the 
Real is a mere void, attached to the particularity of certain symptoms, norms, prohibitions or 
vanishing mediators, the possibility of genuine historical change becomes a legitimate 
political question once again. The example of the end of socialism in Romania is illustrative 
in this respect. The dislocation of the socio-political totality upon the realisation of the hole 
left by the insufficiency of the organising principle of society is not limited by some material 
beyond that persist and defines every socio-political totality. Like the materialist experience, 
we find that contingency runs “all the way down”, which is to say that there are no limits to 
historical change, no ahistorical core that will return in every socio-political ordering. The 
void might be conceived as an extra-historical place but it is one that is literally nothing more
than the inherent instability of a particular historical formation and, as such, not an index to 
some prior determining ahistorical limits. 
80 Žižek, FTKN, p.101.
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Indeed, in a set of interviews with Glyn Daly published under the name 
Conversations With Žižek (2003) Žižek’s discussion of historicity and dialectical materialism 
indicates how his position has changed. Žižek argues that the ultimate power of a Lacanian-
Hegelian dialectics resides in how it carves a space between the ‘false opposition’ of 
universal History and historicist relativisation of the other. In the symptom we find an 
overlapping of universality and history insofar as this constitutive excess is the internal limits
of a historical order. As such, while it might appear ahistorical, as an inevitable feature of our
social life, the dialectic functions to historicise it.  If every totality is grounded by the 
specificity of its contingent symptom as the element that gives to it its unique character, 
Žižek now conceives of every totality as specific and particular on the basis of this symptom. 
Žižek, as it were, can claim that ‘each specific epoch […] has its own ontology.’81 The most 
powerful aspect of this position is that by politicising a totality through this failure we gain an
insight into the historicity of that order. As Žižek puts it: the dialectic works to ‘historicize 
these so-called eternal questions […] to introduce historicity into the absolute itself.’82 By 
politicising this external aberration we therefore deny it of its universal, ahistorical character 
and, as a corollary, posit that ‘concrete historical struggles are at the same time struggles for 
the absolute itself.’83 In this, we find a mode of critique that aims at ‘overcoming eternity’ by 
‘opening up the dimension of temporality/historicity.’84 Moreover, it does this without 
reference to productive contradiction or bestowing a fate onto certain political agents. 
Instead, historicity is conceived as a point of contingency in and against a historical order on 
the basis of the dislocating effect of the symptom’s insufficiency. Here, antagonisms are no 
longer that abyssal thing, that Real which is “too hot” to touch, but an immanent dislocation 
81 Žižek, CWZ, p.88.
82 Žižek, CWZ, p.88.
83 Žižek, CWZ, p.88.
84 Žižek, FA, p.94.
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that can be transformed. To refer again to Žižek’s “materialist” thesis: contingency goes “all 
the way down.”
4.6. Conclusion
In this chapter we have outlined Žižek’s dialectical materialism as a dialectical mode of 
knowing, and discussed how, via a Lacanian reading of Hegel, Žižek addresses the 
challenges that the failures of traditional Marxism present to us. Finally, we have also seen 
how Žižek recasts a series of theoretical problems that were specific to his previous Lacanian
position to overcome certain aspects of his prior theoretical deadlock. To conclude, however, 
I want to raise a set of questions as to the appropriateness and effectivity of Žižek’s 
dialectical materialism as a philosophy for Marxism. 
In this regard, the most important aspect of Žižek’s dialectical materialism is clearly 
what it produces. The “totality with failures” is a mode of knowing that not only produces a 
form of knowledge — the limitations of a particular historical-political horizon — but, so 
Žižek claims, a practical effect in the subject, which I have outlined in terms of the difference
between knowledge and Truth. The value of Žižek’s dialectical materialism rests on the 
nature of this effect and its plausibility at a socio-political level.  
First, as we have seen, Žižek’s Marxist philosophy has its theoretical basis in 
Lacanian psychoanalysis and, in particular, an understanding of the role of the analyst in 
clinical treatment. How plausible is such a practice at the level of large-scale social 
structures? In the clinical setting the subject’s symptom is conceived of as singular in the 
sense that it is a result of the unique mediation of the subject with their world as they enter 
into language. Parental expectations, specific traumas, the difficulties in coming to a 
workable solution when the child is faced with the deadlocks of desire, all indicate a highly 
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complex and highly individual relationship between the subject, the analyst and the symptom,
which resists generalisation and simple prescriptive treatment. However, at the level of the 
analysis of socio-political structures, much of this nuance and specificity is not possible. It is 
implausible to imagine a form of Marxist analysis that focuses so specifically on the 
particularity of the subject’s relationship to its symptoms at an individual level. This is not to 
say that Žižek’s dialectical materialism will necessarily fail in identifying certain key socio-
political symptoms but that it might prove far from effective in terms of its specific practical 
goal. In the same way that the effectiveness of psychoanalytic treatment relies on the clinical 
setting and the delicate relationship between analyst and analysand so that the subject cannot 
self-analyse or resolve their dissatisfaction by, for example, reading about the general 
structure of subjectivity and the symptom, it seems likely that, for all their merit, Žižek’s 
socio-political analyses might not provide the disruptive effect that he hopes. As a result, the 
dialectic becomes another form of ideology, a variant of knowledge. 
Even if we assume that the dialectic has this effect, it is not out of the woods. The 
kind of transformation that a confrontation with Truth might produce remains open to 
question given that its political consequences remain uncertain. Given the momentary nature 
of this spark of cognitive dissonance, is this moment not likely to be missed or its potentiality
left unrealised? The latter seems particularly likely if we reflect on how the subject 
experiences this moment. If dialectical practice works by demonstrating to consciousness 
what it cannot include within itself, disrupting the closure based on the expulsion of the 
symptom that all social structures rely upon, will the subject not immediately shy-away from 
this confrontation, or repress it once more in order to avoid uprooting their identifications 
with the social order which secures it? As we said regarding Lacan’s conception of Truth, it 
is certainly not always advantageous for the subject. If this is the case, the subject will 
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certainly be made to make a decision about where they stand in relation to the totality, but it 
might not be the one that Žižek has in mind or that will serve as the precursor of 
transformation. Rather than igniting the fuse, it is plausible to imagine that it will be put out. 
The insight into the lack in the Other might even be reintegrated into knowledge and become 
something akin to the cynic’s fetish, allowing the subject to adopt the position of the 
fetishistic disavowal that we saw in socialist ideology. As a fetish, the shock of truth that is 
supposed to produce a realisation of the “not-all” and the unstableness of our political and 
social order becomes the very thing that might prevent political actors from confronting the 
Real. The question, then, that looms large over dialectical materialism is how does one 
convert this momentary rupture into positive transformation? Žižek speaks of the possibility 
of an Act that arises from the confrontation with the points of impossibility but how this Act 
occurs in the context of dialectical materialism as a practice is not certain. The gap between 
the moment of political awakening and transformation cannot be bridged directly with this 
mode of knowing. We will address how Žižek attempts to resolve this apparent dead-end in 
the chapter that follows. For the time being, we can conclude that what is required is a way of
thinking how this rapturous moment of freedom is, one, sustained, and, two, prevented from 
becoming an effervescent moment of aesthetic disruption.
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Chapter 5: The Politics of Truth
5.1. Introduction
In the conclusion of the previous chapter we raised several issues pertaining to the difficulty 
of conceiving how Žižek’s dialectical practice might lead to revolutionary transformation. 
We argued that the shock of destructive insight, the dizzying experience that Žižek speaks of 
when the subject confronts the symptom, might quickly become part of the quotidian once 
again. As a result, Truth (vérité) might quickly be reintegrated into knowledge (savoir), 
Reason captured by Understanding, and the revolutionary transformation it is supposed to 
engender is contained or left unconverted. In each of these instances, a certain potentiality 
remains unrealised, and dialectical materialism, as a Marxist philosophy that aims to change 
the world not just interpret it, risks failure.
It is these concerns allied with a confrontation with the work of Alain Badiou that 
leads Žižek to pursue the risky position of a “politics of Truth” first proposed in The Ticklish 
Subject (1999), a shift that has garnered much concern and contestation. For Žižek, Badiou is 
pivotal in developing a theory of political action on the basis of a Lacanian-Hegelian 
philosophy. It is in this context that Žižek refers to Badiou positively as ‘the theorist of the 
Act.’1 If we recall the potential failure of dialectical materialism on the grounds that the 
1 Žižek, Desert, p.128.
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“gap” or “rupture” it is trying to induce is also a gap between theory and practice — in the 
sense that there seems to be no necessary connection between the effect of truth and 
transformation — in Žižek’s work the theory of “the Act” is an attempt to bridge this gap by 
outlining a form of political transformation that appears as an unpredictable practical 
moment. Put differently, the Act, then, indicates the possibility of a move from “Truth” to 
practice. Žižek develops this conception of the Act through an interpretation of Badiou’s 
work, with a specific focus on the notion of the Truth-Event. What emerges from this 
engagement with Badiou is a series of positions that move Žižek’s work beyond the 
dialectical materialism we have thus far considered. 
At the point of the “gap” or the “symptomal torsion”, Žižek’s theory of the Act 
outlines a risky, ungrounded event in which transformation is produced by doing something 
that is considered impossible within the current socio-political coordinates. In terms that we 
are already familiar with, the Act means identifying with the symptom, breaking a 
prohibition, ratcheting up the tension within a totality to breaking point by asserting 
something that cannot be admitted or conceived within it. Here, “Truth” can be considered on
the side of the Act insofar as it is directly through the Act that a totality is ruptured and 
something emerges within it that was perceived to be impossible from the perspective of the 
ruling order. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given that thinking politics in terms of Truth not only 
rubs against spontaneous liberal, pluralistic sensibilities but also evokes a history populated 
by political disasters, some of the most recent of which Žižek knows only too well, Žižek’s 
“politics of Truth” has been the object of much criticism. In the secondary literature, the Act 
is frequently connected to a form of abyssal negativity2 or a politics that equates to the 
2 Simon Tormey and Andrew Robinson, “A Ticklish Subject? Žižek and the Future of Left Radicalism,” Thesis 
Eleven, Vol.80 (2005).
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enforcement of a singular conception of good.3 While the Act attempts to occupy the point of 
universality, and as such suggests a return to the insistence of the Other, we will see here that 
it in fact does not institute the Other but its lack, in the same way that the dialectic functions. 
In this chapter we will critically consider Žižek’s “politics of Truth” from the 
perspective of his engagement with Alain Badiou’s work. We begin by charting the 
convergences and differences between Žižek’s and Badiou’s thinking on the Event before 
turning to consider Žižek’s similarly Badiouian-inspired notion of subtraction, which 
develops more specifically the form of the Act. We will then go on to outline how this breaks
with a common reading of Žižek’s position that interprets it as a form of active nihilism. I 
will at this point employ Žižek’s theory of feminine subjectivity to demonstrate the 
implications of subtraction for political practice and suggest that the negativity of subtraction 
is accompanied by a positive, creative labour. The final section of this chapter is reserved for 
a discussion about the nature of dialectical materialism as a philosophy after Žižek’s 
engagement with Badiou. I will here draw attention to a contradiction in Žižek’s project 
between the avowed role and function of philosophy, as addressed in sections 4.3 and 4.5 in 
the previous chapter, and show how Žižek’s politics of truth runs counter to that. 
5.2. The Event of the Not-All: Žižek and Badiou
While Žižek touches upon Alain Badiou’s ideas sporadically in his early theoretical writings4 
it is not until Ticklish Subject that Žižek begins a detailed and sustained critical engagement 
with Badiou’s philosophy.5 After Ticklish Subject, Badiou becomes a constant feature in the 
Žižekian theoretical armoury, central to his dialectical materialism, and arguably as important
3 Geoff Boucher "An Inversion of Radical Democracy: The Republic of Virtue in Žižek's Revolutionary 
Politics" in International Journal of Žižek Studies vol.4. no.2 (2010).
4 See Žižek, FTKN, pp.188, 270, TWN, see the introduction.
5 See Žižek, TS, pp.146-70.
103
The Politics of Truth
to his positions, certainly politically, as Hegel or Lacan. Žižek begins his ongoing dialogue 
with Badiou’s philosophy through a critical reading of Badiou’s theory of the Truth-Event, 
the central theoretical figure of his work Being and Event (2007). Žižek employs his usual 
Lacanian and Hegelian modifications to Badiou’s work to produce a theory of revolutionary 
practice that operates without grounding in an expressive dialectic or an Other of historical 
necessity. It is through this work, and the conception of the Act that is developed in 
conjunction with it, that Žižek expands beyond the dialectical materialist mode of critique. 
Badiou’s work proves fertile ground for Žižek because of its shared allegiance to 
Lacan’s separation of Truth and knowledge.6 In Badiou’s conception of this separation there 
is a similarly rupturous dialectic at work. However, rather than merely the “shock” or 
“Tuche” of that non-hermeneutic moment of recognition, for Badiou Truth is discernible 
through and constructed by the subject’s fidelity to the Event. 
Žižek chooses to conceive of the Event as an equivalent to the Act, as we will see 
shortly. For Badiou, the Event is an exceptional occurrence, one that is radically separate 
from the quotidian reality of Being. Badiou builds his notion of the Event and outlines its 
relationship to Being by way of a complex meta-mathematical ontology. The essential 
relationship between Event and Being can nevertheless be articulated relatively simply. The 
Event’s existence is reliant on an “evental site”, which is characterised by certain elements —
Badiou calls them “multiples” — that are part of a situation but not represented or included in
that situation.7 Badiou conceptualises this relationship as one between the “state of the 
situation”, a philosophical correlate to the political State, and Being. The State’s function is 
to count or structure Being in a more-or-less defined manner. The multiples of the evental site
6 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham, London: Continuum (2007[1988]). See pp.525, 431-
435.
7 Badiou, Being and Event, p.174.
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are elements that are not counted or structured by the State but are inherent to the situation.8 
We can think of these multiples in a number of ways, but in the political context the examples
which speak loudly are those of the excluded, the illegal, sans-papiers. Badiou describes 
these elements as residing at “the edge of the void,” which means that they are not 
represented but, rather, exist only for themselves. It is for this reason that Badiou describes 
these multiples as “foundational.”9 
Badiou conceives of the Event as the inscription of these elements and the Event itself
into the situation.10 Among other things, the inscription of the Event marks the beginning of 
the subject’s fidelity to it and generates a process of discerning its consequences and 
connections. For Badiou, the non-hermeneutic character of Truth derives from how the Event
is neither representational nor verifiable, but, rather, is Being that declares itself and the 
Event itself as such.  It is self-authoritative and is unrecognisable from the perspective of the 
Order of Being or the State. 
We can see the connection with the essential theoretical conditions of Žižek’s work 
immediately. The Event is a rupturous, anti-hegemonic occurrence that is neither guaranteed 
nor grounded by an Other. It is contingent, risky, and beyond the possible, at least from the 
position of the status quo. Žižek conceives of the Act in very similar terms. It is grounded, 
ultimately, by a risky ‘subjective wager.’11 Against the backdrop of Badiou’s work and 
Lacan’s conception of the Impossible Real12 he argues that the Act is something that is not 
reducible to “objective conditions” nor can it be judged on any ‘neutral “objective” 
8 Badiou, Being and Event, p.175.
9 Badiou, Being and Event, p.175.
10 Badiou, Being and Event, pp.180-2.
11 Žižek, DSST?, p.168.
12 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis.
London and New York: Norton (1998) p.167.
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criteria.”13 Moreover, given that it breaks from all the conventions or expectations of the 
status quo it appears from the interstices of order, passing through the torsion of the 
symptom, and as if something that was impossible has happened.14 
We will return to a fuller elaboration of the consequences of Badiou’s positions on 
Žižek’s work in terms of the Act in 5.3. We should also signpost here that when Žižek first 
develops his conception of the Act — prior to his engagement with Badiou — there are a 
series of problems with his position. This will be the subject of the next chapter where we 
will outline what has been described in the introduction as the “second Žižek.” Here, 
however, we can delineate Žižek’s position from that of Badiou’s in several ways that will 
enable us to see the precise contours of the basis of Žižek’s theory of political action.
5.2.1. Truth and Materialism
The most important aspect of Žižek’s disagreement with Badiou concerns the precise status 
of Truth. Even after his commitment to Badiouian politics Žižek steadfastly refuses naming 
the positive dimension of the consequences of the event as Truth, instead arguing that they 
remain mere symbolic fictions.15 What Žižek does preserve from Badiou’s position is the 
notion of the exceptional event as Truth. The event is True insomuch as it is a moment of 
transformation that forces the passage from the old to the new through the point of 
universality at the symptomal site. The subject intervenes in the order of Being through a 
risky Act that both undermines and forms the basis of a new ordering.16 
13 See Žižek, HCC, p.119, DSST?, p.175-6, PV, p.167.
14 Žižek, OB, pp.83-4.
15 Žižek, FTKN, p.lxxxviii.
16 Žižek, IDLC, p.397.
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The second key disagreement with Badiou concerns the precise nature of a materialist
Event.17 Žižek argues that Badiou remains stranded in a “Kantian” opposition between Being 
and Event.18 Citing Badiou’s Platonism, Žižek argues that his notion of Truth fails to escape 
the representational problematic since, ultimately, Truth is no more than the translation of 
multiplicity into the order of Being.19 As has been argued, Žižek’s critique is limited in 
several respects.20 Nevertheless, if we are attentive to Žižek’s position we can see how this 
misunderstanding of Badiou’s position — Badiou is not as Kantian as Žižek argues — is a 
productive one. How so? In Žižek’s attempt to avoid the problems that he accuses Badiou’s 
position of suffering from, Žižek implicitly problematises and moves beyond certain aspects 
of his initial dialectical materialist position. 
As was noted in the previous chapter, Žižek’s dialectical practice made conceiving of 
transformation difficult on the grounds that while the production of a punctual confrontation 
with the Real produced a shattering effect in the subject in no way could we guarantee that it 
would also produce lasting change as a result.  In Ticklish Subject Žižek identifies two 
problems that result from conceiving of the Event in such a stringently punctual way. Žižek 
argues that the strict opposition between Being and Event is akin to reifying the order of 
Being into a big Other. Žižek calls this the ‘self-obliteration’ of the Truth-Event.21 On the 
contrary, Žižek argues that, like the symbolic, the order of Being is already perforated by 
Events and marked by the continuing presence of former Acts. To refer to an example from 
the previous chapter, there I made the claim that one form of symptom that the dialectic 
17 A question that has regularly motivated Žižek’s reading. See CWZ, pp.137-8, pp.214-6, PV, p.186.
18 Žižek, TS, p.196.
19 See Žižek, OB, p.125, FTKN, pp.lxxxiii-lxxxiv.
20 Adrian Johnston has carefully delineated the problems with Žižek’s accusations of the Kantian division of 
Being and Event in Adrian Johnston, “There is Truth, and then there are truths — or Slavoj Žižek as a Reader of
Alain Badiou,” in International Journal of Žižek Studies, volume 1, issue 1 (2007). Žižek’s opposition is largely 
constructed by him against Badiou’s immanentalism with which the most authoritative accounts agree. Peter 
Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth, London: University of Minnesota Press (2003) p.272.
21 Žižek, TS, pp.286-7.
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might uncover and thrust into view was the vanishing mediator as the point of mediation 
between two series that is subsequently gentrified but nevertheless continues to exist in 
spectres of violence or some Utopian point of alteriety. As such the vanishing mediator 
attests to the continuing existence of an Event within Being. As Žižek puts it in Ticklish 
Subject ‘[…] the gap of the Act is not introduced into the Order of Being afterwards: it is 
there all the time as the condition that actually sustains every Order of Being.’22 In the same 
sense that we have seen Žižek describe the not-all as the position of materialism he argues 
that ‘[t]here is no Order of Being as a positively consistent Whole.’23 Towards a similar end, 
Žižek argues that if we insist on conceiving the Event as something external or beyond the 
order of Being we risk falling into the trap of elevating the Event to something that is not 
only impossible from the point of view of the current order but impossible as such. The 
consequence of this would be to reduce the Event to a miraculous intervention over which the
subject has no control. Žižek, then, insists upon a strictly materialist conception of the Event 
which rejects any sense of a dualism between Being and Event. An Event is not the preserve 
of some subterranean Real beyond the order of Being; rather, the Event ‘explodes out of the 
gap in/of the order of Being.’24 
Žižek’s critique of Badiou results in a slight but pivotal alteration in his position that 
requires further attention. By describing the materialist Event on the basis of the not-all there 
is a slight but crucial change of perspective to Žižek’s dialectical materialism. Whereas 
previously the not-all was something that was to be realised by the dialectic and was only 
revealed in its affect on being; here, Žižek does not attempt to reveal or realise the not-all but 
position the not-all as the basis for an evental practice. Faith in the possibility of an event 
22 Žižek, TS, p.287.
23 Žižek, TS, p.287.
24 Žižek, PV, p.166, see also OWB, p.107.
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rests on the belief that ‘“All there is” is the interstices, the non-self-coincidence, of Being – 
that is, the ontological nonclosure of the order of Being.’25 Why is this difference important? 
Certainly, it could be argued that the dialectic and the “politics of Truth” intersect neatly on 
the same point, both grasping the same problem but from opposing sides. What this 
overlooks, however, is the change in the function of Žižek’s dialectical materialism. To put it 
succinctly: no longer is it the dialectic of the analyst, but something closer to a traditional 
form of philosophy with all the accordant risks undoubtedly accompanying it. We will return 
to this question in the conclusion of this chapter.
5.2.2. The Event and The Subject
Žižek’s reformulation of the relationship of Being and Event also enables us to discern how 
his work resolves some of the problems inherent to Badiou’s position. Namely, Žižek’s 
staunch Lacanianism allows him to avoid one of the central pitfalls of a politics based upon a 
Badiouian ontology. In Being and Event Badiou argues that the subject is always a subject of 
Truth in the same way that for Althusser subjects are always a subject of Ideology — as 
Althusser famously outlines in “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” (1995). For 
Badiou, we cannot conceive of pre-evental subjectivity in any meaningful or practical sense. 
This has a series of consequences, first among them is Badiou’s inability to account for the 
emergence of the Event in anything other than terms of a miracle. While the Event relies 
upon the subject’s fidelity to it — in terms of its inscription, its naming, and the fidelity to its 
consequences — it also brings the subject into existence.26 There is, thus, a certain circularity 
to the logic here: the Event is prior to the subject but emerges only through the subject that it 
also brings into existence. Badiou only partially resolves this through a differentiation 
25 Žižek, PV, p.167.
26 Badiou, Being and Event, p.433.
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between pre-evental animality and post-evental subjectivity proper that comes into being with
the emergence of the event.27 The result of this is that there is little room to conceive of the 
mediation between the site of the Event — the pure multiplicity at the edge of the void — and
the Event itself. In other words, the subject qua animality has no role other than to ignorantly 
wait in pre-evental stasis for the Event to grab hold of it. As Critchley states, ‘[f]or Badiou, 
we are simply the sort of animals who are claimed by circumstances to become a subject.’28 
From the perspective of the subject, the Event is inconceivable other than as a miraculous 
occurrence. While the Event will always be “miraculous” from the perspective of the 
situation and its statal structure, one must enquire as to whether there really is no space for an
anticipatory pre-evental subject and practice? This question is all the more urgent considering
that in Badiou’s work the pre-evental subject names a point of paralysis rather than 
possibility.29 
The anterior motive of Žižek’s recasting of the relationship between Being and Event 
is to provide a way to conceive of the relationship between the pre-evental and the evental by 
placing the subject as the key point of mediation. That is to say, he proposes that the subject 
is both the operator of the Event’s conditions and responsible for the Event’s symbolisation in
the symbolic order or the order of Being.30 ‘The subject is, both at the same time, the 
ontological gap […] as well as the gesture of subjectivization which, by means of a short 
circuit between the Universal and the Particular, heals the wound of this gap […]’31 Yet, 
through opening a possibility of pre-evental practice, Žižek evokes a different danger and an 
equally deleterious circularity. This seems to reach a breaking point the moment one 
27 Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, London: Verso (2000) p.41.
28 Simon Critchley “Demanding Approval: On the Ethics of Alain Badiou” in Radical Philosophy, No.100 
(2000) pp.21-22.
29 See, for example, Daniel Bensaïd, “Alain Badiou and the Miracle of the Event” in Think Again: Badiou and 
the Future of Philosophy, eds. Peter Hallward, London: Continuum (2004).
30 Žižek, FTKN, p.lxxxvi.
31 Žižek, TS, pp.185-6.
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confronts the above passage in Ticklish Subject. If in Badiou’s account of the Event there was
a debilitating circularity with regard to the Event-subject relationship from the perspective of 
the Event, by introducing the subject as prior to the Event Žižek re-sets this circularity but 
now from a different site. By placing this much emphasis on the subject — both instigator 
and extrapolator of the Event and its consequences — there is a danger that Žižek disables 
political possibilities. If the subject now carries the full weight of responsibility for evental 
transformation it potentially loses its grounding in the particular tensions and symptoms of a 
situation. In addition, there is also a danger that on the basis of this circularity Žižek’s subject
returns to a form of Hegelian subject-substance, whereby the subject is assumed to be able to 
refound and recreate the whole totality of the substantive Other.
Žižek, therefore, needs to carefully conceive of the relationship between subject, 
Being and Event. How does the subject relate to and enact this transformation? And, what 
relationship does it have with the current order of Being in this transformative modality? 
5.3. The Act
Žižek conceives of the Event as an Act that consists of changing the coordinates of the 
possible and impossible in a given situation by doing something that is beyond the current 
designated set of possibilities. Žižek’s key Lacanian reference in this respect is Lacan’s 
notion of the Real as Impossible in Seminar XI (1981), where Impossible does not mean 
impossible as such — it is not the opposite of possibility — but, rather, Impossible within the
reign of the pleasure principle.32 For Žižek, this structure pertains to all Acts, even at a socio-
political level. As he puts it:
32 Lacan, Seminar XI, p.167.
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The impossible happens: not impossible in the sense of religious miracles, 
but in the sense of something we don’t consider possible within our 
coordinates. This is why Lacan’s formula for overcoming an ideological 
impossibility is not “everything is possible,” but “the impossible happens.”33
Crucially, it means that the Act is always mediated historically in a very specific way. 
Because the Act is related to the distribution of the possible and impossible within a given 
socio-ideological context it must be conceived as emerging within and acting upon those 
historical coordinates. As such, the Event will occur on the basis of certain possibilities that 
are presented as impossible, or possibilities that are supposed to be impossible but yet are 
realised all the time. The Act, then, will arise from within and utilise these inconsistencies.34
As Adrian Johnston (2010, 2009) has extensively detailed, the Act requires a delicate 
balance between political flexibility and militant insistence in order to navigate the 
possibilities of the impossible. Following Žižek, we might call this “the Art of the 
Impossible.” The term refers to — and bastardises — what Lenin described as “the Art of 
Insurrection” in a defence against accusations of Blanquism and voluntarism.35 For Žižek, a 
similar navigation of possibilities is required, always dependent on the particularities of a 
concrete situation. For Žižek, theory must constantly probe and theoretically assess an order 
of being for sites of potential inconsistencies that might be radicalised. Given these 
inconsistencies, however, Žižek argues that we must remain open to the possibility of 
intervening into a situation at one of many sites, even ones that might initially appear 
insignificant. For example, in various examples Žižek emphasises how seemingly moderate 
demands can lead to substantial change if they pass through the symptomal point.36 If we 
33 Žižek, DTI, p.143.
34 Žižek, Iraq, pp.39, 80-81.
35 V.I. Lenin “Marxism and Insurrection,” A letter to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) Sept, 13-14, 
1917. In Lenin Collected Works, Moscow: Progress Publishers, vol.26 (1972)
36 Žižek, YDD, pp.133-4.
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recall the example of the Law and its obscene underside from the previous chapter, Žižek 
argues that by making specific demands at points at which the system is unable to follow its 
own explicit rules the subject can pull the whole system into crisis.  ‘[T]o insist on 
consistency, i.e., on the principles of the system itself, at strategically selected points at which
the system cannot afford to follow its principles, leads to a challenge to the entire system.’37 
Certain political demands, thus, while entirely realistic can disturb the very core of an order if
those demands cannot be incorporated into the system without radical overhaul. ‘A measure 
(say, the defence of human rights) which is in general a liberal platitude, can lead to 
explosive developments in a specific context.’38 The key to “the Art of the Impossible,” as 
Žižek writes of the Lukácsian-Leninist manner in which he understands Badiou’s notion of 
the Event, is ‘seizing the right moment, of aggravating the conflict before the System can 
accommodate itself to the demand.’39 
However, for Žižek, there can be no guarantees when it comes to the Act. Because it 
is based on the inconsistencies of the Other, the balance between possible and impossible, 
and actuality and potentiality, can rapidly shift. Similarly, the ends of an intervention can 
never be known in advance since the nature of the symbolic order means that there is always 
a gap between the intention and the outcome of an utterance. For this reason Žižek argues 
that the Act is always accompanied by a “radical risk”: it is ‘a step into the unknown, with no 
guarantee about the final outcome.’40 Nevertheless, despite this risk, the Act cannot be 
thought of in isolation from the context of its emergence. In response to our concern in the 
previous section with regard to whether Žižek’s reformulation of the relationship between 
subject and Event/Act produced a dangerous subject-centric circularity we can here respond 
37 Žižek, TIP, p.111.
38 Žižek, TIP, p.111.
39 Žižek, “HCC,” p.119.
40 Žižek, Desert, pp.152-3.
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by insisting that despite the subject’s primacy it nevertheless must always be conceived of as 
secondary in relation to the historical contexts in which it intervenes. The subject, thus, 
should not be thought of as a pure ground for the Act. As Žižek writes in Less Than Nothing: 
the subject ‘should never be directly elevated into the grounding Principle of all reality […] 
The Subject is always already related to some heterogeneous substantial content, it always 
comes second, as the negation or mediation of the content […]’41.
5.4. Subtraction
However, there remain problems with conceiving of transformation solely on the basis of 
Žižek’s conception of the Act. Primarily, these problems concern the unpredictability of the 
outcome of the Act and how it appears to contribute little to one of the principle aims of a 
Marxist politics, which is to create lasting structural change rather than merely the 
momentary Event of disruption. 
It is to Badiou’s credit that his conception of the Truth-Event speaks to this need 
insofar as it conceives of a militant fidelity to the Event that constructs and articulates its 
consequences. Initially, Žižek does not have a response to the question of what happens after 
the Act/Event, although he does highlight the conceptual space of the problem in his first 
engagement with Badiou in Ticklish Subject when he writes: 
the test of the true revolutionary, as opposed to this game of hysterical 
provocation, is the heroic readiness to endure the conversion of the 
subversive undermining of the existing System into the principle of a new 
positive Order which gives body to this negativity – or, in Badiou’s terms 
the conversion of Truth into Being.42
41 Žižek, LTN, p.379.
42 Žižek, TS, p.286.
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In Parallax View Žižek finally resolves this problem through the notion of subtraction, a term
that Žižek borrows, along with much of the conceptual architecture, from Badiou’s The 
Century (2007). Indeed, in “Philosophy is not a Dialogue” (2009) Žižek announces this as a 
significant change of direction:
[I]n my latest book [Parallax View] […] I’ve taken the radical step that 
leads away from my usual position, a step that was very painful for me. Up 
until now, I’ve held on to the idea that the authentic experience as such, to 
say it simply, is that which Lacan once called going to the end of the 
analytic process, and I told myself with doubts that this process is political, 
even that any political activity correlates with it. I’ve now abandoned that. I 
don’t believe any more that the conclusion from psychoanalysis is, if I can 
say it like this, the authentic form of political engagement.43 
We should not quite take Žižek wholly at his word here since this new position exists in 
addition to — expanding rather than replacing — the Lacanian repertoire of political 
interventions and, as such, still has a certain connection to them. However, the emergence of 
subtraction does amount to a significant sea-change in Žižek’s thinking, albeit not quite the 
complete break from the Lacanian problematic he suggests. 
In Parallax View Žižek describes subtraction as a form of Evental withdrawal that 
rejects the positive order of knowledge, as well as its possibilities, demands, and explicit 
points of identification. As we will see in his political articulation of the logic of subtraction 
in his reconceptualisation of the Party as the organisational form of Communist politics, 
Žižek suggests that the consequence of subtraction is adopting the position of the analyst. In 
this context, however, we can explain Žižek’s understanding of subtraction on the basis of a 
crucial literary reference. Žižek’s understanding of subtraction in Parallax View is informed 
43 Žižek, “Dialogue,” p.103.
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by a reading of Herman Melville’s short-story “Bartleby, The Scrivener” (2012). Bartleby’s 
enigmatic rejection of the requests of authority is exemplary of the kind of antagonistic 
rejection that Žižek has in mind. What gives Bartleby’s gesture its exceptional quality is that, 
as well as a refusal of the given, it marks an embodiment of positivity. Žižek argues that what
is key to the disturbing effect of Bartleby’s act is that it affirms a non-predicate: “I would 
prefer not to”; ‘He does not say that he doesn’t want to do it; he says that he prefers (wants) 
not to do it.’44 As an Event, subtraction is exceptional because it rejects what at first seems 
not only sensible but inevitable at the level of the order of Being. However, it goes beyond 
the Act insofar as this disruption also creates a space that sustains the beginning of a new 
ordering. Bartleby’s act is negative in the sense that it refuses, but at the same time Bartleby 
does not just disappear. By affirming the non-predicate, then, Bartleby simultaneously 
produces something that is, simultaneously, ineffable within the terms of the question and 
persists against it: Bartleby’s being, his will, some heterogenous autonomy. As such, it 
appears as a disturbing intervention into the symbolic. This is why Žižek argues that 
Bartleby’s Act is violent: ‘There is no violent quality in it; the violence pertains to its very 
immobile, inert, insistent, impassive being.’45 To extrapolate somewhat: by asserting this 
impassive Being against the terms of the choice put to him, Bartleby is saying “I reject your 
choice not because I want you to offer me a different one but because I reject the very idea 
that it is you that proposes the choice at all.” Bartleby’s rejection, then, is a self-affirmation, 
in the same way that the Event announces and registers itself as an Event, without the 
reliance on the authorisation of the State. “I exist for myself.” 
Žižek returns to the notion of subtraction in a slightly different guise in In Defence of 
Lost Causes (2008). The major issue with Žižek’s account of Bartleby’s subtraction is that 
44 Žižek, PV, p.381.
45 Žižek, PV, p.385.
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there appears to be no necessary connection between the act of refusal and its violent effect 
other than as a rejection of authority. As a result, Bartleby’s gesture might be seen to result in
a mere shrug of the shoulder from those in power: “go ahead, rot in the interstices, see how 
long you last!”  Rather than being antagonistic, then, in this instance subtraction would be 
mere external autonomy. Indeed, Alain Badiou certainly seems to accept this position when 
he takes his notion of subtraction into the political realm.46 Perceiving this problem, Žižek 
argues that true subtraction exists only at the points of symptomal torsion. Bartleby’s 
rejection, then, is at the same time an identification with the abject, the remainder, the 
symptom that renders the order of being not-all. This is significant because, as such, 
subtraction is not only a rejection which persists beyond the dominant political order, but one 
that antagonises that order by virtue of striking at its weakest and most fragile point. We can 
here, once more, address our previous concerns regarding whether Žižek’s conception of the 
subject meant a return to the kind of mega-subject that has proved to be so disastrous for 
Marxism. First, the importance of the symptomal torsion as an evental site means that the 
subject’s subtractive practice is always historical and locatable.47 As such, its power resides in
how it forces open a space for proper divisions to emerge. As a function of the symptomal 
site it asks: “for or against?” “Are you for the normal flow of the everyday or are you 
standing with its excluded or the oppressed that are ignored?”48 It also indicates how Žižek’s 
“politics of Truth” is not about the imposition of a universal conception of the Good, which 
as we have seen was central to Žižek’s critique of totalitarian politics. Identifying with the 
symptom, then, is not a new conception of the Good but an identification with a point of 
antagonism. Given the antagonistic nature of the subtractive refusal, it does not impose a new
46 Alain Badiou “‘We need a Popular Discipline’: Contemporary Politics and the Crisis of the Negation” 
interview by Filippo Del Lucchese and Jason Smith in Critical Inquiry 34 (2008) pp.645-59.
47 Žižek, IDLC, p.409.
48 Žižek, IDLC, pp.410-1.
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universal but functions so as to split the current universal by running through the point of 
symptomal torsion. The “universality” of the Truth, then, derives from the split that it 
enforces and which results in two universalist positions. In Žižek’s Hegelian terms: the 
abstract universality of the order of Being and the concrete universality of the division of the 
Truth-Event, which is unaccountable within the order of Being.49 The effect of the subtractive
position is to initiate a struggle: ‘not simply between the particular elements of the 
universality: not just about which particular content will “hegemonize” the empty form of 
universality, but a struggle between two exclusive forms of universality themselves.’50  In 
classical political terms, we can think of this division between two universalities as one 
‘between Society as a hierarchical structure and a Society for which the excluded (demos, the
third estate, dissidents) stand.’51 
Thinking of Bartleby’s subtraction in this way means that we can conceive of the 
Event, not as an abstract negation but as one that creates and sustains the possibility of the 
New through a constant antagonistic disjunction within the order of Being. As Žižek argues:
in its political mode, Bartleby’s “I would prefer not to” is not the starting 
point of “abstract negation” which should then be overcome in the patient 
positive work of the “determinate negation” of the existing social universe, 
but a kind of arche, the underlying principle that sustains the entire 
movement: from “overcoming” it, the subsequent work of construction, 
rather, gives body to it.52
The logic in operation here is that of retroactivity. That is to say, Bartleby’s gesture is always 
a risk whose effects will only be judged apres-coup, depending on how its meaning is later 
49 Žižek, TS, p.227.
50 Žižek, IDLC, p.285.
51 Žižek, OWB, p.59.
52 Žižek, PV, p.382.
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inscribed, which, in turn, sustains the initial force of this antagonistic refusal. We will shortly 
turn to the nature of the creative side of subtraction but before this we need to carefully 
delineate the nature of subtractive negativity.
5.4.1. Active Nihilism and Purification
Before we outline the particular type of political subjectivity that a subtractive politics 
suggests, we must first address a common concern with Žižek’s politics that it is little more 
than what Raoul Vaneigem (2001) describes as “active nihilism,” a politics of destruction and
suicide conceived as revolutionary action.53 As well as Tormey and Robinson’s (2005) 
specific rebuke, variations of this critique can be found among many of Žižek’s interlocutors. 
For example, Peter Hallward argues that there is a morbid fascination with death at the heart 
of Žižek’s work.54 While this is certainly present in Žižek’s earliest writing regarding the 
Thing — and, as we will see, this dimension does persist in some of Žižek’s formulations of 
revolutionary politics — subtraction, nevertheless, navigates a course around it. Indeed, one 
could even consider it as a direct attempt to avoid this form of nihilism.
When Badiou fashions the outlines of subtraction in The Century he does so by 
differentiating it from a different form of “passion for the Real”, that of “purification.” 
Badiou argues that purification has been the dominant radical attitude of the Twentieth 
Century, consisting in an obsession with the removal of semblance, the escape from 
representation to the Real, and the attempt to reduce being to its contingent absoluteness as a 
form of test of authenticity.55 “Purification,” then, is the violent discarding of deceptive 
53 Raoul Vaneigem, The Revolution of Everyday Life, trans. David Nicholson-Smith. London: Rebel Press 
(2001) p.178.
54 Hallward, Badiou, p.150.
55 Alain Badiou, The Century, trans. Alberto Toscano, Cambridge: Polity (2007) pp.52, 56.
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appearance until the Real is revealed in its awful, violent contingency. Following Badiou,56 
Žižek connects the logic of purification to Ernst Jünger’s celebration of military combat,57 
and the Stalinist logics of the purge and the New Man.58 What defines purification is its 
mistaken presumption that if the layers of appearance and semblance are stripped back far 
enough ‘something will remain,’ some “sublime” remainder will be revealed to lie in wait 
behind the deceit of appearance.59 It is this search for a form of authentic newness — the 
“New Man”, some pure ethical position, etc. — that leads to purification resulting in a cycle 
of destructive infinity. Since appearances are constitutive of every Real, purification is 
‘doomed to incompletion.’60  
Active nihilism, then, is a paradigmatic form of purification. Its claim to authenticity 
through destruction is always indexed to a form of violence that ends in horror or self-
annihilation. Subtraction is of vital importance to Žižek because it allows him to conceive of 
a form of practical negativity that is neither destructive nor doomed to end in failure. What it 
aims to produce is negativity as a minimal difference, which, as Žižek explains, is the gap 
within the All. The negativity that it names, then, is that of the symptom, an element that 
“destabilises” the natural functioning of the All when it is denied its exceptional external 
place.61 Here, we do not get the destruction of purification but the opening of rupture within 
and against the All. Bartleby’s act, then, is the equivalent of dialectical critique at the level of 
political practice. His subtraction similarly attempts to open the All, through antagonising it 
and sustaining a place both within and against it.
56 Badiou, The Century, pp.39, 53.
57 Žižek, FTKN, p.lxxiii.
58 Žižek, FTKN, p.lxxv.
59 Žižek, FTKN, p.lxxv.
60 Badiou, The Century, p.52.
61 Žižek, FTKN, p.lxxvii-lxvii.
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To see how the logic of subtraction effects the way that Žižek conceives of negativity,
it is illustrative to look at how it re-purposes the most obvious and abyssal figure of 
negativity in his work, the death drive. We saw previously how Žižek conceived of the drive 
as das Ding the abyssal, thicket of traumatic maternal jouissance, a kind of pre-reflexive 
materiality which destroyed the subject upon contact. Through the logic of subtraction, 
Žižek’s notion of drive and its relation to desire significantly alters in form. Žižek now 
conceives of desire along the lines of purification in the sense that its constant search for 
something that is impossible produces the same “bad infinite” given the constitutive lack that 
characterises jouissance.62 As such, desire is ‘driven by the “impossible” quest for the lost 
object.’63 Drive, on the other hand, is now conceived of by Žižek in a manner similar to the 
minimal difference; it does not confront a fullness, or even search for one, rather it ‘circulates
around a hole, a gap in the order of being.’64 The purpose of drive, then, is also that of 
subtraction: it aims to disturb, open-up and assert a point of non-coincidence. As Žižek writes
in Parallax View, the work that was so important for this reconception of his position in line 
with Badiou’s idea of subtraction: drive is ‘a push to enact “loss” — the gap, cut, distance —
itself directly.’65
5.4.2. Breaking the Theoretical Deadlock II: Between the Democratic and 
Totalitarian Political Subject
The idea of subtraction allows Žižek to reformulate the nature and form of the political 
moment of his Lacanian-Hegelian dialectical materialist philosophy. It means that he is able 
to break out from the disabling opposition between democratic lack and authoritarian das 
62 Žižek, PV, p.61.
63 Žižek, PV, p.62.
64 Žižek, PV, p.61.
65 Žižek, PV, p.62.
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Ding, which, as I argued in 3.4., required addressing as one of the key challenges of Žižek’s 
Marxism. To draw out its implications more fully, here I will connect subtraction to another 
key theoretical figure in Žižek’s work, feminine subjectivity. Although Žižek does not 
explicitly make this connection himself, feminine subjectivity can be regarded as the form of 
political subjectivity that best matches the politics of subtraction. In addition, making this 
connection allows us to draw out some of the less explicit positive and creative dimensions of
subtraction. 
For Lacan, the difference between the masculine and feminine subjects derives from 
their different relationships to castration, or, in more general terms, the set of exclusions and 
prohibitions on which a socio-symbolic order is grounded.66 While the masculine subject 
takes seriously the exclusions that ground an order, the feminine subject rejects their 
exceptional status and the jouissance that they engender.67 To translate this into terms that we
are more familiar with, the masculine subject does not want to know about the symptom and 
is happy to repress or disavow its consequences in favour of its fantasmatic re-coding. For 
example, the bourgeois subject would be a masculine subject insofar as they take no notice of
the symptomal status of the freedom to sell one’s labour, and instead choose to accept the 
fantasy that by selling their labour they really can become free, wealthy, secure, and full 
citizens. In libidinal terms, this is the fantasy of what is constitutively impossible. The 
feminine subject, however, rejects the fantasmatic status of the symptom, refuses the terms of
the promise of jouissance, and instead, as with subtraction, identifies with the symptom as the
impossibility and inconsistency of the Other’s promise. The feminine subject, then, can be 
66 Despite Žižek’s numerous arguments I still have reservations about Žižek’s defence of Lacanian 
Phallocentricism, given that it continues to confirm and propagate common prejudices, even if these are given a 
positive valence. However, due to limitations of space, we are unfortunately unable to pursue this further here. 
For Žižek’s defence see ME, p.145, and a more detailed discussion see Vighi and Feldner, Žižek: Beyond 
Foucault, chapter 15.
67 Lacan, Seminar XX, pp.79-80.
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thought of as the proletarian who challenges the political order by drawing attention to the 
violence, poverty and destitution that is obfuscated by the promise of freedom. 
Identifying with the symptom, then, is not the Abyssal confrontation with the stupid 
insistence of maternal jouissance but, rather, the acceptance of its lack. This is evident in the 
new relationship to jouissance that feminine subjectivity engenders.68 Whereas Phallic 
jouissance is an economy based upon an impossible satisfaction in an acetic world of benign 
pleasures, feminine jouissance is an enjoyment in this lack. As Žižek writes in Less Than 
Nothing ‘[i]n feminine jouissance the absence itself is sexualised.’69 In this sense, feminine 
subjectivity is also of the drive: it pushes this lack, it cuts into Phallic jouissance and the 
smooth, self-assured ideological edifice of a hegemonic power. What is so disturbing about 
this enjoyment is its otherness. It is a jouissance not based upon the fantasy of the Other, but, 
rather, an enjoyment in its lack. That is to say, it is jouissance that demonstrates ‘the ultimate 
form of autonomy’ compared to the dominant socio-political structures.70 
This relationship to the not-all also explains why the feminine subject qua subtractive 
subject is creative and far freer than the masculine subject. The feminine subject opens up a 
series of opportunities and possibilities that are absent from the masculine perspective.  In 
terms of their relationship to prohibited content, the masculine subject accepts prohibition 
and thus does not want the smooth, consistent order of being disturbed by the symptom, but 
for the feminine subject, who no longer accepts the prohibition, there is nothing that ‘one 
should not talk about.’71 With regard to the feminine subject’s relationship to love, Žižek 
writes, it is ‘without restraint or reserve.’72 What feminine subjectivity thus allows us to 
68 Žižek, ME, p.161, Fink, The Lacanian Subject, p.111.
69 Žižek, LTN, p.751.
70 Žižek, LTN, p.752.
71 Žižek, LTN, p.748.
72 Žižek, LTN, p.749.
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glimpse is a political practice that is both autonomous and creative insofar as it is no longer 
wedded to the fantasy of an impossible jouissance, but able to “autonomously” enjoy and 
operate fully within the symbolic with all its inconsistencies and fractures. In this sense, 
Žižek describes the feminine position as ‘immersed in the symbolic more wholly than a man 
— without restraint, without exception.’73 In terms of our prior example, then, what we could 
say is that the bourgeois subject remains ignorant of the symptom on the basis of its 
fantasmatic promise of freedom, whereas the proletarian subject fully identifies with the 
symptom and thereby renders the totality not-all. 
As a result, feminine subjectivity allows us to illuminate some of the more obscure 
aspects of the subject’s relationship to the Event. Žižek talks of a political practice without 
rules, that suspends ethical norms, and takes risks that are not covered or designated as 
possible by the Other. As the feminine subject demonstrates, this does not mean a total exit or
lawlessness but, rather, the ability to decide and create norms in the very practice of 
autonomously applying them, given that the ultimate norm that sustains them has been 
rejected: the prohibition of the symptom. As a result, like the autonomous evental-practice 
which is at odds with the order of Being, the feminine subject suggests a practice that has to 
be ‘an immediate index of its own truth.’74
Subtraction and feminine subjectivity thus allow Žižek to escape the political dead-
end of his pre-dialectical materialist position. From the perspective of subtraction and 
feminine subjectivity the errors of Žižek’s democratic position are now clear: caught between
the Scylla and Charybdis of accepting limit and the dystopian reaching for the prohibited 
Thing it remained in the masculine economy of prohibition and exception. As such, the 
democratic position was not a true negation of the Stalinist one but rather its obverse: both 
73 Žižek, PATD, p.68.
74 Žižek, “LC,” p.260.
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conceive of the Real beyond lack as a substantial fullness. The feminine subject and 
subtraction overcomes this binary. The inconsistency of the socio-symbolic order that is 
revealed to the feminine subject, thus, demonstrates the possibility of a political practice that 
reaches beyond the opposition of complicity and catastrophe.
5.5. The Tension at the Heart of a Marxist-Lacanian Dialectical 
Materialism
In the introduction we described Žižek’s “politics of Truth” as a risky and controversial 
position since to invoke Truth in the political field brings with it resonances of totalitarianism
and other forms of politics which enforce a single conception of the Good. In this chapter I 
have demonstrated that Žižek’s “politics of Truth” does not signal the return to a totalitarian 
politics as some have argued, nor is it limited by a conception of an Act that is purely 
negative. 
Žižek’s “politics of Truth” does remain “risky” in another sense, however.  When we 
compare the role of Žižek’s “politics of Truth” with that of dialectical materialism as critical 
practice it soon becomes evident that they stand at odds to each other despite the fact that 
they seem complimentary. The most important opposition resides in how while dialectical 
materialism began by rejecting all ontology on the basis of a practice that sought to 
historicise all order, with the “politics of Truth” a minimal ontology returns. The problem can
be clearly discerned with regard to the question of materialism in Žižek’s work: is it a critical 
position or is the not-all a form of minimalistic ontology? With regard to the critical dialectic,
the “law” of the not-all was a presupposition that had to be confirmed through dialectical 
practice. Insofar as it informed the dialectic, it could be said to function in a similar way to 
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how Fredric Jameson understands the term totality as functioning in the context of Marxism 
as a methodological postulate for critical practice.75 In Žižek’s case, the not-all was a 
similarly speculative presupposition that guided dialectical practice. This changes with “the 
politics of Truth,” however. Here, the not-all becomes the basis for a conception of the Act 
and subtraction. He argues that Being already is not-all, in order to facilitate an engaged 
political position and an argument for the continuing possibility of evental transformation. 
Here, the not-all is not a methodological postulate, but, rather, indicative of a return to 
ontology, however underdetermined. 
Why is this seemingly minor modification in his position important? It is important 
because it indexes a transformation in the role of dialectical materialism as a philosophy and 
Žižek as a philosopher. On the one hand, the “politics of Truth” seems to compliment the 
dialectic and, as I have argued, overcome some of its limitations in terms of how the subject 
is supposed to move from the discomforting shock of the Real to concrete political practice. 
On the other hand, however, Žižek is no longer presenting the philosopher’s role as that of 
the analyst it would seem. While Žižek still maintains the gap in being, he is no longer 
merely attempting to “open” it through the dialectical critique of totality. The role of 
philosophy is now to inform how the subject must act to utilise this not-all for a revolutionary
politics. Why is this problematic? With regard to Marxism, it is not a problem, strictly 
speaking. Traditionally, Marxism has always allowed philosophy, or theory, to occupy this 
role: to change the world, one has to also describe it and, on this basis, suggest the kind of 
change that might be possible. Marxist revolutionary theory is always premised on the role of
the theorist and theory as the bridging point, the moment of consciousness, the point where 
the masses realise their role. However, Žižek’s return to dialectical materialism was premised
75 Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act, London: Routledge 
(1983) p.31.
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on a critique of Marxism, which did not only problematise Marxist philosophy at the level of 
content but also at the level of form. Žižek argued that philosophy could not stand in for the 
Other — that is, the philosopher could not take the role of the master, whether in its 
traditional or perverted guise. Žižek’s critique of Marxism, in other words, insists that we 
should avoid the traditional form of the relationship between philosophy and practice. Žižek 
initially avoids this, as we have seen, with a critical practice, akin to analysis, where Truth is 
produced via negativia. For Žižek, if philosophy was to remain antithetical to the master, the 
stand-in for the Other, it had to demonstrate the failure of the master-signifier. Žižek’s 
“politics of Truth” seems to indicate a move beyond this purely critical position, however, 
insofar as it suggests to the subject how to Act. That is, it tells the subject that they are the 
basis for the Act and that they have the power to carry it out. The return to an ontology, 
however minimal, would seem to risk positing the Other that the fetishistic position so 
desperately wants to embody. The riskiness of Žižek’s position, then, resides in how by 
making these minimally programmatic and prescriptive claims Žižek might return philosophy
to the position of the master and offer the subject an Other, which, as we saw, was the basis 
of the failure of traditional Marxism and the disasters of really existing socialism. If Žižek is 
going to remain faithful to the Lacanian critique of Marxism, and on this basis offer a 
renewed Marxist theory, he will have to carefully navigate this potential danger. We will 
return to see how Žižek fares in this regard in the final chapter and analyse whether Žižek can
maintain the position of the analyst while answering that old Chernyshevskyan-Leninist 
question, which all Marxist theory must eventually arrive at, “what is to be done?”
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Chapter 6: The (other) Act and the
Absolute
6.1. Introduction
In the introduction to this thesis and at several points throughout I have highlighted and 
alluded to the existence of a “second Žižek.” The “second Žižek” is problematic, because not 
only does it stand awkwardly in his relation to the materialist not-all, and the risky 
underdetermined nature of the Act, but the theories and positions associated with it also 
appear wholly antithetical to Marxist theory and politics. This dimension of Žižek’s work is 
outlined most definitively by Boucher (2009) and Boucher and Sharpe (2010) but can be 
considered to be properly traumatic within the Žižekian field. With the exception of Adrian 
Johnston’s work perhaps, which I will return to shortly, the “second Žižek” is the dimension 
of Žižek’s work that critical accounts obsess over and Žižekian sympathisers repress in order 
to avoid its full consequences. In the previous chapter we qualified a number of the responses
to certain criticisms with the caveat that this or that element of Žižek’s work did not 
necessarily carry the implications that they argued it did. We can say here, however, that 
elements of their critical readings of Žižek were nonetheless well founded. One of the many 
problems with the “second Žižek” is the political position which Žižek articulated on its 
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basis. From what I will argue are rather problematic theoretical foundations, Žižek derives 
political conclusions that are even more questionable, especially from the perspective of his 
Marxism. We have already touched upon several critiques of Žižek’s work which align it 
with a violent, destructive nihilism and with spectres of totalitarianism. It is here where these 
criticisms find their ammunition. 
This chapter will aim to bring to the surface and isolate these elements in Žižek’s 
work and in doing so demonstrate how they are at odds with the political and theoretical 
positions that have been outlined above. The purpose of this critical confrontation with the 
“second Žižek” is, ultimately, to critically reflect on to what extent these positions — 
theoretical and political — have a place in a Marxist dialectical materialist philosophy. In 
order to approach the “second Žižek” we must make a number of decisions regarding Žižek’s
work. The “second Žižek” is neither a constant nor, strictly speaking, an isolated incident in 
Žižek’s writing. The two key theoretical texts where much of the positions of the “second 
Žižek” are developed are The Indivisible Remainder (1996[2007]) and The Abyss of Freedom
(1997), which attempt to read F.W.J Schelling’s theory of the emergence of God as a theory 
of the genesis of the subject. To some extent, Žižek’s most recent theoretical works Absolute 
Recoil and Less Than Nothing are also important as they return to some of the same themes in
greater detail, expanding them into new areas. However, it is certainly not limited to these 
texts. In terms of the political positions associated with the “second Žižek” the Ticklish 
Subject and essays around the turn of the millennium are the most obvious examples of the 
presence of the “second Žižek.” As Žižek’s political critique has developed, he resorts less to 
the extreme positions taken in this period. They nevertheless continue to emerge at the very 
heart of Žižek’s work. For example, and rubbing against the position of the materialist not-
all, in Parallax View Žižek hints at a dimension that ‘reaches over’ the horizon of collective, 
129
The (other) Act and the Absolute
socio-political practice.1 Whereas in the previous chapters this beyond was nothing but an 
effect of the internal limitations of the symbolic, here Žižek is indicating a beyond to the not-
all. One of the definitive features of the “second Žižek”, then, is the continuing existence of a 
subterranean Real, which, as we shall see shortly, is associated with an Absolute and 
metaphysical power in the form of a transcultural, transnatural death drive. 
Above, we briefly touched upon the work of Adrian Johnston, noting that his work 
was an exception to the norm. Johnston (2010) demonstrates a different way to deal with the 
“second Žižek” from the majority of the critical and sympathetic readers by integrating it into
a theory of subjectivity. As a result, Johnston is able to limit its metaphysical character by 
connecting it to the bodily Real, while, at the same time, remain critical of those moments in 
Žižek’s work in which the metaphysical dimension becomes detached from the bodily Real 
as some beyond to both nature and culture. To be clear, my critique in this chapter in no way 
takes issue with the transcendental materialist account of the subject which Johnston is 
developing. Rather, I take issues with the subterranean dimension of the Real as a 
metaphysical absolute and the disastrous political consequences that accompany it in Žižek’s 
work.
This chapter begins by focusing on these political consequences, in turn, delineating a
different, although related, version of the Act present in Žižek’s work in the form of an 
abyssal destructive, suicidal negativity. It proceeds to consider the metaphysical basis of this 
conception of political action in Žižek’s reading of Schelling. We turn to consider how this 
metaphysical materialism marks a return to an expressive conception of dialectics in section 
6.4 through a reading of Žižek’s understanding of Democritean philosophy in comparison to 
Marx’s preference for Epicurean materialism. The final section of this chapter attempts to 
1 Žižek, PV, p.5.
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understand Žižek’s error in the context of “the end of History” and in terms of the political 
function of his reading of Schelling.
6.2. The (other) Act
Žižek’s conception of the Act as an abyssal rejection of the symbolic order emerges shortly 
after his declaration of allegiance to a dialectical materialist Marxism. This notion of the Act 
emerges prior to Žižek’s engagement with Badiou and the resulting reformulation of his 
conception of political practice through an understanding of subtraction. In the striking but 
troubling conception of political and social transformation that this earlier conception of the 
Act indicates, the subject is encouraged to take a suicidal option of total withdrawal, and told 
to tear down the very fabric of their social universe and instead immerse themselves in a 
destructive and painful freedom. As such, this Act is an exemplary case of the problematic 
logic of purification.  
The basic coordinates of the type of Act which Žižek describes are already familiar 
from our prior understanding of the concept in Žižek’s work. Žižek imagines the possibility 
of a forceful intervention that challenges the status quo, while seeming risky, or even 
impossible, from within its perspective. What Žižek’s alternative conception of the Act adds 
to this is that it must aim at a mode of self-destruction in which the subject goes through total 
aphanisis and embraces something close to a momentary madness, not by virtue of going 
against the grain of the current hegemonic order, but, rather, by virtue of touching the Thing, 
that maternal, pre-symbolic plenitude of jouissance that in his democratic phase Žižek told us
was “too hot” to do anything but encircle. Žižek bases this conception of the act and the 
subject’s freedom on a particularly violent understanding of “subjective destitution,” one 
figure that Lacan uses to describe the end of analysis that was never fully developed but is 
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here used by Žižek to conceive of social transformation.2 Only through this self-annihilation 
does Žižek think transformation can be enacted.3  
The clearest account of this destructive act of self-inflicted violence in Žižek’s work 
occurs shortly after his turn to Marxism, specifically at a point where he appears particularly 
eager to further differentiate Lacanian-Marxism from deconstruction and post-structuralism 
and their political positions. In a disagreement with Judith Butler’s book The Psychic Life of 
Power (1997) concerning the nature of identification, set out in the essay “From ‘Passionate 
Attachments’ to Dis-Identification” (1998),4 Žižek develops a conception of transformation 
that re-articulates the ‘entire symbolic field by means of an act proper, a passage through 
“symbolic death.”’5 Rejecting the effectiveness of any directly symbolic re-articulation on the
basis that it will only constitute a minor transgression within the symbolic order,6 thereby 
overlooking the retroactively legitimated performative power of symbolic acts,7 Žižek argues 
that only ‘the intervention of the real of an act’8 can provide the basis for political practice. 
Žižek describes the act as Real, not in terms of the fragmentation of the symbolic order, the 
rendering of it as not-all that we saw in the previous chapters, but in terms of the escape from 
the symbolic order as such.9 To use terms that Žižek himself uses elsewhere in his work: the 
Act qua Real is conceived in this context as the subject throwing itself at the mercy of the 
2 Paul Verhaeghe and Frédéric Declercq “Lacan's analytical goal: ‘Le Sinthome’ or the feminine way.” in 
Essays on the final Lacan. Re-inventing the symptom, ed. L. Thurston New York: The Other Press (2002) pp. 
59-83.
3 Žižek, TS, p.452-464.
4 This essay is also present in Ticklish Subject as part of the chapter 5.
5 Žižek, “Passionate,” p.5.
6 Žižek, “Passionate,” p.6.
7 Adrian Johnston, Badiou, Žižek, and Political Transformation: The Cadence of Change, Evanston, Il: 
Northwestern University Press (2009) see chapter three. See also: Geoff Boucher "The Law as a Thing: Žižek 
and the Graph of Desire" in Traversing the Fantasy: Critical Responses to Slavoj Žižek eds. Geoff Boucher, 
Jason Glynos and Matthew Sharpe Aldershot: Ashgate (2005) p.39.
8 Žižek, “Passionate,” p.5.
9 Žižek, “Passionate,” p.14.
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Vortex of the Thing.10 Or, as Žižek describes this action in Sublime Object: ‘the total 
“wipeout” of historical tradition.’11 
To be clear, Žižek conceives of this intervention, which at best can be thought of as 
self-transformation, as the basis for social transformation in his dialogue with Butler. That is 
to say, Žižek conflates two dimensions which have no necessary overlap.12 On this basis 
Žižek is able to articulate a Lacanian Ethics of the Real as a counterpoint to the 
deconstructivist position of the finitude of socio-symbolic existence — a position that broadly
characterised his prior democratic position. The Ethical Act in this case is the unlimited 
embrace of the Real. Extending this position he argues that radical evil is not the totalitarian 
position of the finite subject acting as if there were a God, but, rather, the disavowal of the 
divine power of the subject itself.13
Žižek draws his examples of the Act primarily from literary and filmic sources. For 
example, Žižek cites Sethe’s act of infanticide in Toni Morrison’s Beloved, Keyser Soze’s 
shooting of his family in the Usual Suspects, Christ’s Crucifixion, and Antigone’s decision to
go against the state to bury her brother and bear the consequences of being buried alive. With 
regard to the last of these, it is telling that in his later work Žižek uses the exact same 
example to demonstrate the position of purification.14 Here, once again, Žižek’s Lacanian 
reference point is Lacan’s claim in Seminar VII that ‘the only thing of which one can be 
guilty is of having given ground relative to one’s desire.’15 It is on this basis that Žižek 
conceives of the Impossible not as that miraculous disruption of the status quo but an heroic 
acceptance of our ultimate desire, understood at the level of the subject as das Ding, and at 
10 Žižek, FTKN, p.xxx.
11 Žižek, SOI, p151.
12 See Žižek, “Passionate,” p.7, TS, p.375.
13 Žižek, “Passionate,” p.17.
14 Žižek, FTKN, p.lxxiii.
15 Lacan, Seminar VII, p.319.
133
The (other) Act and the Absolute
the socio-political level as something akin to an ultimate political goal. Here, however, the 
suggestion that Žižek makes through his particular choice of examples is that regardless of 
any strategic consideration we must perform the Act, consequences, social or personal, be 
damned. Elsewhere Žižek describes the effect of the act’s negativity as so total that it 
amounts to “wiping the slate-clean” and marks a new beginning as a form of immaculate 
conception at year-zero.16 Žižek derives this notion from a conception of the end of analysis, 
where he insists on a particular violent act of subjective destitution that necessitates going to 
the end. This is one particular understanding of the end of analysis, albeit one that is 
transformed to an incredibly extreme and violent end; however, as he himself later 
acknowledges, there are several ways to conceive of this end, and several concerns that Lacan
has with the confrontation with ‘the terrifying Real in its blinding destructive power.’17 
We can see here a series of differences between this conception of the Act and the 
mode of political practice that we considered in the previous chapter. 
 The Act relies on abandoning language, thus presuming the symbolic is escapable. In 
this way, Žižek takes the nonexistence of the big Other to imply its rejection, rather 
than merely its fragility and unboundedness. 
 Given this rejection of the symbolic, Žižek conceives of the Act as wholly asocial, 
unlike the subtractive practice which, while operating in the interstices of power to 
gain autonomy, did not constitute a rejection of sociality entirely. 
 The focus on individual transformation, without mediation or the overdetermination 
of its consequences in the symbolic, suggests a return to the subject-substance model 
of reconciliation characteristic of a traditional understanding of Hegel.
16 Žižek, FA, p.127.
17 Žižek, LTN, pp.511-513.
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 The politics of alliances and divisions suggested by subtraction is here disavowed in 
favour of the single punctual, abyssal act of transformation.
 As presented here, the Act appears far closer to a mode of purification than 
subtraction. In this context, the Real is not the gap or fracture but a confrontation with
an abyssal Real in all its traumatic horror.
 This version of the Act almost certainly will be subject to the kinds of problems we 
have already touched upon in discussing the difficulties of Žižek’s politics. The 
extreme and destructive nature of the Act means that it is unlikely that this shock will 
be maintained or converted into positive structural change. Instead, it would seem 
most likely that it will lead to a quick return to ideological semblances to protect 
against this abyssal Real. 
As well as these troubling differences, there is a further problem at the heart of Žižek’s 
conception of the Act in this context that we need to focus carefully on. Rather than a 
considered and strategically measured action, Žižek describes the Act as “crazy” not only in 
the context of the socio-political order but crazy to the subject itself. He describes how the 
subject of the act becomes a ‘lifeless puppet’, how it ‘surprises the agent itself’,18 that it 
demonstrates some other ‘terrifying violence at work,’19 and reduces the subject to an 
automaton.20 It’s unclear why Žižek is so keen to emphasise the unconscious nature of the 
Act. It has been suggested that he maintains a clear “split” in the subject so as to be able to 
prevent the conclusion that he is returning to a model of transformation that is akin to the 
subject as the creator-author of the entirety of the socio-symbolic contents.21 Regardless of 
Žižek’s intended aims, the consequences of this move is that all subjective agency is removed
18 Žižek, “Passionate,” p.14.
19 Žižek, FA, p.127.
20 Žižek, TS, pp.374-5.
21 Boucher, Charmed Circle of Ideology, p.173.
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from the Act and it becomes incredibly difficult to imagine how this conception of the Act 
can inform political practice. Are subjects now supposed to just wait for the Act to happen 
through them? Should the subject attempt to judge the Act or just accept it as it occurs? If we 
follow Žižek’s statements on the matter it would seem that the subject must simply bear the 
consequences of the Act as it works through them. Žižek describes the Act as something that 
“repulses” the subject, a foreign body within them that repels them.22 If this sounds vaguely 
familiar it is because we have heard Žižek describe revolutionary political practice in similar 
terms previously when discussing the position of the pervert who disavows their own 
responsibility for the Act, and its repulsive consequences, on to the Other.
The unconscious nature of the Act raises several further questions when its connection
with the revolutionary pervert comes to light. What is the nature of the “foreign body” that 
the subject experiences? What agency is at work in this Act if it is not the conscious subject? 
Žižek’s allusion throughout is that this extra dimension is that of the unconscious — that 
dimension of the subject that the conscious subject cannot recognise as themselves. Yet, 
given the power and force of this intervention it is reasonable to highlight how this 
formulation of the unconscious goes far beyond anything elsewhere in Žižek’s work. Indeed, 
Žižek describes the unconscious in this context as the intervention of the “divine.” He argues 
that the lesson of the Act is that ‘divine miracles occur.’23 
Here, I want to propose that when Žižek refers to the divine nature of the Act in this 
context and describes how the Act totally overwhelms and eclipses the subject that he is 
actually referring to something far beyond the unconscious. This is not just the unexpected or 
the unknown, but a dimension that Žižek introduces in his work that secures for the subject a 
properly metaphysical power, connected to a theological Absolute. The problem can be 
22 Žižek, “Passionate,” p.14.
23 Žižek, “Passionate,” p.17.
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approached by way of a symptomatic confluence in Žižek’s conception of the Act that has led
to seemingly contradictory interpretations of it. On one hand, Žižek’s conception of the Act 
suggests a total negativity insofar as it is said to demonstrate the possibility of “wiping the 
slate clean” through the total rejection of finite reality. On the other hand, as Yannis 
Stravrakakis argues, the transformative power of the Act also demonstrates an ‘unlimited 
(real) positivity’ insofar as the Real in this context is without limit and able to effect a total 
transformation.24 Žižek’s conception of the Act can produce seemingly opposed 
interpretations because it carries both of these dimensions. It marks a point of pure 
destruction and creation, and the accordant possibility of a total re-beginning of socio-
political reality. In other words, Žižek’s conception of the Act here is not merely a figure of 
political practice but indicates a Power that is absolute in its scope and its force. That is to 
say, when Žižek describes the “divine” nature of the Act it would seem that he is not using 
the term metaphorically, but, rather, literally. 
How can Žižek support such a position? What leads him to conclude that in political 
practice the subject might possess such an incredible power? It is my contention that Žižek’s 
theory of the Act is supported by a set of philosophical positions that develop a conception of
the subject that endow it with a divine Power.
6.3. The Short-Circuit of Man and God.
Immediately after declaring his work to be a form of Marxist dialectical materialism Žižek 
peculiarly does not undertake an analysis of capitalism, nor return to the cannon of Marxist 
philosophy, but, rather, Žižek turns to F.W.J Schelling’s Weltater drafts, in which Schelling 
attempts to account for the beginning of the universe inclusive of God. In the introduction to 
24 Yannis Stavrakakis, The Lacanian Left: Psychoanalysis, Theory, Politics, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press (2007) p.110.
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Indivisible Remainder Žižek claims that he is reading Schelling’s theogony as a 
metapsychology. But what we find, in actuality, is Žižek utilising Lacan to read Schelling in 
order to produce a cosmology with the subject at its centre.
According to Žižek’s reading of Schelling’s position: before the beginning of the 
world a lot occurred. There was an Urgrund as a form of proto-substance: a formless, 
contentlessness contradiction.25 In this Urgrund there was also something akin to a proto-
subject at work, although this subject was not activated. Together these constitute what Žižek 
calls the “abyss of pure Freedom” a form of absolute basis for all creation. The immobility of 
this absolute basis is eventually broken, so Žižek argues, when the proto-subject no longer 
wills nothing but nothingness itself. This leads to a radical contraction, which produces an 
expansive explosion26 and, in turn, engenders a vicious cycle of pulsating drives: the ‘vortex 
of “divine madness” that threatens to swallow everything.’27 One level up from the “abyss of 
Freedom” then, Žižek describes the world of Grund qua drives which he characterises as a 
‘chaotic psychotic universe.’28 It is against this background, Žižek argues, that phenomenal 
reality emerges through an intervention by God. 
God’s original Act is to announce the Word, Reason, logos, and repress the Grund of 
the pulsating, chaotic drives into the eternal past. Schelling calls this act the Ent-Scheidung, 
or primordial division. In this act of division, God creates temporality by differentiating 
between the past and the present.29 God also determines the essential structure of the world. 
Žižek argues that the basis of God’s Act remains in the persistence of the Urgrund within the 
Grund. That is to say, the abyss of Freedom empowers God’s Act.30 After this Act, the 
25 Žižek, IR, p.14.
26 Žižek, IR, p.23.
27 Žižek, AF, p.16.
28 Žižek, IR, p.13.
29 Žižek, IR, pp.13, 29.
30 Žižek, IR, p.79.
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Urgrund is, like the Grund, also repressed into the eternal past remaining only in the form of 
a spectre that continues to link the world of present Reason to its chaotic and irrational past. 
As a result, Žižek describes the entirety of the structure of the Universe quite simply as 
Urgrund—Grund—Existence.31 
Utilising this structure Žižek reformulates his understanding of the Lacanian subject. 
No longer does Žižek conceive of the subject as emerging through its constitutive alienation 
within the symbolic. Instead, Žižek suggests there is a dimension of the subject that persists 
beyond this alienation and through which it can “decide its eternal nature.” In this context, 
Žižek describes how the subject can determine their “fundamental fantasy,” which gives to 
the subject its “eternal” character, in an act akin to self-re-pre-destination.32 The structure of 
the subject is, as a result, substantially transformed. Prior to the emergence of the subject in 
the symbolic order and persisting underneath the symbolic, there exists a certain power that 
allows the subject to wholly redetermine their being regardless of their symbolic 
determinations. Žižek characterises this power as the “indivisible remainder.”
We can here highlight the connection between the subject and the power of the 
Absolute. Žižek argues that the power of the subject located in the indivisible remainder is 
one and the same power that God possess in the Ent-Scheidung. As Žižek tells us: there is ‘a 
kind of short circuit, of direct overlapping, between man and the Absolute; this act of 
contracting being, of choosing one’s eternal nature, has to be repetition of the same act of the
Absolute itself.’33 With this “short-circuit” established Žižek can argues that ‘[M]an is not 
merely an epiphenomena in the universe, a negligible grain of dust […] he is the only one to 
31 Žižek, IR, p.21.
32 Žižek, IR, pp.17-18, LTN, p.177.
33 Žižek, IR, pp.20-21.
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possess the “power of the centre,” and stands as such in direct contact with the abyss of 
primordial freedom.’34 As Žižek puts it: the subject can “Rejoin the Absolute.”35 
To reiterate, it is here that Žižek recovers what he thinks is the pivotal political insight
of Schelling’s work: emboldened with the resources of Schelling’s onto-theology, Žižek 
argues that the subject possesses this absolute ontological power with which it is able to ‘tear 
the chain of causal necessity asunder’ and recover ‘the primordial abyss-origin of all 
things.’36 As Žižek makes clear, this is a properly metaphysical Freedom grounded neither in 
the subject’s natural being nor in its transcendental constitution. The subject can thus make or
remake their world in a punctual moment of destruction and transformation.37 To do so they 
have to go through the madness of vortex like Grund to reconnect with “the abyss of 
Freedom,” which Žižek praises Schelling for conceiving as ‘the most horrible thing.’38 
The emergence and continuing existence of this metaphysical beyond in Žižek’s work
can be charted through a number of conceptual figures. Žižek writes of an “unnatural” 
savagery in man that is different to animals in the form of a passion for freedom that nature 
and education attempt to discipline.39 He describes a transcendental spontaneity that is neither
phenomenal or noumenal but instead precedes them both.40 This is what Žižek is referring to 
when he describes ‘some monstrous excess in the real’ that accounts for the emergence of our
socio-cultural world.41 It appears even in several of Žižek’s favoured Hegelian figures, such 
as “the night of the world” in which he explicates that far from indicating an immanent void, 
34 Žižek, IR, p.14.
35 Žižek, IR, p.20, p.31.
36 Žižek, IR, p.19.
37 Žižek, IR, p.20.
38 Žižek, CWZ, p.166, Žižek, IR, p.24.
39 Žižek, AR, p.65, TS, p.38.
40 Žižek, TS, pp.24-5.
41 Žižek, FA, p.92.
140
The (other) Act and the Absolute
it instead describes its ‘exact opposite,’ a ‘primordial Big Bang.’42 It is even present on 
occasion when Žižek describes dialectical materialism, going against the not-all to posit a 
dimension that “reaches over” the horizon of the collective praxis, in the form of the 
“inhuman” core of humanity.43 What each of these have in common is that they name a realm
that is “neither nature, nor culture.” That is to say, it is neither Real qua void nor symbolic, 
but the power that brings both into existence. In the Act, via Žižek’s understanding of the 
“indivisible remainder” and God’s abyssal Freedom, this figure gains an explicitly political 
function and becomes an Absolute power. 
It is the presence of this Absolute power that facilitates the conception of political 
practice in terms of the Act at the centre of the “second Žižek” and all its problematic 
political baggage. It leads Žižek to dismiss the primacy of the symbolic order, now that the 
subject wields the power of God.44 It allows a belief in epochal change without concern for 
the specificity of the antagonisms and injustices of the present, given that, much like Stalin 
(2008) conceived of it in fact, if one transforms the base — the fundamental fantasy, the 
eternal past — then superstructural change will occur automatically. Questions regarding 
organisation, social power, and strategy are no longer of interest, given that subjects no 
longer have to concern themselves with the intricacies and complexities of their particular 
socio-historical context. It means that political change is not just unexpected or “miraculous” 
in light of the fact that it works in and against current norms and knowledge, but, rather, that 
it is the intervention of the divine in-itself. Moreover, because this subject’s power is not 
immanent to the symbolic or grounded in its understanding of the situation, but, rather, by the
Absolute itself it is emboldened by precisely the kind of legitimacy, i.e., the Other, that was 
42 Žižek, TS, p.35.
43 Žižek, PV, p.5.
44 Žižek, FA, p.92.
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at the heart of the failures of Marxism according to Žižek. When Žižek describes how the 
subject of the act qua Real experiences this transformation as if they were an automaton, he is
dangerously close to describing the same kind of subjectivity, doing the duty of the Other and
relieved of the consequences, that he suggests was catastrophic in the history of Communism.
How does this position alter what we have already highlighted in Žižek’s work? It 
alters the position of the not-all that we have described in two significant ways. First, by 
adding in this third dimension, which works to account for the genesis of the structure as well
as its transformation, Žižek contains the inconsistency and openness that the not-all indicated 
in an all-encompassing structure. Significantly, it also removes the importance of the tension 
between a totality and its symptom, the not-all and the evental site, where the genuinely new 
and contingent occurs. With Žižek’s Schellengian subject there is no tension, no genuine 
contingency, no openness since it is God’s original Act, that metaphysical abyss of Freedom, 
that intervenes to resolve and redeploy this opposition from without. We could say that if 
Žižek was attempting to secure the Act, Event or historicity through his reading of Schelling, 
what he in fact does is destroy their possibility. God’s Act is not exceptional because there is 
no exception to it, all reality depends upon it. And by way of understanding the persistence 
and power of God’s Act in these terms, Žižek places all change within a Universal History 
characterised by moments of punctual but total transformation that break the otherwise 
immobile order of Being. We can conceive of this difference as a change of emphasis in the 
nature of universality. Previously, we understood the singular universal as universal because 
it was a particular that stood for the very limitations of a universal order; conceived on the 
basis of God’s abyssal Act the particular remainder is now universal on the basis of a 
metaphysical Absolute.  
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6.4. Democritus versus Epicurus 
What happens when we prioritise this prior metaphysical dimension over symbolic reality? I 
want to think of the effects of the position of the “second Žižek” in terms of epistemology, 
contingency and transformation, while delineating the sharp divergence between the “second 
Žižek” and Karl Marx. We can approach this problem through an understanding of their 
respective differences with regard to Democritean and Epicurean philosophies. Karl Marx’s 
doctoral dissertation The Difference Between The Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of 
Nature (1975) sought to discern a practical and modern materialism, free from spiritual 
idealisation, through a critical comparison of these two philosophical schools of thinking 
materialism. In his latest works Less Than Nothing (2012) and Absolute Recoil (2014) Žižek 
also turns to Epicurean and Democritean philosophy, in order to outline a modern, de-
mystified materialism. However, he chooses a very different route to Marx. Rather than 
arguing for one position over another, as Marx does when he sides with the Epicureans, Žižek
argues it is not necessary to choose between these two positions because they can be, in a 
sense, synthesised.45
As traditionally conceived, the relationship between Democritus and Epicurus relies 
upon a slight but significant difference. Democritus conceived of reality as consisting of 
atoms of an infinite number, too small to be seen, residing in a void with qualities of only size
and shape. What Epicurus added to Democritus’s position was that the movement of these 
atoms did not occur simply in straight lines, along definite trajectories that were entirely 
deterministic, but that they also “swerved.” This “swerve” or clinamen was the element of 
indeterminacy and contingency. It is this that empowered Marx to suggest that Epicurean 
materialism was a modern and critical materialism. Marx cites the Epicurean clinamen as ‘the
45 Žižek, AR, p.385. Žižek borrows heavily from Mladen Dolar’s essay “The Atom and the Void — from 
Democritus to Lacan” (2013).
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law of the atom’ that ‘breaks the fati foedera’ and provides the space for transformation and 
freedom.46 For Marx, the Epicurean critique of determinism was politically enabling insofar 
as it allowed man to reclaim freedom within nature. Marx argues that without the notion of 
the “swerve” materialism implies a form of bondage more severe than that of religion. 
Quoting Epicurus:
Necessity, introduced by some as the absolute ruler does not exist, but some 
things are accidental, others on our arbitrary will. Necessity cannot be 
persuaded, but chance is unstable. It would be better to follow the myth 
about the gods than to be a slave to heimarmene of the physicists. For the 
former leaves hope for mercy if we do honour to the gods, while the latter is
inexorable necessity.47 
Much like the critique of religion relies on a critique of God, Marx argues that a critical, 
enlightened materialism must accept an openness to chance. That means ultimate or first 
causes in which the structure of change has already been decided must be rejected. ‘[I]t is 
chance, which must be accepted, not god, as the multitude believe.’48 For Marx, change and 
transformation is only possible because of the immanence of contingency and chance. As 
Marx puts it somewhat poetically: ‘[t]he death of nature has become its immortal 
substance.’49 
Žižek approaches Democritean and Epicurean philosophy with a similar objective in 
sight: how do we understand transformation and change? Just as Marx describes the openness
of substance to transformation, Žižek argues that ‘in its “normal” state’ substance ‘is 
46 Karl Marx, The Difference Between The Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature in MECW, vol 1. 
New York: International Publishers (1975[1840-1) p.49.
47 Marx, Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy, pp.42-43.
48 Marx, Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy, p.43.
49 Marx, Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy, p.62.
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nothing,’50 seemingly indicating that far from being determined that substance is actually, in 
Žižek’s Lacanian terms, not-all. However, when we turn to Žižek’s argument and attempt to 
combine Democritean and Epicurean philosophy we discover that Žižek reduces this 
insubstantiality to a logically prior and ontologically deeper level: Den. 
Žižek argues that Democritean philosophy has wrongly overlooked this concept in 
Democritus’s writing. As a result, the relation between atoms and the void has been crudely 
simplified. What precedes the existence of Atoms and Void is Den, which Žižek follows 
Mladen Dolar in understanding as the ‘derivative’ of the split into Atoms and the Void.51 In 
his synthesis of Epicurus and Democritus, Žižek procedes to argue that clinamen are in fact 
only the obverse of Den. What appears to be the cause of change and transformation is as a 
result reduced by Žižek to a prior cause. The model Žižek has in mind here is that of 
Lacanian castration. Like objet a is always the stand-in for a lost jouissance, Žižek conceives 
of clinamen deviations to be the result of the lost Den.52 For Žižek, moreover, it is not enough
to presume that Den is in the eternal past, some retroactive presupposition of change. As a 
result, to understand change we must move back from clinamen to Den.53 
As a result, a lot rests on the nature of Den and its subsequent relationship to 
clinamen. What we find is that their structure is almost identical to the relationship of the 
indivisible remainder and the abyss of Freedom. Den is a similar positively charged nothing 
with a specific creative power — like the abyss of Freedom, ‘the nihil out of which every 
creation proceeds’54 — which in Žižek’s most recent works is named the “less than 
50 Žižek, AR, p.386.
51 Mladen Dolar, “The Atom and the Void — from Democritus to Lacan” in Filozofski vol.XXXIV, no.2 (2013)
pp.11-26, p.25.
52 Žižek, AR, p.389.
53 Žižek, AR, p.391.
54 Žižek, AR, p.386. My italics.
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Nothing.”55 As Žižek explains in Less Than Nothing: ‘this nothing is not the Oriental or 
mystical Void of eternal peace, but the nothingness of a pure gap […], the pure form of 
dislocation ontologically preceding any dislocated content.’56 The structural relationship that 
Žižek develops between Den and clinamen mirrors that of the abyss of Freedom and the 
indivisible remainder. What it means is that change is understood to occur through the 
abyssal dimension of Den rather than the immanent contingency and openness indicated by 
clinamen. Indeed, Žižek connects clinamen to Den arguing that the former are nothing but the
substantialisation of the latter.57 
Žižek does not offer up any political advice regarding this understanding of 
transformation. However, by reducing the contingency of clinamen to this prior pre-
ontological Cause he risks a series of political conclusions that Marx’s materialism actively 
seeks to avoid. For Marx, Epicurean materialism was the forefather of modern science and 
critical thinking given that it disqualifies conceiving of the nature of our world and its 
potential transformation on the basis of a ‘divine power,’ or ultimate cause.58 
Epistemologically, given the particularity of chance and change, Marx suggests that 
Epicurean philosophy was the pre-Socratic equivalent to the sensuous “blooming” and 
“buzzing” materialism of Francis Bacon and the conjunctural, multi-factorial evolutionary 
materialism of Darwin.59 But what is of concern are the political consequences of Epicurean 
philosophy. For Marx and Engels, as they write in The German Ideology, Epicurean 
philosophy entailed that ‘the world must be disillusioned, and especially freed from the fear 
55 Žižek, AR, p.386.
56 Žižek, LTN, p.38.
57 Žižek, AR, p.391.
58 Lucretius quoted by Karl Marx in Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy, Third Notebook, MECW, vol.1. New 
York: International Publishers (1975) p.466.
59 John Bellamy Foster, Marx’s Ecology: Nature and Materialism, New York: Monthly Review Press (2000) 
pp.38-9, 63-64.
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of gods.’60 Because there were no final or absolute causes, no ultimate determinate structure 
to nature, Marx and Engels suggest that the possibilities and freedom this entails must be the 
basis for any relation to the world. No longer subject to divine determinism, Marx argues that
in Epicurean philosophy ‘human self-consciousness’ emerges as ‘the highest divinity.’61  As 
John Bellamy Foster argues, with Epicurus, we ‘retain a clear conception of the possible, 
while remaining open and non-determinant.’62
It is this sense of the possible that is at risk of being lost when Žižek subordinates 
clinamen to Den. Freedom and transformation are not the result of the gaps in our socio-
historical world but merely the re-emergence of the original power of Den.  This marks a 
clear change of direction when compared to Žižek’s other discussion of materialism and is 
much closer to an expressive dialectics than one grounded on the not-all. In the context of the
not-all Žižek writes that ‘True materialism […] consists precisely in accepting the chanciness
without the implication of the horizon of hidden meaning — the name of this chance is 
contingency.’63 The “less than Nothing” as the original dislocation, the first and ultimate 
Cause from which all change derives, seems to return to the presupposition of such a hidden 
meaning or ultimate determination, in the same way that equating the subject’s Act to the 
original Act of God means that all change stems from an original Absolute power.   
In an 1842 article Marx wrote for the Kölnische Zeitung, Marx criticises philosophy 
for failing to sufficiently replicate the sciences. He argues that a philosophical, ‘theological 
physics,’ a physics of the final and singular cause, was bound to be ‘a virgin dedicated to God
and barren.’64 It could be argued that the same will apply to a “theological politics”, in which 
60 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p.141.
61 Marx, Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy, p.30.
62 Bellamy Foster, Marx’s Ecology, p.57.
63 Žižek, FTKN, p.lii.
64 Karl Marx, The Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung, MECW vol.1, New York: International 
Publishers (1842) p.201.
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change was thought to be based upon a singular causal outside, without mediation or 
symbolic determinacy, as any political practice conceived on this basis would risk equally 
becoming a virgin dedicated to God and, as such, barren.
6.5. The Act, Schelling and "the End of History"
In Žižek’s work the conception of the Act that we have described above has become an 
increasingly marginal position. However, its thematics emerge on occasion in even his most 
recent work; the escape from the symbolic, absolute violence, and individual destruction are 
all suggested as potential political strategies. At times, Žižek still cannot resist the temptation 
of inhuman terror, while casually shrugging off total global annihilation.65 Elsewhere he 
speaks about killing with impunity given the absence of the big Other,66 overlooking how, far 
from “anything goes”, the point of autonomous political practice is that subjects must decide 
on their own ethical and political value-systems while pursuing change. It is my contention 
that as Žižek has developed more refined modes of practice through his engagement with 
Alain Badiou’s work and a more detailed analysis of the political the wholly irrational 
destructive Act is less frequently invoked as a serious political proposal. Politically at least 
the “second Žižek” is a less prominent figure in his more recent writings. 
Why did this figure emerge in Žižek’s work at all, we might ask? It could be argued 
that the emphasis that it placed on the possibility for total transformation might have 
represented a provocative challenge to the de-politicised consensus of the status quo. In this 
sense, the rhetoric of violence and total transformation associated with the Act might have 
functioned at a discursive level micro-Act in itself. Žižek argues that he aims for something 
similar when he speaks of a Leninist politics — the name, for Žižek, stands in part for the 
65 Žižek, IDLC, pp.169, 171.
66 Žižek, Violence, p.170.
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suspension of ‘the stale [post-]ideological coordinates, the debilitation Denkverbot in which 
we live […]’67 In this regard, it is perhaps worth noting that Žižek’s violent rhetoric certainly 
changed some minds. In 2011 his work was cited in the Irish Dail as a warning that if radical 
reform was not forthcoming Members of Parliament could expect something far worse.68
Perhaps, there is an element of provocation in these positions. Žižek at various points argues 
that he sets traps for his liberal-postmodern-deconstructivist opponents, as if in some way 
testing whether they really want the radical transformation that they claim.69 However, even 
when measured against the much needed attempt within this post-political era to assert and 
keep open the possibility of a radical politics, the Act of the “second Žižek” is wildly 
inappropriate, and as I have argued, likely discourages and stultifies any Utopian longings if 
this was thought to be the type of transformation they might affect or the kind of process that 
transformation relies upon. Moreover, it would almost certainly be a catastrophe for any 
Leftist political project that took it seriously. Indeed, far from representing a serious politics 
for the left, this conception of the Act has far more in common with the ideologies that 
inspired revolutionary millenarians.70
Perhaps the Act and his Schellengian turn plays another role for Žižek, however. 
When Žižek introduces his readers to Schelling’s work he defends his decision to utilise a 
work of theology to inspire a new understanding of Lacanian meta-psychology, he argues that
Schelling’s theological narrative form was merely a means through which it was possible to 
address the yet to be resolved contradiction of Kantian Idealism, namely: how does one 
67 Žižek, DSST?, p.3.
68 “Michael D Higgins making his last speech in the Dail,” 16:04  Youtube.com, posted by Irish Labour Party,  
uploaded on Jan 26 2011, [Online] Accessed from: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OJJ5q1_5jX8 accessed 
on: 2.10.2013
69 See, for example, Žižek, PV, p.11.
70 See Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the
Middle Ages, Ayesbury: Paladin (1970) p.13.
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account for the Real genesis of transcendentally constituted reality?71 Schelling’s account of 
the emergence of God and the beginning of the world, thus, actually resolves questions for 
Kantian, and Lacanian philosophy, if we are able to look past the ideological form. To bolster
his defence, Žižek cites Fredric Jameson’s (1981) thesis regarding narrative form as a 
sophisticated ideological mode of contradiction resolution. He suggests that because the 
contradiction of Kantian philosophy could not be resolved within Kantian terms a 
‘philosophico-mythological narrative’ was invented to do so. However, if we look at the 
quote to which Žižek refers, Jameson is quite explicit in his view that narrative form resolves 
a very particular, extra-philosophical kind of contradiction. ‘The production of aesthetic or 
narrative form is to be seen as an ideological act in its own right, with the function of 
inventing imaginary or formal solutions to unresolved social contradictions.’72 Schellingian 
scholars would no doubt be able to offer some ideas regarding which social-contradictions his
accounts of the un-Godly beginnings of God were addressed to. The omission of the 
dimension of social contradictions in Žižek’s rephrasing of Jameson’s thesis is telling, 
symptomatic even perhaps, because regardless of any social contradictions that Schelling’s 
work addresses, it raises the question of what social contradictions does Žižek’s Schellengian 
philosophy and its accordant conception of political practice attempt to resolve?
While Žižek’s conception of the Act is presented as an emancipating practice whereby
the subject regains their autonomy from the Other while effecting social change, it appears to 
very closely reflect the very deadlock that it attempts to address. Rather than the unique 
power of the subject, it suggests impotence and isolation, an act of striking at the self rather 
than the system. Indeed, in Heroes (2015) Franco “Bifo” Berardi diagnoses a similar form of 
frenetic, irrational self-violence as a symptom of the subject of late-capitalism’s exhaustion 
71 Žižek, AF, p.94, n.36.
72 Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious, p.79.
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and powerlessness in the face of the pressures of a hyper-competitive society, which 
constantly compels the subject to mobilise its energies. “Running amok,” a sudden frenzy and
rage where the subject impotently hits out to try to establish reputation and temporarily 
reassert itself against the pressures of a world that begins to feel intolerable. As Bifo charts, it
is a frequent precursor to suicide.73 The Act shares nearly all the features of what Bifo 
diagnoses as “running amok.” The loss of self, the blurring of boundaries between inside and 
outside, the collapse of temporal categories of past, present and future in to pure present and 
psychosis.74 The Žižekian Act, then, appears less the basis for an emancipating politics and 
more like a tragic form of pathology in our contemporary period.
Within Žižek’s system the valences are reversed and the problem is repackaged as a 
solution. The deadlock is not overcome but rather accepted. The same could be said when we 
compare the ideological dead-end of Žižek’s early period and how he here suggests that we 
escape it. What Žižek’s position with regard to the Act and his earlier democratic position 
have in common is an acceptance that radical political practice and disaster are one and the 
same thing. With the conception of the Act, the “second Žižek” merely accepts the dichotomy
of catastrophe or the status quo, before asking subjects to risk the former as precisely what 
we need. Far from a solution to this deadlock Žižek’s conception of the Act seems to 
reproduce its dead-end. 
With regard to Žižek’s Marxist politics, this conception of the Act could be said to 
also reflect and reproduce the ideological deadlock described by Fredric Jameson as that of 
“the end of History.” As his now canonical formulation puts it: ‘it is easier to imagine the end
of the world than the end of capitalism.’75 The Act, while based on a conception of the end of 
73 Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Heroes: Mass Murder and Suicide, London: Verso (2015) pp.55-56.
74 Berardi, Heroes, Pp.55-56.
75 Fredric Jameson, Seeds of Time, New York: Columbia University Press (1994) p.vi.
151
The (other) Act and the Absolute
analysis, could be said to be a deeply ideological figure as a result. Žižek accepts the 
ideological deadlock and follows its “inherent transgression” — i.e. destruction. Rather than 
resolving the challenge of “the end of History”, as well as the political deadlock of his own 
democratic work, through an analysis of capitalism and its antagonisms and symptoms, the 
Schellengian empowered act allows Žižek to simply cut the Gordian knot. Imagining the 
possibility of change by way of the Act as an extra-historical Freedom with the power to 
inaugurate a total revolutionary transformation, thus allows the “second Žižek” to side step 
the patient critique and analysis of the “the end of History” and the invention of forms of 
political practice. From the perspective of this Act of total destruction these problems and 
challenges can be side-stepped. As such, Žižek is vulnerable to the charge that the violence 
and destructiveness of the Act is a form of ideological displacement. In his own terms, it is a 
fetish that covers the lack of a viable emancipatory politics and the absence of a historical 
materialist critique of capitalism and liberal democracy, or whatever the Lacanian equivalent 
of that might be, in this period of his work. Given the implausibility of the Act and its 
multitudinous problems it would seem that this is nothing but a fantasmatic resolution to a set
of historical challenges that elsewhere Žižek realises he must address. 
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Chapter 7: Žižekian Science
7.1. Introduction
“What can dialectical materialism tell us about quantum physics and the other natural 
sciences?” By asking this seemingly innocuous question Žižek returns to one of the most 
controversial areas in the history of Marxist philosophy. After Lysenko, Zhdanov, and the 
intellectual crimes of Stalinism, the idea of returning to a project of a Marxist, dialectical 
materialist science is unthinkable to many. Yet, in the same work that he outlines his 
understanding of Schelling, Žižek returns to precisely this project, engaging with quantum 
physics and the cognitive sciences in an attempt to bring together Hegelian philosophical 
speculation and the findings of the natural sciences. What emerges from this attempted 
synthesis is a confusing and precariously balanced amalgam of dialectical critique and 
metaphysical speculation that threatens at many points to collapse into a heap of untenable 
theoretical positions. But, perhaps more shockingly given the history of Marxist dialectical 
materialism, what is truly concerning about Žižek’s dialectical materialist science is that it 
makes or comes unerringly close to making the very same mistakes that characterised diamat,
or “classical” dialectical materialism. Given that Žižek associates his own dialectical 
materialism with the Marxist project, his failure to learn from the mistakes of the “classical” 
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dialectical materialism of Engels, Stalin, et al. is highly worrying. In this chapter I want to 
demonstrate how Žižek’s engagement with the sciences mirrors and repeats the problems of 
“classical” dialectical materialism. In doing so the chapter will build upon Adrian Johnston’s 
(2013) recent critique of Žižek’s engagement with quantum physics. Johnston correctly 
argues that what underpins Žižek’s arguments regarding the “Hegelian” or “Schellengian” 
character of quantum science is a highly problematic analogical form of reasoning, which 
risks crudely reducing the complexity of natural phenomena to figures from his own 
dialectical materialist philosophy. The extended use of these dialectical materialist conceptual
figures also risks transforming Žižek’s dialectical materialism from a philosophy of the not-
all to a philosophy of the One-All.1 By overestimating the role of philosophy and the 
applicability of Hegelian-Lacanian-Schellengian categories Žižek risks transforming his 
philosophical position into a world-view in the form of a structure that is supposed to 
encompass and explain all phenomena, presenting a world which contradicts the axiom on 
which his critical, political work is based: the not-all. While Žižek’s engagement with the 
sciences also demonstrates elements of a non-reductionistic and critical materialism, these 
elements are almost wholly overridden by a tendency in his work to impose his own 
dialectical materialist ontology on to scientific theory in a way that, at points, seems to 
wholly distort it. Where I depart from Johnston’s position, however, is that rather than merely
seeing this as a problem with Žižek’s engagement with quantum physics, I suggest that it is a 
result of failing to take “classical” dialectical materialism as a philosophical position 
seriously. Consequently, with regard to “classical” dialectical materialism, Žižek’s dialectical
materialism repeats two of its central mistakes. It clumsily straddles the divide between 
scientific positivism and Hegelian philosophy, ultimately foisting the latter behind the former
1 Adrian Johnston, “A Critique of Natural Economy: Quantum Physics with Žižek” in Žižek Now: Current 
Perspectives in Žižek Studies eds. Jamil Khader and Molly Anne Rothenberg, Cambridge: Polity (2013).
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as a supposedly underpinning metaphysical structure. In doing so, it projects into nature the 
values and politics of his own dialectical materialism in what we might call a psycho-socio-
morphism not dissimilar to the socio-morphism evidenced in “classical” dialectical 
materialism. 
While there is certainly a debate to be had concerning the possibility of a 
contemporary dialectical materialism engaging with the sciences, it would do well to begin 
with an acknowledgement of the failures of the past. In the few sympathetic accounts of 
Žižek’s engagement with the sciences, where the possibility of a dialectical materialism of 
the sciences has been defended,2 as well as Žižek’s work itself, this has so far been sorely 
lacking. We will reflect on and analyse these failures, as well as considering how they are 
also present in Žižek’s dialectical materialism in this chapter. To begin, this chapter will 
compare Žižek’s dialectical materialism and “classical” dialectical materialism with a 
particular focus on how diamat took the form of a political cosmology, partially as a 
consequence of over-estimating the power of philosophy and its scope and applicability. 
Following this, we will attempt to untangle the knot of Žižek’s multiple engagements with 
the sciences by showing that there are several competing approaches operating at any one 
time in his writing. The analysis will then turn to Žižek’s interpretation of quantum physics, 
the most problematic element of his work with the sciences, outlining the problems with 
Žižek’s engagement over two sections — “Žižekian Positivism” and “A Psycho-Socio-
Morphic World.” In doing so, I will demonstrate how as a result he repeats certain mistakes 
that were at the heart of classical dialectical materialism’s interpretation of scientific results. 
2 See Roland Williamson, "Hegel Among The Quantum Physicists" in International Journal of Žižek Studies 
vol.3. No.1 (2009); Joseph Carew, “‘Why is there Nothing Rather than Something?’ Less Than Nothing’s New 
Metaphysics,” in International Journal of Žižek Studies, vol.8 no.1 (2014).
155
Žižekian Science
7.2. Žižek and Diamat
Despite the manifold limitations of Žižek’s philosophical engagement with the sciences the 
impulse behind the project is admirable and well-founded. By giving the sciences an 
important place within his dialectical materialism, Žižek addresses a blind-spot that generally
characterises Western Marxism, which was consistently hostile to Engelsian philosophical 
themes. With this rejection, Western Marxism fell into two broad categories: the Gramscian 
“absolute historicism” which reduced the object of science to an object of ideology,3 or 
Lukácsian dialectical materialism which implicitly accepted the divide between neutral value-
free science and ideological and political matters.4 This latter conclusion was also frequently 
drawn in analyses of the failures of diamat and its so-called “proletarian science.”5 This 
position nevertheless has a number of problems. As John Bellamy Foster (2000) argues, the 
separation between science and politics did not prevent the renewal of biologism and extreme
forms of social Dawinism in the sciences.6 Marxism was also said to have been hampered by 
the failure to address questions regarding nature, because the division between the objects of 
science and history are often far from as absolute as the philosophical value-divide proposes, 
especially it might be said in the era of the Anthropocene, when political and ideological 
decisions are having a decisive influence on the Earth and its future. As a result, there has 
long been an undercurrent of desire within Marxism to address this lacunae with a critical, 
3 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, 
New York: International Publishers (1992) p.445. 
4 Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. Rodney Livingstone, 
Pontypool: Merlin (1971) p.3.
5 With regard to this conclusion concerning the Lysenko affair and the Zhdanovist movement for “proletarian 
science” see Zhores Medvedev The Rise and Fall of T.D. Lysenko, New York: Anchor (1969) and David 
Joravsky, The Lysenko Affair, Harvard: Harvard University Press (1970).
6 Bellamy Foster, Marx’s Ecology, p.8.
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non-mechanistic, non-reductive materialism that engages with the sciences while keeping a 
close connection to a materialist conception of history.7 
When Žižek is questioned about returning to dialectical materialism in an interview in
the journal Historical Materialism shortly after he returned to the project, he similarly attacks
Western Marxism and Cultural Studies for the insufficiency of their responses to the sciences,
arguing that remaining at the level of historical and ideology critique has several problems, 
including an inability to answer questions regarding the relationship of the subject to nature 
and its emergence from nature.8 Žižek states that his work on Schelling and quantum physics 
is an attempt to address this by returning to ontological questions regarding radical 
contingency.9 But what is telling is that, despite acknowledging that taking the position that 
dialectical materialism is needed to supplement historical materialism is controversial, at no 
point here, or in any other place in his work as far as I am aware, does Žižek stop to question 
why Western Marxism in particular is uncomfortable addressing these questions and what 
such an engagement would have to avoid given the limitations of classical dialectical 
materialism. Despite his return to the problematic of classical dialectical materialism, Žižek 
offers little more than derisory remarks about it as a philosophy, nearly wholly ignoring its 
status other than as a “fetish.” This failure to engage with it seriously seems to have led to 
him overlooking several of its problems that his own work is at risk of repeating.
Most centrally, there is a question regarding philosophical form. While we certainly 
cannot reduce classical dialectical materialism to the late philosophical works of Friedrich 
Engels, at the core of these works reside errors that provided the foundations for diamat after 
7 See, for example, Bellamy-Foster, Marx’s Ecology (2000), Sebastian Timpanaro, On Materialism, trans. 
Lawrence Garner, London: New Left Books (1975), Raymond Williams, Culture and Materialism, London: 
Verso (2005).
8 Žižek, “Interview,” pp.185-6.
9 Žižek, “Interview,” p.187.
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they were uncritically accepted by later Marxists.10 Engels over-estimates the achievements 
of Marx, suggesting that his theory of history was on a par with the theories of the natural 
sciences.11 And, in an era of supreme optimism regarding the explanatory power and unity of 
the sciences,12 Engels also overestimates the power and applicability of the Hegelian 
dialectics for explaining not only social but natural phenomena as well.13
The result of these mistakes was that Marxist philosophy took the form of a 
“philosophico-scientific” master key that functioned to not only unlock the structure of the 
socio-historical world and its transformation but also that of the natural world as well.14 In no 
way did Engels intend for Marxism to take the form of a “world-view”, quite the opposite in 
fact; Engels hoped for a Marxist science, rather than an ideology. Nevertheless, by 
overestimating and over-generalising the applicability of his historical and philosophical 
modes of analysis and critique, Engels turns Marxism into precisely that, giving it the form of
a universal discourse, that allowed it to become a “political cosmology,” as Jordan 
illustratively labels diamat.15 
The risk that Žižek courts by attempting to offer a dialectical materialist interpretation
of quantum physics, or other sciences, is repeating Engels’s mistake of overestimating the 
appropriateness of categories derived from a socio-political theory for the understanding and 
10 Richard T. De George, Patterns of Soviet Thought: The Origins and Development of Dialectical and 
Historical Materialism, Michigan: Ann Arbor (1970) p.107. See also Jordan, Evolution of Dialectical 
Materialism.
11 At Marx’s funeral: ‘just as Darwin discovered the law of development of organic nature, so Marx discovered 
the law of development of human history.’ Friedrich Engels, “Speech at the Grave of Karl Marx,” March 18th 
1883, [Online] https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1883/death/burial.htm accessed on: 03.10.2014
12 Lesek Kolakowski, The Main Currents of Marxism, trans. P.S. Falla, complete edition, London: W.W. Norton
(2005) pp.308-310.
13 ‘It goes without saying that my recpaptulation of mathematics and the natural sciences was undertaken in 
order to convince myself also in detail — of what in general I was not in doubt — that in nature, amid the welter
on innumerable changes, the same dialectical laws of motion force their way through as those which in history 
govern the apparent fortuitousness of events […]’ Friedrich Engels, Anti-Dühring Herr Eugen Dühring’s 
Revolution in Science, in MECW, Vol. 25. (1987) p.12.
14 Paul Thomas, Marxism and Scientific Socialism: From Engels to Althusser, London: Routledge (2008) p.41.
15 Jordan, Evolution of Dialectical Materialism, p.394.
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explanation of natural phenomena and the objects of scientific inquiry. The result of this 
would also be the same. Dialectical materialism would become something akin to a world-
view. In some sense, Žižek already risks this with his engagement with Schelling, which, as 
we have seen in the previous chapter, presents a closed and total image of the universe via a 
cyclical structure of birth, death and re-birth. Whereas Engels suggested that Absolute 
dialectical laws regulated a cosmos that takes the shape of an eternal cycle of transmuting 
matter-in-motion, Žižek posits the eternal return of God’s original Act which, like dialectical 
laws, certain subjects, and philosophers, are able to grasp. Engaging with the sciences in a 
way that wields Hegelian-Schellengian-Lacanian categories to describe the structure of all 
levels of being risks committing the same error, namely, transforming dialectical materialism 
into a philosophical master-key and the world that it describes in to a closed, ordered totality. 
As Adrian Johnston writes apropos the analogical and homological reasoning that underpins 
Žižek’s engagements with quantum theory, it ‘seems as though it leads right back to the onto-
theological vision of being as an organic Whole of smoothly enmeshed microcosms and 
macrocosms, a seamless, enchained continuum of recurring patterns embedded within each 
other in a fractal-like fashion.’16 Dialectical materialism, then, becomes the philosophy of that
onto-theological vision and something akin to an understanding of the structure of the 
Absolute.
7.3. Žižek's Four Approaches to the Sciences
One of the central difficulties in understanding Žižek’s engagement with the sciences is 
working out what he is in fact doing. Far from simple critique or interpretation, in Absolute 
Recoil (2014), Less Than Nothing (2012), Parallax View (2006) and Indivisible Remainder 
16 Johnston, “Critique of Natural Economy,” p.107.
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(2007[1996]), his most extended engagements with the sciences, he switches back and forth 
between four approaches with little or no signposting. These are: a defence of scientific 
realism against discursive idealism; a critical-historical materialist position; dialectical 
materialist re-interpretation; and the deconstruction of the scientific object-subject divide. 
 Following Lacan’s own use of mathematics and mathemes as a way to formalise a 
form of vérité beyond savoir, Žižek defends scientific truth that is mathematically 
formalized. He argues that these pure non-sensical syntaxes describe something that 
“just works.”17 Žižek argues that this “symbolic Real” enables a form of non-
subjective “acephalic” knowledge.18 On this basis, Žižek also argues that philosophy 
must be conditioned by scientific discovery and its developments.19
 Žižek combines this with a broadly historical materialist position that criticises 
various scientific interpretations as ideological reflections of their conditions of 
emergence. Žižek argues that this functions in a number of ways. On one hand, 
certain scientific positions “catch on” because they find in nature similarities to our 
social world that seem to legitimise it, like classificatory biology in the eighteenth 
century, for example.20 Equally, the process can run in the opposite direction with 
scientific theory presenting historical particularity as truth. In a study of the 
ideological interpretation of cognitive science, Žižek finds evidence of the ideologies 
of New-Age post-materialism, liberal relativism,21 and post-Fordist, infinite 
17 Žižek, IR, p.209; Žižek, LTN, p.738.
18 Žižek, “Desire,” pp.147-151.
19 Žižek, LTN, p.912.
20 Žižek, LTN, p.908.
21 Žižek, PV, p.179.
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plasticity.22 Žižek argues that science is bound to ideological interpretation to such an 
extent that “everything goes,” all answers can exist, with no clear consensus among 
competing interpretations.23  
 Žižek’s engagement with the natural sciences, however, goes beyond critique to 
embrace his own interpretation and, on occasion, even suggests a “productive 
reformulation” of scientific problems with Lacanian, Hegelian or Schellengian 
categories.24 At times this is presented as if it involves mere conceptual clarification. 
In Parallax View he argues that contemporary science comes close to a dialectical, 
non-reductive materialism like his own, but does not quite realise it, oscillating 
instead between ‘mechanical materialism and idealist obscurantism.’25 He then helps 
these sciences become sufficiently dialectical materialist through providing the 
“missing concepts” that they are unable to formulate, presumably given their 
philosophical insufficiencies.26 It is here that he embarks on the risky dimension of his
endeavour, since we need a means through which to judge whether or not Žižek’s 
interpretation is any less ideological than others. The danger that lurks at this point is 
the same one that was realised in classical dialectical materialism, which began from a
similar presumption that the contemporary sciences were quickly realising a 
spontaneous dialectical materialist position but nevertheless needed help in realising 
it. 
22 Žižek, PV, pp.209, 241.
23 Žižek, PV, p.177.
24 Žižek, IR, p.225.
25 Žižek, PV, p.4.
26 Žižek, PV, p.171.
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 The fourth position that Žižek takes is to challenge the spontaneous separation of 
subject and object on which the sciences are traditionally conceived. He questions 
whether on occasions the spontaneous separation of subject and object is not socially 
mediated in some way. He asks: can we also find the moment of the subject, that 
contingent moment of negativity, in the object of science. In the instance of his 
engagement with the cognitive sciences, this is a reasonable suggestion, given that the
object is, in some sense, the subject. In this case, the space of freedom, or the 
particular type of freedom that Žižek argues is characteristic of his psychoanalytic 
understanding of the subject, would seem at the very least a legitimate area of inquiry.
It would seem far less so, however, when Žižek turns to quantum physics. Locating 
the subject at the micro-level of quantum fluctuations appears beyond any relatively 
sensible hypothesis.
When Žižek engages with quantum theory or cognitive science we see examples of all four 
approaches. The results are highly variable. I follow Adrian Johnston in thinking that his 
work in the cognitive sciences is far more convincing than his recent endeavours with 
quantum physics. If a realistic dialectical materialist engagement with the sciences were 
going to be possible, then, one would think that all four of these approaches might indeed be 
useful, arguably with a specific emphasis on the dimension of critique.  Žižek intimates that 
he intends something similar in the movement back and forth between science and our 
ideologically determined perceptions regarding our natural world.27 
While Žižek claims success, frequently asserting the discovery of “cognitivist Hegel” 
or the “Schellengian character” of quantum physics, in actual fact we find that Žižek’s 
27 Žižek, LTN, p.912.
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multiple approaches produce three unresolved tensions. First, Žižek offers no way of 
responding to the tension between his desire for mathematical formalisation as a condition of 
science and the implicit rejection of positivistic confinement to the measurable and 
observable, on the basis that the latter generates “spiritualist obscurantism.”28 Second, while 
Žižek is quick to point to the ideological function of other interpretations of the sciences he is
much slower in questioning whether his own interpretation might also carry an ideological 
function or demonstrate his own investment in certain ideological figures. In a similar way, 
when Žižek presents his conceptual reformulations, he frequently seems to suggest that these 
can be taken as fact. In other words, he never questions whether his own conceptual 
intervention in the interpretation of the positivistic findings of science are merely hypotheses,
or whether the sciences merely “fit” into his Hegelian-Lacanian-Schellengian concepts. The 
latter would suggest a panlogicism in which the universe is the realisation of some 
overarching transhistorical logos. This essentially Hegelian position is a possible position 
with regard to the sciences, but one very different from the one that Žižek claims he is taking.
Alternatively, given that Žižek sees the total proliferation of interpretations along ideological 
lines, one does wonder if his own intervention is an example of a kind of “if you can’t beat 
them, join them” strategy. Third, there are several unanswered epistemological questions 
when Žižek embarks on the deconstruction of the separation of subject and object. Does that 
mean for Žižek that the findings of science are any less “objective”? Quantum physics 
especially is a highly formalised discourse that produces a set of statistically consistent 
results despite the strangeness of what occurs at the quantum level. These certainly do not 
leave room for anything like Žižek’s subject — as contingency, openness, negativity. So, 
does Žižek’s subject, then, override the objectivity of quantum theory? If this is the case, 
28 Žižek, IR, pp.208-9.
163
Žižekian Science
Žižek can no longer maintain that he also considers the findings of the sciences true in terms 
of the symbolic Real.
7.4. Quantum Physics with Žižek
It is Žižek’s engagement with quantum physics that most starkly demonstrates the problems 
with combining these positions. It is also a vital topic area to engage Žižek on since in his 
most recent works he has placed quantum physics at the centre of philosophy’s endeavours. 
As he puts it: ‘Today, the scientific discovery which needs philosophical rethinking is 
quantum physics.’29 In Absolute Recoil and Less Than Nothing Žižek places renewed 
emphasis on quantum physics, while returning to a subject that he first broached in the 
second part of Indivisible Remainder. I will read the two sets of engagements together given 
that there are enough similarities and repetitions to consider them as broadly homogeneous, 
even if there are some revisions in the later texts and the addition of an attempt to understand 
the so-called “God Particle,” the Higgs Boson. In these works, quantum physics has also 
taken on additional importance, because it provides Žižek with a materialist response to 
problematic ‘theosophical speculation’ about the emergence of existence and matter.30 In 
other words, in an apparent self-criticism of his former reliance on Schellengian speculation, 
Žižek now thinks quantum physics must provide the materialist basis for his own ontological 
commitments.
Quantum science describes a world of paradoxical effects without causes, fluctuations
in which phenomena change from different states, as if at random, and a logical structure in 
which common philosophical views regarding matter, determinacy and non-contradiction are 
no longer possible. For Žižek, the importance of quantum physics for philosophy resides in 
29 Žižek, LTN, p.741.
30 Žižek, AR, p.393.
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precisely how it has ‘broken with our everyday comprehension of “reality.”’31 To be more 
specific, Žižek is particularly interested in how quantum physics a) has undermined our view 
of nature as a holistic, unified entity and b) undermined the separation of subject and object, 
since some of its findings show how “objective” reality includes a space for the subject 
within it. Žižek, here, refers to the infamous double-split experiment with which it has been 
demonstrated that, at a quantum level, the subject’s observation alters the results of 
experimentation. To put it rather crudely, quantum phenomena seems to “know” if it is being 
observed and, as a result, acts in different ways. What Žižek hopes that quantum physics will 
provide him with, as a result, is a way to locate the (Lacanian) subject in the world of the 
infinitely small sub-atomic level, beyond the level of the Newtonian interactions of atoms and
particles and the socio-historical world of signifying structures and jouissance. On the basis 
of this understanding, in Indivisible Remainder Žižek sets about revealing the limitations of 
rival ideological interpretations, focusing on how the radical consequences that he has drawn 
from quantum physics are frequently effaced. For example, he argues that “New-Age” 
approaches frequently obscure this unbalanced conception of nature at the very lowest level 
by recuperating this disconcerting effect in ideologies of peaceful existence.32 
For Žižek, the only way one is able to retain the full consequences of quantum theory 
is by treating the relationship between the object and our knowledge of it as equivalent to the 
relationship between subject and object described by Marxism and psychoanalysis, where 
knowledge of something can provoke a violent change in it — as, for example, the 
confrontation with the unconscious symptom denatures the subject and the Other, or the self-
knowledge of the worker transforms them into a revolutionary proletarian.33
31 Žižek, IR, p.209.
32 Žižek, IR, pp.210-211.
33 Žižek, IR, pp.208-210.
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It is here where the crux of the problem with Žižek’s engagement with quantum 
physics comes to light. Žižek takes what is, at the very most, a relatively benign analogy to be
indicative of the truth of quantum physics. It leads to a severe misrepresentation, as we will 
see. On the basis of his understanding of quantum theory through Lacanian epistemology, 
Žižek then claims that the subject dependent nature of quantum experimentation 
demonstrates the absolute freedom, creativity and possibility which denotes the Lacanian 
subject.
To take a more recent example from Žižek’s work, in Absolute Recoil and Less Than 
Nothing Žižek argues something similar is revealed in the Higgs Field where, given its 
similarity to the kind of dynamic that characterises what Žižek understands to be the logic of 
the Urgrund or abyss of Freedom in Schelling’s work, we find the material basis of the 
“absolute contradiction” from which all content and substance emerges. It is, he claims, a 
‘physical version of how “something appears out of nothing.”’34 
As Žižek explains it, the Higgs field describes a paradoxical vacuum state. When left 
to run without intervention physical systems tend towards a state of lowest energy. If enough 
mass is taken away from a system, thereby lowering its energy, conventional theory suggests 
that it will reach a state of vacuum, where the energy in a system reaches zero. However, in 
certain conditions — and this is the paradox that the Higgs experiment has tried to explain —
it has been shown that particular fields never reach this zero-level vacuum because reducing 
mass enough actually functions to raise the system’s energy.35 Something seems to create 
energy at precisely the point it is taken away to create nothing.36 
34 Žižek, LTN, p.4.
35 Žižek, AR, p.393, LTN, pp.944-5.
36 Žižek, LTN, p.945.
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For Žižek, this is indicative of how “less than nothing” is a creative state in which, 
from nothing, something emerges. As Žižek says: ‘Energetically, it costs something to 
maintain the nothing (the void of the pure vacuum […]) This is why “there is something and 
not nothing”: energetically, something is cheaper than nothing.’37  We can see why Žižek 
might want to draw quantum physics into his account here because, on the surface, it seems a 
more effective and plausible way through which to make a similar point to that which he 
attempted to make with his earlier conception of the abyss of Freedom as the Urgrund of all 
existence. If this is still the basis for agential freedom, as it seems to be in Absolute Recoil 
and Less Than Nothing, then Žižek has a minimally “materialist”, scientifically backed, 
account of the existence of a basal creative contingency. Similarly, Žižek can now suggest 
that his conception of the emergence of the world through this “absolute contradiction” is 
based in the findings of contemporary science. Nevertheless, in all these deployments of the 
Higgs Field and the kind of emergentist ontology it applies, Žižek constantly refers to 
Lacanian and Schellengian categories. He tells us that this has the same logic as the death 
drive38, that the Higgs Boson ‘is the equivalent of what Lacan calls the objet petit a’39 or that 
‘we are back here with the notion of Den in Democritus.’40 The whole theoretical 
construction relies so heavily on analogies and homologies that, despite claiming to take 
these scientific discoveries seriously, Žižek appears merely to be slotting them into his own 
dialectical materialist ontology. This conclusion is supported when we consider how Žižek 
takes quantum physics far beyond its own terms when it is explained through recourse to 
these concepts. 
37 Žižek, LTN, p.945, AR, p.393.
38 Žižek, LTN, p.945.
39 Žižek, LTN, p.944.
40 Žižek, LTN, p.945.
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As Adrian Johnston argues, Žižek’s contention that in quantum phenomena we see the
potentiality for freedom has a) no basis in contemporary science, b) would be almost 
impossible to test for and c) would need an account of how there is a connection between the 
social and Newtonian worlds and the quantum world of micro fluctuations, as well as and 
how those quantum fluctuations ensured freedom while not being ‘thoroughly diluted, 
transmuted, and/or effectively screened-out at larger-sized levels of material reality.’41 No 
such account exists in Žižek’s work, or, as far as I am aware, in quantum theory. 
The essential philosophical position of Žižek’s dialectical materialism — that “the big
Other does not exist”, or, the materialist “not-all” — is similarly not supported by the 
ontology of quantum physics. Far from “out-of-joint”, “contingent”, or “barred” in the same 
way that Žižek contends the symbolic order is fractured, the quantum world is predictable 
and orderly. This is not to say that, as Žižek argues, quantum phenomena are not uncanny, 
paradoxical or go against many of our everyday, common-sense perceptions about external 
reality. However, far from contingent and open, the quantum level is highly “regular.” Part of
why quantum theory has caused such dismay within scientific theory and the philosophy of 
science is that despite its highly counter-intuitive findings it has proved unerringly accurate in
its predictive ability.42 Thus, for example, when Žižek refers to the wave-function as 
evidencing the indeterminancy and incompleteness of reality that leaves space for the subject,
he wholly misses the nature of the discovery. The wave function is completely determined 
mathematically in terms of future time and place, while the indeterminate part of quantum 
formalisation is probabilistic and can correctly predict the possibility of certain occurrences 
41 Johnston, “A Critique of Natural Economy,” p.109.
42 Salvator Canavo, Quantum Theory: A Philosophers Overview, New York: SUNY Press (2009) p.7.
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in these terms. To suggest, as Žižek does, that this emergence is properly contingent ignores 
the admittedly strange regularity and predictability that quantum theory reveals.43 
It also shows why Žižek is wrong in arguing that quantum physics demonstrates a 
spontaneous dialectical materialist epistemology, in which our knowing affects and changes 
the object, because the object of quantum physics – the laws of subatomic particles – already 
accounts for the effect of the subject within it. As Quentin Meillassoux argues in his own 
account of quantum physics: 
Certainly, the presence of an observer may eventually affect the effectuation
of a physical law, as in the case from some of the laws of quantum physics 
— but the very fact that an observer can influence the law is itself a property
of the law which is not supposed to depend upon the existence of the 
observer.44
In other words, “knowledge” does not really change the object because that act of knowing is 
already included in what is known. The possibilities of what might occur when the subject 
observes quantum phenomena are bounded, predictable and restricted. If this was not the 
case, mathematical formalisation would not be possible. Put simply, if the role of the 
observer-subject appears strange at the quantum level, it is not strange enough to do anything 
but leave the persistent and closed structure intact. “Subject,” then, is part of substance in a 
neatly, already determined manner, far from the “crack” that Žižek wants to claim. 
Žižek’s attempt to found his ontology on the findings of quantum physics has an 
unintended effect. If Žižek wants an ontology that demonstrates the “not-all”, that “the big 
Other does not exist,” quantum physics is incapable of providing this. As well as the practical
difficulties of demonstrating the legitimacy of his claims, or the wildly underdeveloped 
43 Canavo, Quantum Theory, p.9-11.
44 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude, trans. Ray Brassier, London: Continuum (2008) p.114.
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nature of many of his arguments, the probabilistic reason that quantum phenomena 
demonstrates is nothing more than a form of big Other given that it requires a finite set of 
possibilities to be rationalised as possible. Thus, if Žižek tries to universalise this, 
extrapolating from what occurs at the quantum level to a model that can account for every 
level of reality, quantum theory would provide only a mechanistic materialism since what 
occurs in quantum phenomena is statistically regular. In this way, Žižek’s argument would 
fail. If freedom resides in quantum fluctuations, a form of natural event, the subject is not free
but, in fact, determined by substance.
7.5. Žižekian Positivism
The divergence between Žižek’s reformulation of quantum phenomena in dialectical 
materialist terms and the positions of quantum theory itself demonstrates a tension between 
philosophy and science that is played out in Žižek’s reticence to precisely outline their 
relationship. At times, Žižek suggests that he is merely working within the framework of the 
sciences, straightening out unacknowledged conceptual problems, or offering a theoretical 
stringency that science might have overlooked. Similarly, Žižek claims that science must 
inform philosophy and take on and accept its consequences. In these cases, Žižek presents 
philosophy as if it is subordinate to scientific practice. However, Žižek’s dialectical 
materialism proves to be something of an unruly subordinate. At other times, thus, Žižek calls
for the reformulation of quantum theory, and while attending to the findings of science rides 
rough-shod over them. He even states this position programmatically on occasion: in Less 
Than Nothing he asks how thought, freedom, and the Event are possible, and then suggests 
that we must reverse engineer their conditions of possibility into the findings of quantum 
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theory.45 Thus, the results of Žižek’s conceptual work are far from mere hypotheses it would 
seem. Nowhere in his work does he suggest the provisionality of his positions, or 
acknowledge the necessity of confirming them through empirical practice, hypothesis testing 
and theory revision.
In essence, the same tension is present in classical dialectical materialism beginning 
with Engels. Like Žižek, Engels thought that many contemporary sciences were 
spontaneously realising the truth of the materialist dialectic and that those that were not could
be better equipped in their task if they would utilise this philosophy. But while seeming to 
give priority to the sciences, adding that philosophy was subordinated to them, Engels also 
argued that it was time for philosophy to take revenge upon certain sciences that were 
insufficiently dialectical. Indeed, he even goes so far as to assert that Hegelian dialectics are 
necessary to protect against ‘shallow,’ ‘one-sided empiricism’ and the ‘whole swindle of 
induction,’46 associating ‘the unobstructed development of all scientific knowledge with the 
application of the reconstructed dialectical method.’47 Engels might reject “absolute truth” but
nevertheless proposes something very similar, insofar as he argues that with Hegelian 
philosophy it is possible to ‘trace out the inner law running through all its apparently 
accidental phenomena.’48 At a philosophical level, both Jordan (1967) and Leichtheim (1961)
describe the result of this tension in classical dialectical materialist positions as “Hegelian 
Positivism,”49 seemingly borrowing the phrase from Freidrich Hayek’s (1964) 
characterisation of a philosophical trend that included Marx and Engels but also Hippolyte 
45 Žižek, LTN, p.735, IR, p.230.
46 Engels quoted in Jordan, Evolution of Dialectical Materialism, pp.146-147.
47 Jordan, Evolution of Dialectical Materialism, p.83.
48 Engels, Anti-Dühring, p.24.
49 Jordan, The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism, p.147, George Lichtheim, Marxism: An Historical and 
Critical Study, London: Routledge and Paul Keegan (1961) p.251.
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Taine, Emile Durkheim, John Dewey and Benedetto Croce.50 The term is immediately 
insightful. It signposts the two opposed theoretical positions that classical dialectical 
materialism attempts to straddle, while the striking disjunction that the term evokes by 
combining these positions indicates the tension that emerges when doing so.
Žižek faces the same tension. And, ultimately, the same question that characterised 
many of the internal wranglings over the status of philosophy within the Soviet state: do we 
give priority to the empirical or the rational? Like diamat, Žižek ultimately sides with the 
latter. In what follows, I want to illustrate how Žižek’s arguments function with regard to 
quantum theory and how he is able to offer his interpretations of it.
Žižek’s account of quantum relies primarily on the Copenhagen Interpretation (CI) of 
quantum phenomena. This interpretation is relatively positivistic. Although it does not reduce
everything to computational data, it nevertheless is one of the most minimal quantum 
ontologies, and insofar as it is possible presents its positions in terms of waves, particles, 
locations and states.51 As one might expect, CI is primarily descriptive and far less 
explanatory than other interpretations. It presents an image of underlying reality that is vastly 
counter-intuitive but grants these strange appearances the status of brute-facts.52 It results in 
what might be described as an incredibly spacious image of a world that offends common-
sense, as much as for the strangeness of what it describes as its refusal to offer anything more
than the most minimal causal explanations. 
It would seem that Žižek’s “productive reformulations” or his attempt to provide 
conceptual clarification utilise, and perhaps even rely on, such a minimal ontology. Where 
the positivistic CI might seem philosophically challenged, Žižek can offer Lacanian, 
50 Freidrich Hayek, The Counter Revolution in the Sciences, New York: Macmillan (1964) p.204.
51 Canavo, Quantum Theory, pp.52-3.
52 Canavo, Quantum Theory, p.51.
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Hegelian, and Schellengian concepts as a kind of weak explanation. Read through this lens, 
quantum naturally appears “Hegelian” or “Schellengian” in character, or demonstrates an 
epistemology that is common to psychoanalysis or Marxism. However, what Žižek is in fact 
doing is utilising concepts developed to resolve wholly different theoretical and practical 
problems in order to account for quantum phenomena. 
This minimal ontology perhaps also helps us understand why wherever Žižek looks he
seems to be able to find the space for the applicability of dialectical materialism. Castration 
can explain Wave-Particle duality,53 the collapse of the wave function can mirror the effect of
the “quilting point,”54 the delay in the process of determination can be said to mimic the 
Freudian logic of retroactivity, or Nachträglichkeit,55 or, as we have seen, the act of creation 
in the Higgs field can be said to follow the logic of the death drive. In each case it is as if 
Žižek is utilising the diminished ontology of CI as a kind of marionette that will dance for his
own positions.  Given its emptiness, it could be said to offer a scaffolding behind which 
Žižek can insert dialectical materialist structures. Of course, what this analogy misses out is 
that this does considerable damage to the theories it engages with. With respect to other less 
positivistically inclined interpretations of the findings of quantum science, it seems that Žižek
would be far less able to perform this philosophical puppetry.56
Rather than “Hegelian positivism”, then, we might call this “Žižekian positivism.” 
Ultimately, it seems to produce the same effects. Jordan argues that Hegelian positivism 
results in the ‘reduction of the fundamental laws of particular sciences to a set of supreme 
universal laws, which would show that the former can be inferred from the latter.’57 While we
53 Žižek, IR, pp.221-2.
54 Žižek, IR, p.223.
55 Žižek, IR, p.225.
56 See Cavano, Quantum Theory, p.51. 
57 Jordan, The Evolution of Dialectical, pp.83-4.
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do not get anything like this brazen error in Žižek’s writing, a much subtler reduction occurs 
through a gradual engagement of the sciences in which a set of supreme universal figures 
nevertheless appear. As a result, dialectical materialism appears as if it is a philosophy of the 
One-All, rather than the not-all.
7.6. Psycho-Socio-Morphic Projection
The One-All of this world can be said to emerge by way of a very specific displacement and 
projection on Žižek’s behalf. Imposing dialectical materialist categories into the natural 
sciences seems to reduce even the subatomic level, the Real beyond the symbolic, to a 
repetition of the world that Žižek’s Marxist dialectical materialism finds. 
A similar projection occurs within classical dialectical materialism. The key term in 
this regard, given its political importance, is the dialectical “leap.” The term was central to 
Engels’s account of nature and an emergentist, modern materialism, in which the dialectic of 
quantity and quality operates through qualitative leaps by way of the accumulative process of 
quantitative change.58 New phenomena and novel situations are said to be possible through 
processes where the result is composed from but not reducible to its conditions. By the time it
is inscribed in “Dialectical and Historical Materialism” the notion of the leap becomes an 
essential part of the third socio-cosmic law of dialectical materialism.59 But it was also key to 
securing the possibility of revolution. This was certainly the case for Plekhanov (1891) who 
in his article for the sixtieth anniversary of Hegel’s death writes that it is the dialectical leap 
which gave to dialectics its extraordinary significance. It allowed revolutionaries to oppose 
evolutionists and conservatives on the basis that ‘in nature and also in human thought and 
58 Engels, Anti-Dühring, p.43.
59 Stalin, Dialectical and Historical Materialism, pp.10-13.
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history leaps are inevitable.’60 In Plekhanov’s Development of the Monist Conception of 
History (1956), it also played a key role in securing the idea that gradual change would 
eventually produce more radical political transformation.61 What, then, does establishing the 
inevitability of leaps in society and nature provide political practice? Asserting the existence 
of leaps on the basis of a supposedly universal law works to naturalise and legitimise what is 
in reality a controversial political thesis. Just as an anthropomorphic law ascribes human form
and nature to a deity or a natural object, a theory which imbues the nature of the cosmos with 
social traits can be called a ‘sociomorphic theory of the universe.’62 At the most general level 
‘sociomorphic theories are knowingly or unknowingly formulated and advanced because of 
their alleged fitness to support one religious creed or one moral and political doctrine rather 
than another.’63 In this instance we can see several ways that a “socio-cosmic law” functions; 
it can a) act as a normative model for man and society, b) offer a ground from which to 
deduce the inevitability of events given the natural order, c) function to support a particular 
political ideology, d) give a scientific basis for a social, political or ethical strategy. It does 
this, moreover, while denying the initial projection into nature.64
In the case of Žižek, could it be that the radical contingency of the subject at the 
lowest levels of nature also functions in order to secure a political thesis regarding the 
possibility of the freedom of the subject? Earlier we argued that securing the subject’s 
freedom on the basis of the divine act of God enabled Žižek to side-step the difficult 
questions of political power, organisation, and how the subject might strike at the system. By 
finding the power of the subject to be secured by nature, regardless of its circumstances, 
60 G.V Plekhanov, Sixtieth Anniversary of Hegel’s Death, [Online] Marxists.org accessed 
from:https://www.marxists.org/archive/plekhanov/1891/11/hegel.htm last accessed: 9.8.2015 (1891) n.p.
61 G.V Plekhanov, The Development of the Monist Conception of History, London: Lawrence and Wishart 
(1956) p.203.
62 Jordan, Evolution of Dialectical Materialism, p.204.
63 Jordan, Evolution of Dialectical Materialism, p.204.
64 Jordan, Evolution of Dialectical Materialism, p.204.
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Žižek can in effect naturalise revolution and a mode of liberation for the subject in a manner 
that ensures it exists beyond any particular historical iteration or any specific socio-political 
conditions.
7.7. Lysenkoism and the Danger of Dialectical Materialist Science
This chapter has shown how, as a result of failing to reflect on the problems and challenges of
a dialectical materialist engagement with the sciences, Žižek’s positions in certain respects 
appear incredibly similar to the worst theoretical excesses of “classical” dialectical 
materialism. This should be of concern to us because perhaps no philosophy has 
demonstrated quite so aptly Lacan’s understanding of ontology as the master’s discourse. As 
Lacan puts it: accepting ontology as being qua being means ‘quite simply being at someone’s
heel, being at someone’s beck and call.’65  In the case of the Soviet state, particularly in terms
of cultural, political and scientific matters, the relationship between theory and practice meant
that the ‘the superstructure of a speculative philosophy [possessed] legislative powers with 
respect to the realm of facts.’66 With regard to the sciences, it paved the way for the scandal 
of Lysenkoism, and the atmosphere of debate within the soviet sciences where what was of 
ultimate concern was not scientific practice and its results but that these results correctly 
reflected the interpretation of philosophy. In his analysis of this scandal Dominique Lecourt 
(1977) observes how the legitimacy of highly suspect scientific theories was maintained 
through reference primarily to the ideology that they were thought to be demonstrating the 
truth of.67 The basis of this was the error that mistook Marxist philosophy for ‘a 
programmatic method for the solution of particular physical problems,’ as Lewontin and 
65 Lacan, Seminar XX, p.31.
66 Jordan, The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism, p.147.
67 Dominique Lecourt, Proletarian Science? The Case of Lysenko trans. Ben Brewster London: New Left Books
(1977) p.100.
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Levins describe with regard to classical dialectical materialism.68 When it is understood as 
such, rather than a mode of critique, dialectical materialism is at risk of becoming an 
instrument of justification for certain “truths” over others. This is not to suggest that Žižek’s 
interpretation is sustained and propagated by the state apparatuses that created the conditions 
for the Lysenko scandal, nor is it to say that Žižekian philosophy will produce those ends. 
However, there is cause for concern when such a clumsy engagement with the sciences forms
a key part of a supposedly Marxist philosophy with so little reflection on the history of past 
mistakes.
68 Richard Lewotine and Richard Levins, “The Problem of Lysenkoism,” in The Radicalisation of Science, eds. 
Hilary Rose and Stephen Rose, London: Macmillan (1976) p.59.
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Chapter 8: Capitalism and its Symptoms
8.1. Introduction
In the final section of chapter 3, 3.4., I outlined how alongside theoretical problems regarding
the nature of the Real and possible forms of political practice it might allow, Žižek’s newly 
critical stance with regards to liberal democracy posed several questions for political and 
historical analysis to answer. In chapter 3 I suggested that these were found at three levels. 
First, given the new and unexpected forms of political enjoyment that accompanied liberal 
democracy, Žižek confronted a blind-spot in his previous analyses of the nature of the 
Lacanian subject in contemporary society. Second, the limitations of his support for liberal 
democracy indicated the need to understand the connection between liberal democracy and 
capital. And, third, the absence of any consideration of the nature of capitalism and its 
dynamics and contradictions was a clear lacuna in Žižek’s analysis that seemed to produce 
his overly optimistic support for a liberal democratic politics. Addressing these limitations of 
his democratic phase have broadly defined the political terrain of Žižek’s work after his 
Marxist-turn. Since his democratic period, Žižek has regularly focused on the changed nature 
of subjectivity in postmodernity, the nature of liberal democracy and the “post-political” 
state, and the antagonisms that characterise contemporary capitalism.  In this chapter I will 
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map out the changes in Žižek’s position across these three levels to demonstrate the critique 
he has developed.
Žižek’s analysis is not without significant questions at the level of form however. 
Žižek’s dialectical analysis attempts to reveal the key symptomal points within the 
reproduction of capitalism at libidinal, political and economic levels. However, operating at 
the macro-level of national and transnational political structures, which have a complex and 
multivalent connection to the subject, whether this analysis produces the form of “infinite 
judgement” and the Tuche of the Real that Žižek suggests is necessary for the praxical 
political subject to emerge remains questionable.  As I will argue below, in Žižek’s attempt to
offer a consistent and convincing account of capitalism as a “totality with failures” he risks 
negating the shocking confrontation with the Real by producing merely another form of 
knowledge or ideology, albeit one that is antagonistic and oppositional. In the final section of 
the chapter we will reflect on the effectiveness of the dialectic at a socio-political level as a 
result. Before then, in sections 8.3., 8.4., and 8.5., I will address how Žižek answers the 
questions that define his Marxist political project at the level of the subject, liberal democracy
and capitalism, respectively. To begin, however, I will briefly reflect on the object of Žižek’s 
dialectical analyses: capitalism qua Real.
8.2. Capitalism as Real
The aim of Žižek’s dialectic is to produce a “totality with its failures”, which is to say, a 
totality as an inconsistent not-all grounded only by the symptomal torsion of its constitutive 
exceptions and the relation of the subject to them. How does this level with Žižek’s frequent 
claims that capitalism is Real? As we have seen, this term has a number of functions and 
meanings in Žižek’s writing informed largely by the variety of ways that Lacan uses the term 
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in his work. In the context of Žižek’s socio-political critique, however, what does he mean 
when he refers to capitalism as Real? Since there has been much confusion in the secondary 
literature regarding the meaning of the term in this context in Žižek’s work it is useful to 
chart the different ways it has been used and address several misgivings that his critics have 
with the term. 
When Žižek began describing capitalism as “Real” Ernesto Laclau (2000) objected 
that this Lacanian term made little sense in the context of a critical theory. If the Real is the 
beyond of the symbolic, an indicator of something that cannot be symbolised, Laclau 
questioned how could capitalism be “Real” given that it is quite patently a set of practises, 
structures, and relations?1 Moreover, Laclau adds, describing capitalism as Real would also 
seem to prevent the very possibility of a Marxist critique given that the latter is premised on 
the possibility of understanding these practises and relationships and the violence and 
exploitation that result from them.2 For Marxism, in other words, capitalism is anything but 
“unsymbolisable.” 
What Laclau’s critique overlooks is the specificity and context of Žižek’s use of the 
term. Coming within a dialogue with Laclau regarding the limits of radical democracy and 
Laclau’s own post-Marxism, when Žižek refers to capitalism as “Real” he is, in fact, arguing 
that it is the Real of Laclau’s discourse, of how capitalism and class remain the unconscious 
of radical democratic theory.3 The same could be said, of course, of Žižek’s previous 
position. His support for liberal democratic politics on the basis of its ability to keep the place
of power empty could only be maintained by way of the repression or disavowal of the 
intimate connection between the contemporary liberal democratic state and capitalism. With 
1 Laclau, CHU, p.235.
2 Laclau, CHU, p.235.
3 Žižek, CHU, p.96.
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regard to Laclau’s post-Marxist position, advanced primarily with Chantal Mouffe in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Žižek argues that the democratic position that it took 
alongside the deconstructive renunciation of the “discourse of the universal” relied on the 
abandonment of the analysis of capitalism ‘as a global economic system.’4 More generally, 
Žižek sees this as the problem with all forms of identity politics as well as Laclau and 
Mouffe’s theory of discursive hegemony. Reducing all political division and contestation to 
the practice of symbolic articulations of contingent identity, relies on the “repression” of the 
continuing ‘key role of economic struggle.’5 As Žižek puts it quoting Wendy Brown, identity 
politics and radical democracy, including his own former democratic position, occurs 
alongside ‘a certain renaturalization of capitalism.’6 In other words, radical democracy leaves 
the economic level as the unarticulated background of its political practice.  For Žižek, then, 
capitalism is the Real of Laclau’s work, the unsymbolisable background of radical democracy
and post-Marxism. 
The second way that Žižek uses this term has also caused some confusion. In chapter 
7, “Žižekian Science,” we described the “symbolic Real” as the product of a scientific 
discourse that practiced mathematic formalisation and the reduction of knowledge to a pure 
syntax — as Žižek describes it: ‘the signifier reduced to a senseless formula.’7 When Žižek 
refers to capitalism as Real in this sense he is arguing that there is the possibility of a similar 
type of formalisation of capitalist dynamics and relations. Confirming Sharpe’s (2004) earlier
thesis,8 Žižek has more recently alluded to the “matheme” of the reproduction of capital. As 
he describes it in Trouble In Paradise (2014): there is something 
4 Žižek, POF, p.162, CHU, p.106.
5 Žižek, POF, p.162.
6 Žižek quoting Wendy Brown in CHU, p.95.
7 Žižek, OB, p.82.
8 Sharpe, Slavoj Žižek, p.201.
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like a “matheme” of capital, a formal matrix of the self-reproduction of 
capital, like that which Marx was trying to elaborate in his Capital. This 
matheme, this trans-historical and trans-cultural formal matrix, is the “Real”
of capital: the thing that stays the same through the entire process of global 
capitalism, the madness of which becomes palpable in moments of crisis.9
The matheme of capitalism would be a Marxist equivalent of Lacan’s formalisation of certain
psycho-social structures — like the four discourses.10 However, does this mean that Žižek 
conceives of capitalism in deterministic way, as an Other, precisely the kind of Real that his 
own dialectical materialism was conceived to destroy? Sharpe makes this claim of Žižek’s 
second reference to the Real of capitalism. He argues that it ‘risks at every moment the kind 
of fetishisation of [the capitalist economy] that Marx ceaselessly railed against.’11 On 
occasion Žižek does seem to confirm Sharpe’s concern. For example, he describes capital as 
‘a real whose imperatives are much more absolute than even the most pressing demands of 
our social and natural reality.’12 But Sharpe’s critique sits uneasily with Žižek’s actual critical
practice. Žižek has consistently demonstrated that the “objectivity” of capitalism — in 
essence, the value form — is a Real qua real abstraction but only on the basis of the 
interaction of subjects in commodity exchange.13 Similarly, Žižek also argues that this Real is
always mediated by political actors — for example, referring to the global financial crisis of 
2008, he argues that the Real was felt only through the actions of politicians who acted to re-
9 Žižek, TIP, pp.27-28.
10 Alternatively, Žižek might be referring to Lacan’s matheme of capitalism, as a fifth discourse. This is an 
avenue that is still to be sufficiently explored in the continuing interest in a Lacanian-Marxism. It is a topic that 
is unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis not only because Žižek does not engage with it, but that Lacan’s 
own reflections on it are underdeveloped. For the only published reference to the capitalist discourse in Lacan’s 
work see Jacques Lacan, “The Discourse of Jacques Lacan at the University of Milan on May 12, 1972” in En 
Italie Lacan 1953-1978, Milan: La Salmandra (1978) pp 32-55. I thank Jack Stone for the English translation. 
See also: Frédéric Declercq “Lacan on the Capitalist Discourse: Its Consequences For Libidinal Enjoyment and 
Social Bonds” in Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society vol.11 (2006) pp.74-83.
11 Sharpe, Slavoj Žižek, pp.201-2.
12 Žižek, FATTAF, p.80.
13 Žižek, SOI, ch. 1.
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establish the conditions necessary so that capitalism could continue to function. For Žižek, 
insofar as there is a symbolic Real of capitalism, this matrix always relies on the constant 
practice of subjects and the conditions needed for it to be established. 
The final way in which Žižek uses the term Real resolves this ambiguity and suggests 
what is wrong with Sharpe’s critique. For Žižek, capitalism is Real in the same way that the 
symbolic is Real as the not-all of a flawed, inconsistent, antagonistic totality.14 As Žižek 
describes it in Trouble in Paradise (2014) capitalism is not a ‘substantial unified field’ but 
‘an inconsistent space traversed by a multitude of practices and discourses.’ For Žižek, this 
includes different forms of labour, the function of money, state apparatuses, ideological 
narratives, and the affects and actions of subjects.15 These not only demonstrate the 
complexity and diversity of capitalism but, ultimately, its “inconsistency.” Žižek draws from 
this the key methodological and political hypothesis that there is no pure economy.16 The 
point of Žižek’s critique is to show that while there is nevertheless something like a 
“matheme” of capitalism that results from the totality of its interactions, inevitably capitalism
is not a wholly consistent or unified system. It is for this reason that Žižek develops a critique
of capitalism that analyses its relationship to subjects, the state, liberal democracy and its own
excesses: to show that this totality only emerges through the combination of these different 
fields and relies on their inconsistent interaction and the uneven terrain that they demonstrate.
It also suggests that Žižek’s own analyses will always be partial, historical, and incomplete 
since capitalism itself is a historical, constantly shifting, almost patch-work like 
amalgamation of responses to its own insufficiencies and antagonisms.  
14 Žižek, OWB, p.48.
15 Žižek, TIP, p.27.
16 Žižek, TIP, p.27.
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When Žižek describes capitalism as not-all he is prioritising its moments of 
antagonism and the possibility of class struggle. Only if capitalism is an inconsistent totality 
can we conceive of the possibility of the space of genuine political interventions within it. For
Žižek, in this context, the not-all of capitalism names the possibility of class struggle, not as a
metalinguistic perspective that indicates some final signified or some centred political 
subject17 but the ruptures and symptomal torsions in which the subject can recognise its own 
negativity. As Žižek writes, class struggle takes place on the basis of ‘the distance of the 
economy to itself.’18 For Žižek, understanding this distance is to understand the political 
moment of the economy. In a discussion of the role of class struggle, Žižek describes how it 
produces a ‘new form of knowledge.’19 Žižek describes this in “Lenin’s Choice” (2002) as the
work of formalisation, which consists in mapping the presence of the political moments 
inherent to the economy in the form of its antagonisms, how prevailing forms of knowledge 
attempt to avoid these, and how forms of abstract negativity, the seemingly irrational 
outbursts of violence or other socio-political symptoms, are connected to them. Understood 
as formalisation, the work of analysis is to trace the inescapability of antagonism qua class 
struggle at the multiple levels of the socio-political field. As Žižek writes: 
Form has nothing to do with “formalism”, with the idea of a neutral Form, 
independent of its contingent particular content; it stands, rather, for the 
traumatic kernel of the Real, for the antagonism which “colours” the entire 
field in question. In this precise sense, class struggle is the Form of the 
Social: every social phenomenon is overdetermined by it, so that it is not 
possible to remain neutral towards it.20 
17 Žižek, FTKN, p.100, POF, p.77.
18 Žižek, IDLC, p.291.
19 Žižek, “LC,” p.190.
20 Žižek, “LC,” p.190.
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To put this in other terms, class struggle means demonstrating the presence of political 
decisions where the bourgeois subjects see objective necessities grounded in the fantasy of 
the Other. As such, the formalisation of class struggle demonstrates the space for what we 
have called the proletarian/feminine/subtractive subject insofar as it demonstrates the absence
of the big Other of capitalism via its symptomal torsions. To return to the notion of the Real, 
while Žižek concedes that capitalism appears as if an unavoidable force of nature that 
determines everything from the decisions of government to the minutiae of our daily lives, he
conceives of the perspective of class struggle to sees through this illusion and locate the 
limits and contradictions of the system. If class struggle is the form of the social, critical 
theoretical practice is tasked with demonstrating the necessity of and possible points for 
praxical subjective engagement.
8.3. The Subject as a Symptom of Late-Capitalism
In section 2.4., we came to the conclusion that there were significant gaps within Žižek’s 
understanding of contemporary forms of political identity and enjoyment. As a result of his 
own political and theoretical crisis Žižek required an account of the transformations of our 
cultural and ideological substance in order to understand new forms of subjectivity that he 
saw emerge in the disintegration of socialism and the process of democratisation in Eastern 
Europe. In his post-radical democratic period, Žižek begins an analysis of these modes of 
subjectivity and accounts for their form in three ways. First, at the level of identification, 
Žižek argues that a fundamental shift occurs in post-modernity that has seen symbolic 
identification undermined and leads to the primacy of an imaginary identification with 
particular ethnic and cultural practices. Second, Žižek explains that this has an equivalence in
the transformation in the nature of the subject in post-modernity, locatable in the change in 
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the nature and function of the superego from a primarily prohibitory entity to an agency that 
takes the form of a direct injunction to enjoy. Third, Žižek argues that these transformations 
are a consequence of the effect of the “deterritorialising” logic of global capitalism and how 
it undermines all symbolic authority. In this sense, Žižek offers an account of how capitalism 
undermines and de-stabilises fixed identities and symbolic structures. From this position 
Žižek calls into question the effectivity of cultural politics, including that of Laclau and 
Mouffe’s radical democracy.
8.3.1. Post-Modern Identification
For Žižek, the prevailing diagnoses of post-modernity are essentially correct insofar as they 
identify the end of grand ideological narratives and the accordant denaturalisation of stable 
social and cultural identities, historically based at the loci of sex, religion, class and 
nationality. What gives this process its specific character according to Žižek is the decline of 
symbolic efficacy, the result of which has seen imaginary identification take precedence over 
its symbolic counterpart.21 At the political level, Žižek argues that this has resulted in “the 
culturalisation of politics.”22 Under this category Žižek includes multiculturalism, identity 
politics, and the return of new nationalistic fundamentalisms, including those of Eastern 
Europe. It is here where we see that Žižek is able to clearly delineate his own position from 
the post-Marxist position of Laclau and Mouffe in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. In this 
work it was argued that identities and cultural values were symbolic in nature and the result 
of the subject adopting certain symbolic positions.23 In his analysis of the new forms of 
cultural politics and jouissance Žižek opposes this view detailing the imaginary nature of 
21 Žižek, TS, p.451.
22 Žižek, Violence, p.90.
23 For example, see the account of the results for identity formation as a result of the Lacanian conception of the 
symbolic. Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, p.86.
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identification and how these are both a product of and work to feed into the dynamics of late-
capitalism. 
In “Multiculturalism, Or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism,” (1997) 
Žižek outlines how the logics of identification have shifted in the passage from modernity to 
post-modernity. He argues that modernity was characterised by the concretisation of 
“secondary identifications” — with a local community, the family, inter-personal relations —
which no longer functioned as the abstract opposite to concrete “primary identifications” — 
Nation, Religion — but directly integrated into them.24 The key feature of national ideology 
in modernity, so Žižek argues, was that secondary identification overlapped with primary 
identification. The subject, as a result, was not split by an opposition between primary and 
secondary causes but could serve primary identification through secondary identification. To 
put it in simple terms: the subject was not only a subject of Crown and Country in public life 
and a Father in their private life, the subject could serve Crown and Country, contribute to its 
success, precisely by being a good Father.25 
Žižek argues that in post-modernity this logic has been surpassed and that in order to 
re-root the subject there has been a return to isolated, imaginary, primary identification.  For 
Žižek, the key shift has occurred because secondary identification is no longer binding since 
it has come apart from primary identification once again. As a result, identification with 
ideological signifiers no longer have the same effect on the subject and are now experienced 
as an abstract formal frame for diverse and disconnected contents with no definite form of 
ideological unity.26 Žižek sheds light on this process with the example of how “being an 
American” has altered in US culture. As the paradigmatic modern society, American culture 
successfully integrated the dialectic of primacy and secondary identification so that ‘in order 
24 Žižek, “Multiculturalism,” p.41.
25 Žižek, “Multiculturalism,” p.41.
26 Žižek, “Multiculturalism,” p.42.
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to be a “good American,” one does not have to renounce one’s ethnic roots — Italians, 
Germans, Blacks, Jews, Greeks, Koreans, they are “all Americans, that is, the very 
particularity of their ethnic identity, the way they “stick to it,” makes them Americans.’27 
However, in post-modernity, this declaration of ethnic identity no longer functions as part of 
the grand ideological project of “Americanness.” Rather than the sublime effect of 
ideological unity, “being American” has been largely annulled in the same way that subject’s 
are increasingly sceptical with regard to grand ideological narratives. “Being American”, 
Žižek contends, is now experienced as a mere belonging without ideological substance. It is a
master-signifier that is experienced as empty. As Žižek puts it: “Americanness” is ‘a simple 
formal framework for the coexistence of the multiplicity of ethnic, religious or life-style 
communities.’28 Žižek’s key thesis is that the weakening of the master-signifier has led to the 
undermining of substantial ideological meaning at a symbolic level. Far from resulting in the 
subversive reflexivity that is usually associated with the post-modern subject, however, it has 
set in motion a desperate search for new forms of ideological identity at the imaginary level. 
In terms of Eastern European nationalism, the attachment to the national Thing and 
the attempt to re-root national identity through some fantasmatic historical substance — 
Land, Tradition, etc. — is but an attempt to come to terms with the loss of substantial unity at
a symbolic ideological level. Žižek argues that the same process has occurred in Western 
liberal democracies where identity politics and multiculturalism, while appearing as the 
precise opposite of this fundamentalist attachment to some “primordial” form of 
identification, demonstrate a similar form of imaginary identification. For example in the UK,
we might see this process in a return to British ethnicity in light of the weakening of the 
symbolic authority qua National project. On the right, this takes the form of a continuing 
27 Žižek, “Multiculturalism,” p.42.
28 Žižek, “Multiculturalism,” p.42.
189 
Capitalism and its Symptoms
obsession with the British values, or, on the far-right, with common ancestry or the 
ownership and isolation of Britain. There is even a leftist form of ethnic attachment that takes
the form of a reflexive, ironic, retro-kitsch: for example, in recent years there has been the 
fetishisation of the “Keep Calm and Carry on” aesthetic, a construction of imaginary ethnic 
identification in the quirky way that Britons dealt with historical trauma with stiff-upper-lips. 
For Žižek, if the construction of the nation was achieved through the “nationalization of the 
ethnic” at “the end of ideology” there is the “ethnicization of the nation” at the level of 
ideology.29 
In Ticklish Subject Žižek outlines how despite the disintegration of a stable sense of 
symbolic identification the supposed reflexive subject always relies on some form of 
“primordial” or, using Judith Butler’s (1997) term, “passionate attachment.”30 For Butler, 
these are an attachment to something constructed but basal, an element upon which the 
subject is ‘fundamentally dependent.’31 Žižek understands these attachments as imaginary and
rooted at the libidinal level. They form, as he writes, the ‘obscene supplement to the public 
sphere of freedom and equality.’32 For Žižek, “passionate attachments” can take a number of 
forms, but what they have in common is that they offer the subject some basic libidinal 
substance in the form of a particular transgression that simultaneously offers some protection 
against the decline of the symbolic form of ideology and how it structures subjectivity. Žižek 
cites “passionate attachments” from the extreme forms of sexual and hedonistic 
transgressions — smoking, drug taking, sado-masochism, “lad” or “bro” culture — to the 
more culturally acceptable forms of imaginary identification with ideals that replace symbolic
norms, from embracing a particular fascinating “culture”, joining a life-style community, an 
29 Žižek, “Multiculturalism,” p.42.
30 Žižek, TS, p.417.
31 Judith Butler, The Psychic Life Of Power, Stanford: Stanford University Press (1997) p.7.
32 Žižek, TS, p.418.
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obsession with bodily health, to the constant reliance on “small others” in the form of expert 
specialists or micro-ideologies, like buzz books.33 In the same way that an attachment to an 
“ethnic” Thing functions to forestall the absence of effective symbolic norms at a national 
level, these “passionate attachments” function to allow the subject to regulate their 
interactions at an everyday level in societies in which ego-ideals — the symbolic mandates 
that result from the internalisation of master-signifiers — no longer function effectively. 
8.3.2. The Superego
Žižek argues that the substantial mooring that these “passionate attachments” provide allow 
for the process of “dis-identification” with other symbolic and imaginary identifications that 
produce the appearance of cultural contingency and a reflexive relationship to symbolic 
identity and social norms. However, this cannot be considered a mode of liberated 
subjectivity. Far from free, the decline of ideological authority produces in the subject what 
Žižek describes as ‘the ultimate identity crisis.’34 This is revealed in “the antinomy of post-
modern individuality”, which resides in the overlap between the multiplicity of possibilities 
that post-modern self-reflexive identification delivers and the compulsive activity that this 
requires when not supported by the Other.35 This crisis is rooted at a deeper level, however, 
than merely the decline of the effectiveness of symbolic authority and symbolic efficacy.
Žižek argues that the new modes of identification are accompanied by a 
transformation in the very structure of subjectivity.36 Specifically, these new modes of 
identification evidence a change in the nature of the superego from a prohibitory agency to 
one that directly solicits jouissance. The “stupid” superego injunction to enjoy ‘increasingly 
33 Žižek, TS, p.451.
34 Žižek, TS, p.458.
35 Žižek, TS, p.458.
36 Žižek, TS, p.377.
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dominates and regulates the perverse universe of our late capitalist experience.’37 Žižek 
argues that the superego emerges in the vacuum left by a dysfunction in the internalisation of 
societal mandates and the decline of symbolic efficacy. While the subject is “rootless” in the 
sense that it is without a proper symbolic role, it is now dominated by an altogether more 
oppressive psycho-social agency: the superego. While we might no longer be interpellated by
specific ideological grand-narratives, Žižek argues that we are now captured by ideology at 
the level of enjoyment, through the “desublimated”, worldless injunction to “Enjoy!” 
experienced only as an ‘obscure Unnameable.’38
This suspension of the Master-Signifier leaves as the only agency of 
ideological interpellation the “unnameable” abyss of jouissance: the 
ultimate injunction that regulates our lives in “postmodernity” is “Enjoy!” 
— realise your potential, enjoy in all manner of ways, from intense sexual 
pleasures through social success to spiritual self-fulfilment.39
At first sight it appears that our “post-ideological” world amounts to a freedom to create and 
sustain our own norms, escape into our own modes of pleasure, and enjoy previously 
prohibited practises. However, the emergence of the superego as the primary psychical agent 
of ideology has led to a fraught relation with identity and jouissance.  
In 2.3.3., we touched upon the paradoxical and pathological form of the superego in 
terms of its character as an impossible demand. In the context of Stalinism, we described how
the social law began to function as a superegoistic demand insofar as it compelled the subject 
to do what was otherwise already necessary. With the decline of symbolic efficacy the 
superego takes the form of an equally “impossible” demand: an empty injunction to “Enjoy!” 
without attachment to any particular content or prohibition. Precisely as such, the superego 
37 Žižek, TS, p.481.
38 Žižek, PV, p.188.
39 Žižek, IDLC, p.30.
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makes it more difficult than ever to truly enjoy. Without the specific prohibition that allows 
for the “deadly,” illicit nature of jouissance in transgression no particular form of jouissance 
will ever satisfy the superego. Paradoxically, the empty form of the superegoistic demand to 
enjoy prevents enjoyment. As Žižek writes in Ticklish Subject: ‘Once again the superego has 
accomplished its task successfully: the direct injunction to “Enjoy!” is a much more effective 
way to hinder the subject’s access to enjoyment than the explicit Prohibition which sustains 
the space for its transgression.’40 As a result, Žižek is highly sceptical of whether the new 
forms of enjoyment that characterise hedonistic, consumerist late-capitalism really lead to 
anything more than further frustration in the subject. Indeed, Žižek argues that we should 
index the sense of anxiety and guilt that proliferate in post-modern subjectivity in late-
capitalism — the key components of the aforementioned identity crisis — to the increased 
force of the superego. 
At the ideological level, Žižek argues that these frustrations and the deadlock that they
engender in the subject produces “ferocious” superego figures in the imaginary of the subject.
These spectres of Others who really do enjoy appear as a barrier to the subject’s own 
enjoyment and simultaneously account for their failure to enjoy. For Žižek, contemporary 
forms of racism are paradigmatic in this sense. The Other qua image of the object of hatred is
a construction that coalesces around forms of cultural enjoyment that are different to the 
subject’s own. From this insight, Žižek returns to the question regarding jouissance that 
became central in his critique of liberal democracy in the post-socialist period where he saw 
hatred and inter-regional rivalry emerge alongside new forms of political jouissance in the 
national Thing. Žižek argues that these, in part, are a result of the deadlock of desire, for 
which the superego is responsible. Inventing fantasy figures who really do enjoy, and as a 
40 Žižek, TS, p.450.
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result block our own jouissance, allows the subject to account for their own frustration 
despite the universalised injunction. Žižek describes how through a process of ideological 
displacement the subject can ‘locate the cause of its inaccessibility in a despotic figure which 
stands for the primordial jouisseur: we cannot enjoy because he appropriates all 
enjoyment…’41 Žižek is therefore able to offer an insight in to a specific form of rivalry 
which characterised the tensions and hatred of Eastern European nationalism: “the theft of 
enjoyment” in which we blame our own frustrations on some Other.42 For Žižek, there is a 
precise correlate within liberal democratic societies in the “culture of complaint”, an attempt 
to translate our failure to enjoy into a legal obligation to the Other who has disturbed our 
satisfaction. Žižek also sees this relationship in how the subject is perturbed by the 
jouissance of others — how they smoke, or eat, or organise their own cultural practices.  For 
Žižek, at the root of these disturbances and the resulting complaints, is frequently ‘the very 
unfathomable surplus-enjoyment I am deprived of, whose lack makes me feel 
underprivileged.’43
8.3.3. Atonal Capitalism
The subject’s lack of enjoyment, the decline in the effectiveness of symbolic ideological 
projects, and new modes of political and cultural enjoyment are not isolated changes, as we 
have seen. Nor does Žižek think that they can be addressed in a piece-meal fashion since they
share a common root in a wider set of historical processes that, Žižek contends, are a result of
the dynamics of capitalism that can be traced at political and ideological levels. In this sense, 
the transformations in ideology and the subject that characterise post-modernity can be 
41 Žižek, TS, p.378.
42 Žižek, TWN, p.206.
43 Žižek, TS, p.441.
194 
Capitalism and its Symptoms
considered symptoms of capitalism. Žižek argues that at the heart of these transformations in 
our modes of ideological identification and political enjoyment is, ultimately, capitalism. For 
Žižek, the post-modern form of subjectivity and its Lacanian counterpart are symptoms of 
capitalism.
Turning to the question of nationalism and the topic that initially spurred his change 
of political position, Žižek understands the new forms of nationalism as a result of the 
precarity of nation states and the national project in globalised late-capitalism.44 The 
‘universal function of the market,’ which is indifferent to national boundaries, has gradually 
undermined the national project at a political and ideological level.45 For Žižek, the 
“ethnicisation of the nation” is an attempt to produce and ensure the national project’s 
continuing ideological unity through an attachment to a “Thing.” In other words, the 
reassertion of a seemingly “regressive” attachment to a traditional remainder is a primary 
way that national identity is protected against the backdrop of the external demands of 
transnational capitalism. Žižek argues that in the case of Eastern European nationalisms, the 
re-emergence of fundamentalist forms of ideological identity that crystallised around the 
enjoyment of the national Thing can be thought of as kind of “shock absorber” to the 
disorientation that resulted from the exposure of vast swathes of public life to the market 
mechanism that characterised the entry of these countries into the capitalist system.46
With regard to the rise of the superego in the subject, this change has been cemented 
and reinforced insofar as it perfectly coincides with the consumerist character of late-
capitalism. The subject’s participation in certain life-styles and the construction of identities 
feed into the direct commodification of every aspect of life in post-modernity — what the 
subject wears, where it eats, who it is — while the superego injunction to enjoy enjoins it to 
44 Žižek, “Multiculturalism,” p.49.
45 Žižek, “Multiculturalism,” p.42.
46 Žižek, TWN, p.210.
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consume ever more varied and diverse objects for the jouissance that it lacks.  As a result, 
Žižek claims that there is nothing subversive about these new forms of identity and new 
modes of transgressive enjoyment. Indeed, Žižek argues that universalised transgression is 
now the norm itself. The ubiquity of “counterculture” and its role in the cultural industries 
confirms its nature as a new mode of ideological conformity. Žižek also argues that the 
perverse subject is inherently useful to capital. The “imp of perversity” that characterises the 
post-modern subject is intimately connected to the continuing valorisation of capital through 
consumption because of the drive to the permanent refashioning of the self that it cultivates.47
And, as well as feeding the circuits of capital through consumption, the root dissatisfaction 
that drives the perverse subject’s enjoyment is used in post-Fordist working practices for its 
creativity and individuality. As Žižek puts it workers are ‘under the injunction to be what 
they are, to follow their innermost idiosyncrasies.’48 
The new forms of identity, ideology, and enjoyment are also intimately connected to 
capitalism, Žižek argues, on the grounds that the changes that have produced them have been 
driven by its central dynamics. At the level of ideology, Žižek argues that capitalism is a 
unique socio-economic order insofar as it “de-totalises” and “dislocates” stable ideological 
meaning.49 Žižek offers a Lacanian variation on a philosophical theme developed in Alain 
Badiou’s work which characterises capitalism by its ‘universal unbinding’ function.50 In 
Manifesto for Philosophy (1999) Badiou draws attention to the unique ontological status of 
capitalism as an order that undermines every stable frame of representation to disclose an 
ontological truth: the structuralessness of Being at the lowest level.51 Like Marx and Engels 
47 Žižek, TS, p.373.
48 Žižek, TS, p.368.
49 Žižek, TIP, pp.7-8.
50 See Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction, London: Palgrave Macmillan (2007)
51 Alain Badiou, The Manifesto for Philosophy, London: Continuum (1999) pp.56-57.
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claim that capitalism has a revolutionary effect on social relations — “All that is solid melt 
into air, all that is sacred is profaned,” as Marx and Engels put it borrowing Goethe’s words 
in the Communist Manifesto52 — Badiou argues that capitalism produces an ontological 
revelation: in Badiou’s terms, that representation is always contingent, nothing more than the 
One effect as ‘a simple, precarious configuration’ over the pure multiplicity of Being-
without-One.53 For Žižek, the effects of capitalism are similarly revelatory. It reveals the 
fragile and precarious nature of all ideological and cultural meaning and, as such, produces 
the decline of symbolic efficacy that we have described as a central tenant of Žižek’s 
conception of post-modern subjectivity.
Žižek’s argument at this point is difficult to follow. What he seems to have in mind is 
the way in which the market mechanism works to create universal equivalence, whereby 
commodities are reduced to a quantitative value and their substantial qualities become merely
incidental. In the same way, Žižek suggests that at a cultural level identity and ideology lose 
their substantial mooring and become abstract equivalents. For example, culture is no longer 
something we are grounded within and ideological belief does not operate effectively at the 
level of the ego-ideal, rather, it is something that is enacted at the level of choice, as if 
identities and cultures are genuine equivalents, which the subject might adopt in the same 
way that it might consume any number of commodities at a given moment.
Žižek’s position is underpinned by the thesis that, at the level of ideology, capitalism 
works effectively within and can accommodate itself within a vast range of ideological 
projects, cultures and values because it is not universal at the level of meaning but at the level
of its market mechanism qua Real.54  ‘The universality of capitalism resides in the fact that 
52 Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto, p.54.
53 Badiou, Manifesto, pp.56-57.
54 Žižek, PV, p.181, TIP, pp.7-8.
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capitalism is not a name for a “civilisation,” for a specific cultural-symbolic world, but the 
name for a neutral economico-symbolic machine which operates with Asian values as well as
with others […]’55 This is not to say that it leaves these values intact; in fact, anything but. 
Processing them through this machine undermines their ideological efficacy and strips the 
symbolic of its prior substantial weight. In other words, the “deterritorialising” function of 
capitalism sets in motion the transformations in identification and the structure of the subject 
that we have seen. Žižek argues that as a result, late-capitalism is an “Atonal” world, 
borrowing another of Badiou’s terms.56 The end of ideological grand narratives and the “free-
floating” empty superego, in this sense, are the consequences of the “worldlessness” that 
global capitalism produces.
8.4. Liberal Democracy and the State
A key part of Žižek’s Marxist turn has been to critically re-evaluate liberal democracy, the 
democratic state, and their relation to capital in light of the limitations of his democratic 
politics. The results of these analyses can be divided into three parts. First, Žižek alters his 
view with regard to the apparent openness that he initially thought that liberal democracy was
able to ensure. He now argues that democracy is always sustained by a “transcendental” 
frame which contains and colours democratic politics. Second, Žižek explains that the 
political power of the liberal democratic state is characterised by a post-political structure and
demonstrates a bio-political logic. Third, Žižek argues that the democratic state is defined by 
an excess of power over representation that it disavows but can be found in its exercise of an 
55 Žižek, PV, p.318.
56 The term comes from the French edition of Logics of Worlds, in the English version it is translated as atonic, 
which demonstrates Badiou’s meaning with greater clarity as well as a difference with Žižek: for Badiou, 
“Atonic” is a world not only without “Points,” but without truth or the Idea, in the Platonic sense, for Žižek 
atonal refers to the decline of the symbolic. See Alain Badiou Logics of Worlds Being and Event II trans. 
Alberto Toscano London: Continuum (2009) pp.220-222.
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absolute and authoritarian political sovereignty at moments of crisis. Recalling the 
Benjaminian or Schmittean notion of the “the state of emergency”, Žižek argues that this 
excess of state power over any fidelity to its representative function reduces all democratic 
subjects to “bare life” as the object of the state. 
8.4.1. Liberal Democracy
Žižek’s position regarding liberal democracy shifted significantly after his Marxist-turn. For 
example, he now contends, at an ideologico-political level, that “democracy” functions as 
little more than a fetish that effectively blocks and neuters the critique of actually existing 
democracy.57 Žižek’s position recalls recent observations that at the same time that 
“democracy” has become the single most important political cause of the West and almost 
universally accepted as an absolute political good its meaning has become hollowed out and 
detached from the reality of contemporary liberal democracy.58 Žižek, as a result, wants to 
challenge the effectivity of this fetish by revealing the falsity of the “democratic illusion” that
presupposes that the liberal democratic state reflects and embodies the wishes of citizens and 
is effectively held to account in democratic elections.59 On the contrary, Žižek argues that 
large parts of the institutional aspects and interests of the state are never wholly accountable 
through the institutions and mechanisms of liberal democracies themselves.60 Žižek spells this
out in terms of the “transcendental” aspect of the liberal democratic state. Žižek argues that 
while at an “empirical” level democracy appears to mirror and reflect social interests, the 
“transcendental” aspect of the liberal democratic state functions to determine these interests 
57 Žižek, LITET, p.391.
58 See, for example, Wendy Brown, “We are All Democrats Now …” in Theory and Event, vol.13, no.2 (2010). 
Alain Badiou, “The Democratic Emblem” in Democracy in What State? trans. William McCuaig New York: 
Columbia University Press (2011) pp.6-15.
59 Žižek, IDLC, pp.412-3.
60 Žižek, IDLC, p.412.
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by defining their character and limiting the kinds of content they can express.61 Far from the 
Real of contingent contestation that he previously described democratic elections as, Žižek 
now suggests that they function as fact a kind of echo-chamber in which the hegemonic 
ideological views and interests are reproduced. In his recent work, Žižek thus confirms our 
earlier suspicions with regard to his overly optimistic proclamations on the nature of 
democratic power. Far from “empty”, this space is coloured and structured by the 
“transcendental” excess. The conclusion that Žižek draws from this limiting function is that it
renders genuine politicisation impossible if political practice operates only through the 
ordinary channels of democratic participation.
8.4.2. Post-Politics, Bio-Politics
Žižek argues that given this inherent resistance to politicisation and structural change, every 
liberal democratic politics is a politics of the ‘non-event.’62 However, how does Žižek move 
from the argument that liberal democratic politics is ineffectual to the additional claim that 
the ‘main function’ of liberal democracy is, as he puts it, ‘to guarantee that nothing will really
happen in politics’?63 We must pay careful attention to the role that the state plays in 
delineating the coordinates of contemporary ideology and politics. Žižek’s argument rests on 
an account of the two political logics that define contemporary liberal democracies: post-
politics and bio-politics. 
Following a number of other theorists, including Chantal Mouffe (2005) and Jacques 
Rancière (1999), in Ticklish Subject Žižek describes the contemporary mode of liberal 
democratic politics as a form of “post-politics.”64 As generally understood, post-politics is 
61 Žižek, FATTAF, pp.136-7.
62 Žižek, Desert, p.151.
63 Žižek, Desert, p.151.
64 Žižek, TS, p.xxvi.
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associated with the weakening of the public sphere, de-democratisation, and an a priori 
structuring of political spaces by accepted logics of governance. For Žižek, its defining factor
is the exclusion of the political dimension of antagonism, or in Žižek’s case class struggle. 
What replaces it is a politics of competition and negotiation by enlightened technocrats and 
professionalized political actors who attempt to overcome ideological divisions through the 
use of expert knowledge to address specific needs and represent specific interests.65 Political 
decisions are, thus, framed always in terms of ‘expert management and administration.’66  
The political dimension is denigrated within post-politics, or more precisely 
“foreclosed” according to Žižek,67 insofar as “extremes” are placed outside of a narrowly 
defined political consensus that takes the form of a framework of debate in which it is not 
possible to question or disrupt the accepted configurations of political and economic 
normalcy. In other words, ‘the transformation of the democratic struggle into the post-
political procedure of negotiation and […] policing.’68 Politics, as a result, is reduced to what 
Žižek calls the “art of the possible,”69 a practice of opportune intervention that adapts to the 
demands of the world market within the limits of public opinion, the legal framework, and 
interest groups, with a good deal of manipulation of each when possible. Operating within 
this space of determined consensus, its central political feature is a move, as Anthony 
Giddens (1994) described approvingly, “Beyond Left and Right.”70 Žižek cites the Clinton 
and Blair eras of American and British politics as exemplary of the post-political logic in 
power.71
65 Žižek, TS, p.226, n.22.
66 Žižek, Violence, p.40.
67 Žižek, TS, p.198.
68 Žižek, TS, p.199.
69 Žižek, TS, p.237.
70 Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right, Cambridge: Polity Press (1994).
71 Žižek, FA, p.62.
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The other side of post-politics is bio-politics, Žižek contends. Bio-politics is defined 
by a reduction of the political to questions of ‘administrating and regulating “mere life.”’72 
Žižek conceives of bio-politics as a university discourse, where knowledge (S2) conditions 
and works upon the “raw”, uncultivated Real of the subject (a) to produce the interpellated 
subject. Here, the body, or bodily affect, is disciplined, regulated and managed to become the 
object of and embodiment of knowledge. It’s aim is always to foster and protect the 
economically productive and socially permissible forms of jouissance at the same time as it 
produces subjects who know nothing more than those pleasures and their dissatisfactions. At 
a cultural-ideological level, the subject of bio-politics is the narcissistic subject attached to an
enjoyment in personal development, “well-being,” and healthy-living.73 
Within the context of post-politics, what unites subjects is the very absence of any 
higher political causes. Žižek contends that bio-political regulation ensures that the ultimate 
goal of life is life itself, that there is nothing beyond its petty victories and pleasures. In part, 
bio-political authority does this by keeping at bay ‘any traumatic shocks that could prevent 
[individuals’] self-realisation.’74 Žižek often evokes Nietzsche’s (1966) “Last-Men” in his 
characterisation of the form of subjectivity that bio-politics relies upon and reproduces.75 The 
association is fitting given that, like the era of the Last-Man, bio-politics creates a false sense 
of unity and peace. Žižek argues that the predominant mode of bio-political politicisation 
fosters a similarly superficial harmony through the “culturalisation of politics” that we 
explored above. For Žižek, however, what is absent as a result of this political recoding and 
foreclosure is not the heroic Übermensch but antagonism and other political categories which
72 Žižek, Desert, p.100, Violence, p.40.
73 Žižek, PV, p.297.
74 Žižek, PV, p.297.
75 Žižek, Violence, p.90.
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point beyond a reified acceptance of differences as fact. As Žižek writes of the bio-political 
dimension of post-politics:
Political differences — differences conditioned by political inequality or 
economic exploitation — are naturalised and neutralised into “cultural” 
differences, that is into different “ways of life” which are something given, 
something that cannot be overcome. They can only be tolerated.76 
The political dimension, thus, continues to exist but only in a neutered, decaffeinated form. 
What disappears, in other words, are questions usually associated with the very essence of 
politics. The possibility of disagreements regarding the nature of justice, the existence of 
exploitation, and the allocation of political power are replaced by a politics of tolerance and 
the acceptance of established differences as cultural and individual. For Žižek, the key 
ideological form of post-politics and bio-politics is multiculturalism, which, as Žižek 
understands it, seeks to regulate accepted differences and reduce all antagonisms to questions 
of culture and matters of individual and community choices.  
Where political passion continues to exist it does so only in a negative form. For 
Žižek, the symptoms of the foreclosure of the political dimension of antagonism include the 
abstract negativity of the riot and other forms of explosive, misdirected refusal. More 
commonly, however, this negative passion is sublimated and manipulated into a politics of 
fear, which, Žižek argues, is the ‘ultimate mobilising principle’ of all post-political 
ideological projects.77 This can be understood, at an ideological level, as the political 
manipulation of the figure of the “primordial jouisseur” that was discussed above. This re-
emerges in post-political ideology in the propagation of the fear of immigrant who might 
steal our enjoyment, the fear of the criminal harasser who might disrupt our pleasures, and 
76 Žižek, Violence, p.140.
77 Žižek, Violence, p.41.
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even the fear of a catastrophe that might destroy our “way of life.”78 By mobilising fear Žižek
argues that the state is able to prevent real antagonisms emerging. It is in this sense, that the 
politics of fear can be understood as a means to displace and obscure the possibility of 
politicisation by creating a figure in order to ensure that the “place of threat” is ‘externalised 
into the Outside.’79 As such, the politics of fear is a crucial ideological tool of post-political 
power. 
Ultimately, the purpose of post-politics is the prevention of the subject becoming 
aware of the product of this discourse: itself as a point of negativity, the “indivisible 
remainder”, $, that persists as what is inconceivable with the determined space of post-
political contestation. In a political order whose goal is, ultimately, the smooth and efficient 
regulation of life, economy and pleasure, what is forever forestalled within the post-political 
logics of liberal democracy is the subject ‘politicizing his [sic] predicament.’80
8.4.3. The State of Exception
The politics of fear and the exclusion of the subject as “indivisible remainder” are two-sides 
of the dynamic that structures the transformation of political possibility into post-political 
administration. What rests at the centre of this dynamic is an extraordinary feature of state 
power that always resides in the interstices of this dynamic: the power to declare “the state of 
emergency.”  Žižek argues that the “paranoid construction”81 which operates in the politics of
fear is used to justify political interventions that reveal the liminal dimension of state 
sovereignty as an excess over all democratically legitimated power. “Fear,” Žižek argues, 
legitimises the pre-emptive strike, the increases of state power for security and defence, and 
78 Žižek, Violence, p.40.
79 Žižek, PV, p.371.
80 Žižek, TS, p.199.
81 Žižek, Violence, p.41.
204 
Capitalism and its Symptoms
“the state of emergency.”82 It is here that what is perhaps the most important aspect of the 
“transcendental” dimension of the state that Žižek focuses upon comes into view. At this site,
we see the excess of state power that renders visible most explicitly the lie of the “democratic
illusion.” As Žižek sums this exceptional moment up in Lacanian terms: it demonstrates ‘the 
constitutive role of the exceptional/excessive Master-Signifier.’83 Or in terms of the 
supposedly representational nature of liberal democracy, the “excess” of representation over 
what it represents.84  For Žižek, in the last instance this excess is not just the violence that 
results from the distortion and containing function of the state as it mediates the interests that 
it also claims to represent through its post-political logics. But, rather, the constitutive 
violence of the state as it excludes certain actors, modes of participation, and interests from 
the deliberative democratic space in the name of preserving that space as such. For Žižek, this
is precisely what ‘liberalism misrecognises.’85
The excess becomes shockingly visible as it is rendered into an absolute power in “the
state of emergency.” What defines this power is the ability to suspend the current legal order, 
or particular aspects of it, and intervene in the space of that suspension to ensure the 
continued possibility and smooth functioning of that order. In this space, the state, or other 
actors operating on its behalf, can act without the usual legal restraints required, while 
subjects have their normal legal protections suspended. Žižek cites several examples of this 
logic in operation to describe the variety of functions this exceptional power has within the 
contemporary context. It can be utilised in order to prevent politicisation,86 it can be 
employed to cope with the problem of the other,87 most evidently, to protect our “freedom” 
82 Žižek, PV, p.371.
83 Žižek, TS, p.114.
84 Žižek, IDLC, p.413.
85 Žižek, TS, p.114.
86 Žižek, Desert, p.108.
87 Žižek, FATTAF, pp.46-7.
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from the threat of terrorism or other catastrophes,88 and also, in times of economic crisis, to 
maintain the appropriate conditions for capital accumulation.89 The definitive characteristic of
“the state of emergency” is an inter-zone where the law no longer operates because of and to 
facilitate the operation of the sovereignty of the state. As with Carl Schmitt’s (2014) 
conception of the emergency state, Žižek suggests that it reveals the true nature of 
sovereignty: the very power to decide “the state of emergency.” In liberal democracy, Žižek 
contends that this does not reside in the people, nor with parliament, but with an excess that is
characteristic of the state as such. Žižek takes a similar position to Walter Benjamin (2007) 
insofar as he argues that “the state of emergency” is not strictly an exception, although it 
often emerges in exceptional moments.90 Rather, it is the elementary basis of the state and one
that is frequently normalised by its use. As Žižek argues, the emergency state operates 
increasingly to make sure that ‘life goes on as normal’; it is ‘necessary to guarantee the 
normal run of things.’91 In this sense, Žižek’s concern with “the state of emergency” reflects 
Giorgio Agamben (2005) who also argues that it is used ‘increasingly as a technique of 
government rather than an exceptional measure.’92
The exceptional power of the state to declare the state of emergency is a crucial aspect
of bio-politics. Its two aspects in this regard are ‘the pure tautological exercise of power 
grounded only in itself — the rule of “pure” law which suspends all positive particular laws 
(in Lacanese: S1) — and “pure” life as its object (in Lacanese: a).’93 Žižek here refers to 
Agamben’s thesis regarding the reduction of humanity in the state of exception to homo-
88 Žižek, Desert, pp.106-7.
89 Žižek, YDD, pp.14-5, FATTAF, p.77-8.
90 Walter Benjamin, “Theses On The Philosophy of History” in Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn, New York: 
Random House (2007) p.257.
91 Žižek, FATTAF, pp.47, 135, Iraq, p.158.
92 Giorgio Agamben, The State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell. London: University of Chicago Press (2005) 
p.3.
93 Žižek, Iraq, p.159.
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sacer, bare life. As either the purely innocent Other of the refugee or the object of 
humanitarian care, or the evil Other of the terrorist, at the level of the subject the exceptional 
status of the emergency resides in how it renders the subject not merely outside the law qua 
illegal, but beyond it through its suspension in this space. The prime example is that of the 
“legally dead” prisoners of Guantanamo Bay, located in the empty space sustained by the 
power of the state but not regulated by the laws of the state. In the state of emergency the 
subject is reduced to an object without rights or guarantees, it is wholly subject to the excess 
of power that characterises the state. 
For Žižek, the “truth” of the post-political state is this exceptional moment of 
sovereignty.  As such it highlights the shocking contradiction of the post-political logic. At its
core there is a return to the political in the form of an absolute and self-referential 
sovereignty. The precise nature of the political moment, however, is still contained within the
post-political logic since it is at the same time the cancellation of the political because the 
state of emergency is to ensure that the antagonism does not emerge. Post-politics and the 
ultra-political moment of absolute sovereignty are two sides of the same coin because this 
suspension of order operates to maintain that order as such.94 In other words, it functions to 
prevent the “true” state of emergency, the politicisation of that order.95 This can be seen in the
way that antagonism is displaced in this ultra-political moment. It is neutralised and 
legitimated through the creation of an “ultra-antagonism” in the form of a threat — often 
mobilised through the politics of fear — that is presented as the possibility of the destruction 
of individuals’ “ways of life.”96
94 Žižek, Iraq, p.159.
95 Žižek, Desert, p.108.
96 Žižek, Violence, pp.34-5.
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8.5. Capitalism
The final political limitation of Žižek’s democratic phase was the failure to recognise the 
continuing importance of an analysis of capitalism and class to understand the nature of 
political power and the limitations and possibilities of a liberal democratic politics. As a 
result, Žižek overlooked the potential for the “empty” place of power to be contaminated or 
limited. Žižek’s critique of capitalism is an attempt to address this limitation and offer an 
account of the connection between the state and capital as well as some of the central 
dynamics and contradictions of capitalism.
8.5.1. The (Bourgeois) Excess of State Power
For Žižek, post-politics is the political logic of global capitalism. With regard to the state it 
demonstrates its inextricable connection with capital and, ultimately, what Žižek describes as 
the bourgeois character of its “excess”, that transcendental dimension of liberal democracy 
that structures and defines its character. As Žižek argues, ‘the sovereignty of its power, in its 
ideologico-political presuppositions, embodies a “bourgeois” logic’97 With regard to its 
connection with capital, Žižek argues that far from “withering away”, as often assumed of the
neo-liberal state, our contemporary period has seen the state gather further strength and its 
role crystallise as a servant for capital.98 The state plays a key role within the development of 
global capitalism. The expansion of capital ‘co-exists with, and relies on, increasingly 
authoritarian interventions of the state and its legal and other apparatuses.’99 This is especially
the case in digital capital and the becoming rent of profit where the state has established and 
97 Žižek, IDLC, p.412.
98 Žižek, FATTAF, p.145.
99 Žižek, FATTAF, p.145.
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ensured the ‘(arbitrary) legal conditions for extracting rent,’ for example, with expansion of 
intellectual property rights.100 
Within the functioning of the post-political logics of the state, however, the political 
nature of these interventions is obscured insofar as its actions appear as if based on ‘a simple 
insight into the objective state of things.’101 Post-political ‘depoliticisation’ is always centred 
upon the depoliticisation of the economic sphere.102 For Žižek, post-political states are 
characterised by ‘the common acceptance of Capital and market mechanisms as neutral 
tools/procedures to be exploited.’103 Herein we find the very core of the contemporary state. 
For Žižek, the economy is “the Real” of the post-political state both in the sense that it is the 
unquestioned neutral background of its political logics and insofar as it functions as its 
“sublime object”, the object raised to the level of the Thing. States are judged, ideologically 
and materially, by the success of the economy in the last instance.104 
Žižek’s account of the bourgeois character of the state, therefore, rejects the social 
democratic position that the state is a neutral container which different interests might 
occupy, or the post-structuralist position, of Rancière and others, that the state is a general 
ordering and policing apparatus. For Žižek, given the “excess” of the state, as an exceptional 
power or as a transcendental logic, it has to be characterised as bourgeois in its very form. 
Given that the “transcendental” form reaches beyond democratic elections, Žižek concludes 
that the contemporary state, regardless of its democratic mode of operation, should be 
considered as a bourgeois dictatorship in the last instance.105 Žižek’s position on the matter is 
not sufficiently mapped out to be able to judge the legitimacy of his claim or understand 
100 Žižek, FATTAF, p.145.
101 Žižek, TS, p.375.
102 Žižek, TS, p.375.
103 Žižek, TS, p.353.
104 Žižek, LITET, p.156.
105 Žižek, IDLC, p.412.
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precisely what this bourgeois character consists in. However, it is possible to shed some light 
on Žižek’s position in the way that he suggests that the “emergency state” plays a pivotal role
in the state’s relationship to capital. As Žižek has highlighted in light of the response of states
to the most recent economic crisis, the state employed a power similar to the logic of the 
emergency state to shore up the banking system at great expense to the people. More 
commonly, the logic of the emergency state is found in special economic zones in which 
ultra-liberal conditions are created for capital to operate beyond the standard rule of law, 
often alongside the suspension of the usual protections for workers.106 In these instances, the 
state’s primary function has appeared to be to ensure the continuing possibility of the smooth 
running of the economy. The state employs the logic of emergency to justify exceptional 
intervention to allow the continuing “servicing of the goods.” 
8.5.2. The Symptoms of Globalisation
Given its foreclosed character, what seems impossible within the post-political logic of the 
state is the politicisation of the economy. Presented as if an objective process, its violence 
and contradictions appear like an inevitable result of capricious fate, akin to a natural disaster,
or as if merely the result of mismanagement by its caretakers.107 For Žižek, the way that we 
escape from this deadlock is by identifying certain symptoms which do not only index 
temporary dysfunctions, but, rather, the inherent irrationality of the system itself. In other 
words, Žižek politicises the economy by demonstrating its Real, the site of its inherent 
politicisation at which its irrationality appears as constitutive and the space for a decision 
over the nature of the system as such is forced upon the subject. In Žižek’s most recent work 
he has argued that four such dysfunctions exist. These are the challenge of the possibility of 
106 Žižek, FATTAF, p.126.
107 Žižek, Violence, p.14.
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ecological catastrophe,108 the privatisation of our intellectual commons,109 the privatisation of 
our bio-genetic inheritance,110 and the production of a surplus population that demonstrates, 
so Žižek argues, an inherent limit point to the possibility of the infinite expansion of 
capitalism. What all of these antagonisms demonstrate is that capitalism deprives subjects of 
their basic commonality. While capitalism is a global system, one albeit that cannot be called 
a “world” given the absence of shared ideological meaning, it is a global system that is 
inherently divisive and exclusionary. The above antagonisms demonstrate the crisis of the 
commons inherent to capitalism at social, political and natural levels. In each there is a basic 
substance, an inconsistent Real of possibility, that subjects are being deprived of. 
For Žižek, however, one of these antagonisms has a structural priority for conceiving 
of class struggle — and, as we shall see, Communism — because compared to the other 
antagonisms it cannot be resolved with capitalism. As Žižek argues, the creation of a surplus 
population is a “necessary product” of the “innermost logic” of capitalism. With regard to 
Žižek’s understanding of the object of his critique, it described how capitalism is not-all. That
is to say, that capitalism cannot totalise itself without the production of an element that 
contradicts this totality in the form of an excluded mass who, in the society of work, are 
prevented from finding the possibility of realising their social role. It differs from the other 
antagonisms because this will always call into question the system. Whereas the ecological 
crisis can be resolved within capitalism, for example, through measures like carbon taxes and 
other forms of incentives that might drive development of green technologies, Žižek argues 
that nothing can prevent the creation of a surplus population within capitalism. 
108 Žižek, IDLC, p.421.
109 Žižek, IDLC, p.422.
110 Žižek, FATTAF, p.91.
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Žižek describes the explosive growth of a surplus population that are no longer 
needed by global capitalism. ‘[C]apitalism is rendering an ever greater percentage of workers 
superfluous.’111 Most-startlingly, this surplus population is found in the massive re-emergence
of a new class of slum dwellers in the mega-cities of the third world, as documented by Mike 
Davis in The Planet of The Slums (2004). For Žižek, the emergence of this class is the 
‘crucial geopolitical event of our times.’112  ‘They are the true “symptoms” of slogans such as 
“Development,” “Modernization,” and the “World Market”: not an unfortunate accident, but 
a necessary product of the innermost logic of global capitalism.’113 Within these slums there 
are marginalised labourers, former members of the middle classes and migrant rural worker, 
all are incorporated into the global economy in new ways but on informal grounds, with no 
protections and a high level of precarity. 
The post-political response to the emergence of large groups of individuals who are 
only partially and informally part of capitalist circuits of consumption and production and 
excluded from many of the benefits is the construction of new walls safeguarding zones of 
‘(relative) economic prosperity and those excluded from it.’114 In the context of the European 
Union creating a transnational border police, Žižek writes: 
This is the truth of globalisation: the construction of new walls safeguarding
prosperous Europe from the immigrant flood. One is tempted to resuscitate 
here the old Marxist “humanist” opposition of “relations between things” 
and “relations between persons”: in the much-celebrated free circulation 
opened up by global capitalism, it is “things” (commodities) which freely 
circulate, while the circulation of “persons” is more and more controlled. 
111 Žižek, FATTAF, p.104.
112 Žižek, IDLC, p.424.
113 Žižek, IDLC, p.424.
114 Žižek, Violence, p.102.
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We are not dealing now with “globalisation” as an unfinished project but 
with a true “dialectics of globalisation”: the segregation of the people is the 
reality of economic globalisation.115
However, for Žižek, this antagonism cannot be sustained indefinitely or resolved by the state 
because this it is also immanent to the population of the state in question. This slum 
population is only the most shocking symptom of a trend inherent to capitalism, which has 
accelerated since the 1970s. As an influential analysis puts it:
Since then, the major capitalist countries have seen an unprecedented 
decline in their levels of industrial employment. Over the past three decades,
manufacturing employment fell 50 percent as a percentage of total 
employment in these countries. Even newly “industrialising” countries like 
South Korea and Taiwan saw their relative levels of industrial employment 
decline in the past two decades. At the same time the numbers of both low-
paid service-workers and slum-dwellers working in the informal sector have
expanded as the only remaining options for those who have become 
superfluous to the needs of shrinking industries.116
The emergence of surplus population is not simply a result of policy decisions but a tendency 
inherent to the development of capitalism driven by the consequences of the law of value. 
Individual capitals are constantly compelled to reduce variable capital (labour) costs given 
the socially determined nature of value by removing workers from the production process 
through technological and organisational innovation.  Following Jameson (2011), Žižek 
argues that capitalism is defined by the structural necessity of unemployment. As Žižek 
writes: ‘it is the very success of capitalism […] which produces unemployment’ given that 
the dynamics of accumulation and capitalisation are “structurally inseparable” from the 
115 Žižek, Violence, p.102.
116 Endnotes, “Misery and Debt,” in Endnotes #2: Misery and the Value Form (2010)
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production of unemployment and human superfluity.117 For Žižek, thus, it is not just the 
extreme of slum populations that demonstrate the immanent result of capitalism’s innermost 
dynamic. Rather, this population is only the extreme edge of the phenomenon of 
unemployment generally. As a result, Žižek calls for the expansion of the category of 
unemployment to encompass 
the wide space of population from the temporarily employed, through the 
no-longer-employable and permanently unemployed up to people living in 
slums and other types of ghettos (all those often dismissed by Marx himself 
as “lumpen-proletariat”,) and finally, entire areas, populations or states 
excluded from the global capitalist process, like the blank spaces in ancient 
maps.118 
On this basis, Žižek recalibrates our understanding of exploitation in capitalism. Žižek argues
that exploitation should not be conceived primarily in monetary terms or in the expropriation 
of surplus. Rather, capitalist exploitation can be understood in the systemic manner as the 
prevention of subjects actualising their potential.119 This can be understood in terms of the 
limitations to libidinal satisfaction, or, in more concrete terms, in the way that capitalism 
prevents subjects realising their social roles. In “Lenin’s Choice” Žižek argues that the 
proletarianisation of the subject results from the divergence between what is socially 
necessary for their existence and the reality of their social existence. Subjects are defined as 
workers and educated and trained as such. However, within capitalism, large swathes of the 
population are prevented from practising these skills and identities. At the same time, they are
unable to move beyond this socially necessitated mandate given that in capitalist societies 
subjects rely on selling their labour in order to reproduce themselves. In capitalism, despite 
117 Žižek, LTN, p.1001; See Fredric Jameson, Representing Capital, London: Verso (2011) p.149.
118 Žižek, TIP, p.22.
119 Žižek, LITET, p.1003.
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the impossibility of work, ‘the substantial determination of an unemployed person remains 
that of a worker, but he or she is prevented from either actualizing it or renouncing it, so that 
he or she remains suspended in the potentiality of a worker who cannot work.’120
8.6. Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen how Žižek’s analysis addresses the short-comings of his 
democratic period with an analysis of the transformations in subjectivity and identification, 
the political logics of liberal democracy, and the relation between capital and state. Žižek’s 
account provides a series of symptomal points which demonstrate the inconsistency of 
capitalism. If we consider the three levels that we have looked at these are the impossibility 
of libidinal satisfaction, given the continuing reign of the superego. The reduction of the 
subject to the “bare life” of bio-politics and the sovereign exception found in its power to 
realise “the state of emergency.”  And in capitalism itself, the reduction of workers 
themselves to a form of symptomal surplus of the system, deprived of the very possibility of 
realising their own role within capitalism. Žižek describes the condition of proletarianisation 
as that of depriving subjects of their substance, referring to Marx’s conception of 
“substanceless subjectivity” in the Grundrisse.121 In each case, Žižek has a plausible 
argument for a form of proletarianisation that occurs within capitalism at the libidinal, 
political and economic level. In each, moreover, we see that as such, a particular sphere of the
socio-political totality is perforated in the sense that it is not only rendered inconsistent but 
renders visible the subject at the symptomal site of inconsistency in the form of a negativity 
that the system can never fully pacify.  However, while at the level of explication, Žižek’s 
analyses seem plausible, it could be argued that the very form of these analyses is 
120 Žižek, “LC”, pp.290-1.
121 Žižek, DSST?, p.140, TWN, p.26.
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problematic. Here I want to raise a problem with Žižek’s dialectic that emerges from the very
attempt to provide a detailed account of these various levels of contemporary capitalism at 
the most general level. 
As I argued in chapter 4, Žižek’s dialectical mode of knowing is not a philosophical 
practice in the traditional sense since it does not seek to offer an alternative point of 
identification but, enacted from the “place of displacement,” attempts to render visible the 
hole in the Other in order to produce that shocking, discomforting effect at which point the 
subject recognises themselves at the site of the inconsistency of the Other. We said that the 
purpose of the dialectic, as a result, was not to produce a new form of knowledge but Truth in
the sense of the disruption that occurs through a confrontation with a symptom or non-
knowledge that the order of Being relies upon for its consistency. However, here, it would 
seem that in order to offer a plausible and sufficiently detailed account of these phenomena 
within capitalism Žižek undoes the critical revelatory effect of the dialectic. The enormity of 
the structures that Žižek describes and the considerable intellectual labour that is required in 
analysis, means that the shocking effect is at the very least somewhat dampened. This would 
seem to be a consequence of the fact that Žižek’s analysis works in two directions 
simultaneously.  He attempts to offer an account of the inconsistencies of capitalism at 
various levels but to do this, to enact a cut that might produce a form of political 
consciousness, Žižek is unable to limit analysis only to single symptoms and marginal 
phenomena. Instead, he must address large-scale socio-political structures at the most general
level, outlining their operation, their logic, and their connections across several levels. That is
to say, what seems to separate in Žižek’s analysis is the notion of a “hole” in the Other and 
the shocking and praxical effect that this Truth has on the subject and, as a consequence, on 
the object itself. While the result of Žižek’s analysis is a conception of the various 
216 
Capitalism and its Symptoms
antagonisms inherent to the Other, this revelation does not disrupt this Other or the 
relationship of the subject to it. 
It is symptomatic of this problem, I contend, that Žižek seems to tacitly concede the 
limitations of his dialectical mode of knowing when he refers to the results of its practice as a
form of “cognitive mapping,” with reference to Jameson’s term. Although, Žižek’s use of this
term is unclear,122 for Jameson the challenge of “cognitive mapping” described an urgent 
requirement for the reinvention of Marxism at the level of ideology. Jameson’s conception of 
this ideology is Althusserian in tenor insofar as it conceives of a practice that re-connects the 
“imaginary relations” of ideology to the “real relations” of existence.123 For Žižek, the 
dialectic is supposed to reverse this relationship insofar as it is designed to reveal the 
ideological moment inherent to the “real relations” of existence by demonstrating the lack in 
this Other by way of the symptom. However, the results of Žižek’s dialectical practice would 
seem to be far closer to Jameson’s understanding of the term. By referring the subject’s 
ideological discontents back to the deep structures of capitalism, the state and the 
transformations in the subject’s libidinal economy, Žižek’s dialectic is reconnecting the 
subject to a series of “Real” relations in the sense that they determine and structure the 
subject’s experiences. While this might evoke a different form of political consciousness, it is
one that is ideological in the sense that it functions at the level of “knowledge” rather than the
Real as that unsettling effect of the Tuche that occurs when those “real” relations are 
disturbed and denatured as the subject realises their inconsistency as the condition of their 
own Freedom. In this context, the subject is left to organise and fight against these structures. 
The same can be said with regard to the knowledge that formalisation produces. While it 
122 Žižek, YDD, p.3.
123 Fredric Jameson “Cognitive Mapping” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, eds. C. Nelson and L. 
Grossberg. University of Illinois Press (1990) pp.347-60.
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traces the space of class struggle and, at the level of knowledge, is antagonistic with the 
positions of the status quo of bourgeois subjectivity, it seems to remain oppositional only at 
the level of knowledge or ideology. It opens a space for practice, but to actually denature and 
dislocate the hegemonic relations it seems to demand a practice that goes beyond this initial 
moment of critique. 
The problem seems to also emerge when we consider who Žižek’s dialectical 
knowing is addressed to. Here, the disjunction between the role of the analyst and the 
dialectic becomes very clear. The position of the analyst works given that it addresses the 
subject within the clinical setting, setting in motion the transferential dynamic that sees the 
subject mistakenly believe that the analyst already has knowledge of its symptom. Here, 
however, the symptom is not particular but general and Žižek is not addressing any particular 
subject. Instead, he is telling all subjects that they themselves are the symptom of various 
social processes that are beyond them — as Žižek speculates with regard to the trend that 
defines capitalism, ‘[p]erhaps today we are, in a sense, “all jobless.”’124 It could be argued 
that like the clinical subject seeks out an analyst on the basis of some initial feeling of 
discomfort or concern, that readers of Žižek do likewise, turning to Žižek’s work in order to 
probe a sense of social unease. But in the reader-author relationship that results, it seems that 
Žižek offers an alternative explanation of the subject’s discontents and a site of future 
political practice, rather than the direct cause of their dissatisfaction qua the lack in the Other 
that the subject must accept at an unconscious level. As a result, the effect of Žižek’s work is 
an alternative knowledge in terms of an explication of the relationship between that 
discontent and the social structures and logics that account for it. For this knowledge to avoid
124 Žižek, “LC,” p.291.
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recuperation at the level of ideology — for example, through the disavowal of the lack in the 
Other —  it must be incorporated with and become the basis for a collective practice.
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Chapter 9: Communism
9.1. Introduction
The return to Communism as a name for a political project and future society is the most 
surprising development in Žižek’s work since his return to dialectical materialism. As we 
have seen, in his early critique Žižek argued that the central flaws of Marxism and Stalinism 
grew out of a utopian aspiration at their core. Moreover, Žižek’s response to these failures as 
he has developed his own dialectical materialism has largely consisted in the rejection of any 
notion of an Other, the paradigmatic utopian form. How can Žižek return to a notion of 
Communism without also returning to a similarly problematic utopianism? 
Žižek’s return to Communism could not have occurred at a more politically interesting
and salient moment. Shortly after the global financial crisis of 2008, and just as radical leftist 
politics began to return to public consciousness, Žižek declared the importance of resurrecting
a notion of Communism and a Communist politics for our contemporary world. The series of 
international conferences and collections of writings that this project inspired, and the 
connections with political movements that resulted from it, garnered considerable media and 
public attention, especially considering that its main drivers were radical academics.
Žižek’s conception of Communism has developed steadily over a number of works in 
which he has developed various aspects of an understanding of Communism across several 
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levels. However, the multifaceted nature of Žižek’s Communism and Communist politics has 
sadly not been reflected in the secondary literature, which is plagued by a failure to consider 
the specificity and development of Žižek’s positions since his engagement with Communism 
began. With some notable exceptions notwithstanding, Žižek’s Communist politics has been 
wrongly associated with the abyssal Act of suicide,1 a return to totalitarianism,2 and even a 
form of Left-Fascism.3 These inaccurate accounts of Žižek’s work have largely been a result 
of two factors. On one hand, they demonstrate a continuing obsession with the “second 
Žižek,” a position that stands at odds with much of Žižek’s work, as I argued in chapter 6. On 
the other hand, they also demonstrate the dangers of overly hasty judgement. While these 
analysis have identified the emergence of Communism in Žižek’s writing they have primarily 
focused on Žižek’s pre-Communist works in order to develop an understanding of his position
regarding the content and form of Communism.  For example, in the special edition of the 
International Journal of Žižek Studies dedicated to Žižek’s Communism most contributors 
focused on works that pre-dated his turn to Communism, focusing mainly on Žižek’s In 
Defence of Lost Causes, a work in which he attempts, and fails in my view, to rehabilitate 
certain totalitarian positions.4  As a result, there has been a widespread failure in drawing 
attention to the novelty of Žižek’s position with regard to Communism and the mode of 
utopian thinking associated with it. The most interesting of Žižek’s positions on Communism 
are found in work that has been published since these initial negative critical assessments, 
namely Living in the End Times (2012) and The Year of Dreaming Dangerously (2012). At 
1 Yannis Stavrakakis, “On Acts, Pure and Impure” in International Journal of Žižek Studies, vol.4 no.2 (2010)
2 Geoff Boucher, “An Inversion of Radical Democracy: The Republic of Virtue in Žižek’s Revolutionary 
Poltiics” in International Journal of Žižek Studies, vol.4 no.2 (2010)
3 Alan Johnson, "The Power of Nonsense," in Jacobin, no.3-4. (2011) [Online] available at: 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2011/07/the-power-of-nonsense/ last accessed on: 5.5.2014.
4 Chris Mcmillan makes this point in Žižek and Communist Strategy (p.166). To my mind, In Defence of Lost 
Causes is a work that is characteristic of the “Second Žižek”, although it still contains some useful clarifications 
on the nature of subtraction, for example. 
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present, there has been no attempt to analyse the positions taken in these works in the 
secondary literature.
In pursuing an in-depth analysis of Žižek’s Communism this chapter will offer an 
alternative assessment to these critical accounts. In his most recent work, Žižek conceives of 
an “Idea of Communism” in the form of a model for an egalitarian and libertarian direct 
democracy that takes the structure of the discourse of the analyst. He arrives at this position 
using a novel utopian hermeneutic in which he understands Communism from the perspective
of so-called “signs from the future.” In this chapter I focus on Žižek’s utopian hermeneutic 
and his Idea of Communism and how they offer a mode of utopian thinking in response to the 
limitations of classical Marxism uncovered by Žižek’s Lacanian critique. Alongside this I will
also use Žižek’s conception of Communism as an opportunity to demonstrate how, through an
understanding of subtraction and the Act, Žižek is able to navigate the problems that he 
identified with classical Marxism and Stalinism at the political level in terms of their 
continual reliance on an Other.  In doing so, I will also return to the tension at the heart of 
Žižek’s Lacanian-Marxist dialectical materialism, which we drew attention to in the 
conclusion of chapter 5, section 5.5.. The question that we raised as we charted the shift in the
role of the theorist-philosopher from that of the analyst to something closer to the master was 
whether Žižek could remain faithful to his critique of traditional Marxist theory at the same 
time that his own work became minimally programmatic and prescriptive. Alongside a 
detailed exposition of Žižek’s Communist politics I want to outline how Žižek manages this 
tension by attempting to retain the position of analyst at the levels of practice, organisation, 
and the Idea. We will see that to avoid returning Marxist philosophy to its traditional role, 
Žižek constantly attempts to emphasise the role of the subject over the theorist, and an 
openness on the basis of the lack in the Other, over the definitiveness of any political 
programme.
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9.2. The Communist Cause and Collectivity
The initial theoretical inspiration for Žižek’s return to the notion of Communism comes from 
Alain Badiou’s The Meaning of Sarkozy (2008). In this work, Badiou describes the necessity 
of what he calls “the communist hypothesis.” For Badiou, this hypothesis is a form of faith in 
the continuing existence of the eternal Idea of Communism. Badiou argues that against a 
resigned acceptance of the status quo philosophy must battle to once more establish the very 
existence of the communist hypothesis and the Idea that has been the invariable basis of 
emancipatory projects throughout human history. Given the difficulty of conceiving of 
Communism in an era defined by the total victory of capitalism and liberal democracy, 
Badiou proposes that our task at present is the renewal of the Communist Idea rather than its 
realisation.5 Against Badiou, Žižek conceives of Communism primarily as a deadlock that 
results from the inability to resolve the antagonisms of capitalism rather than an eternal Idea 
or some other ideal invariant. In the last chapter we demonstrated how for Žižek 
contemporary capitalism was defined by several antagonisms. At the level of the subject we 
saw how the libidinal deadlock of post-modern identity tortured individuals with the demand 
for an impossible jouissance. At the political level we saw the confluence of the post-political 
and the ultra-political as the contradiction at the heart of liberal democracy. Finally, we 
identified how for Žižek the central antagonism of capitalism was the existence of a surplus-
population, an excluded mass of potential workers unable to work in the society of labour but 
produced within it. For Žižek, it is this last antagonism that is crucial in re-conceiving 
Communism. He argues that it is the ‘reference to the excluded’ that justifies the use of the 
term.6 At a theoretical level, it is the importance of antagonisms in conceiving of Communism
that sets Žižek’s initial reflections apart from Badiou’s. Rather than an eternal Idea Žižek 
5 Alain Badiou, The Meaning of Sarkozy, trans. David Fernbach, London: Verso (2008) pp.97-98.
6 Žižek, “from the beginning,” p.44.
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argues that Communism must emerge from ‘actual social antagonisms,’7 and be ‘re-invented’ 
against them.8 As such, even though Communism also names a ‘future society’ and a ‘present 
political movement acting towards its goal’ Žižek argues that it must primarily be conceived 
as a ‘problem to be resolved’, a burning question addressed to the political subject9: ‘how can 
we get beyond the antagonisms of existing society without reproducing them at a different 
level?’10 
On this basis, Žižek conceives of Communism in the form of this burning question as 
a Cause. In Žižek’s account of the Cause in Metastases when reflecting on its relationship to 
the subject and signification, he touches on two features which are especially pertinent when 
thinking of Communism as a Cause. As the disturbing Real at the heart of the subject’s 
relationship to the Other, the Cause derails the symbolic, throwing it off balance and, as a 
result, effects signification since the subject is always compelled to resolve this Real.11 In the 
socio-political context, by naming this Cause, qua antagonisms of capitalism, as Communism,
Žižek is beginning the process of symbolisation by opening a space for political practice to 
operate within and offering the antagonisms of the socio-political totality as the basis for a 
Communist politics to react against and attempt to overcome.
In the conclusion to the previous chapter, I argued that by operating at the macro-level
Žižek’s dialectic might fail to produce the kind of disruptive Tuche of the Real that he argues 
is the imperative of dialectical critique. As a result, it was suggested that in order for the new 
form of knowledge that it produces to avoid becoming ideology it needed to be connected to a
form of collective practice that realised, sustained and acted upon the not-all that it renders 
visible. It would seem that in understanding Communism as a Cause qua Real Žižek offers an 
7 Žižek, FATTAF, pp.87-88.
8 Žižek, FATTAF, p.6.
9 Žižek, IDLC, p.470.
10 Žižek, IDLC, p.470.
11 Žižek, ME, pp.29-33.
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initial solution to this problem insofar as he understands the Cause as the basis for a form of 
political practice. It has been argued that within Žižek’s work there is no room to conceive of 
the collective, class conscious driven politics that characterises Marxist political practice,12 
however, the Cause demonstrates the error of this view. The Cause is the basis for a collective
identity not based upon divisive imaginary or symbolic ties but a Real that is beyond these. 
Žižek associates this collective identification with Love, which is always based on something 
that is ineffable and unknowable. ‘I respect you for your universal features, but I love you for 
an X beyond these features […]’13 Because this identity is not sustained by accepted cultural 
signifies, or guaranteed by the state or the Other, there is a certain precarity to it. As Žižek 
writes of Love, the mode of collectivity it enables must be ‘fought for and regained again and 
again’ through a commitment to the Cause.14 Nevertheless, precisely insofar as it identifies a 
point that cuts through and against all positive features, the Cause can operate without 
exclusionary or coercive effects upon the subject. For Žižek, identification with the Cause 
allows a form of stability and solidarity because it is based upon a beyond to ideological 
oppositions. Based on the Cause the collective has a number of features. Given that the Cause 
is anti-deterministic, a point that demonstrates a break in the linear chain of sufficient reason, 
the subjectivity that it crystallises ‘can be adopted by any individual’ since there is ‘not a 
determining causal connection’ between social role and revolutionary subjectivity.15 Rather, it
provides the political link of ‘all those who experience a fundamental solidarity’ in this 
Cause.16 It is around this Cause that subjects who recognise the forms of capitalist 
antagonisms must come together and invent a future.
12 Parker, Žižek, p.97.
13 Žižek, PATD, p.17.
14 Žižek, FA, p.118.
15 Žižek, TS, p.227.
16 Žižek, “LC,” p.177.
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A key part of the role of this political collective is to foster class consciousness 
through their connection to the deadlock of the Real. What defines the collective is the 
position of subtraction that it takes. Identifying with the Cause qua symptomal surplus, means
that the subject takes a position that is incomprehensible from the perspective of the logics of 
the order of Being or the socio-political totality. As such, it is defined by that affirmative 
negation that Žižek associated with Bartleby’s Act – which we touched on in section 5.4. In 
the subtracted position, this collectivity will appear as the disturbing object which runs 
counter to the political and ideological currents of the order of the status quo insofar as it 
stands-in for its inconsistency and the possibility of an order beyond it. As the external object,
the collective does not offer a metalinguistic position – as in the Kautskian model of the 
socialist intelligentsia beyond the class struggle importing the Truth from without in the form 
of scientific knowledge (S2). Rather, as Žižek conceives of the Leninist position in opposition
to Kautsky, the collective offers a disruptive Truth qua the antagonism of the Other and a 
political struggle on its basis.17 As such, Žižek argues that it shakes the subject ‘out of its self-
indulgent spontaneity’18 by introducing a gap in the order of Being. The collectivity that 
stands for the Cause, then, fosters political consciousness not by revealing the “true interests” 
of certain subjects but the limitations of the current political and ideological forms of 
consciousness and the continuing presence of antagonism from this subtracted position. In this
sense, it relies on a wager that the antagonisms that we have identified in the previous chapter 
continue to perturb the subject and, in a similar way to how the subject seeks analysis when 
they are disturbed by the Real of their symptom, the collective offers a possible solution to 
their dissatisfactions that result from the antagonisms of capitalism. 
The collectivity’s role in fostering class consciousness is intimately connected to the 
effect of identifying with the Cause. As a political embodiment of the lack in the Other, the 
17 Žižek, “LC,” pp.183-5.
18 Žižek, “LC”, p.187.
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collective operates at an antagonistic disjunction to the order of Being and its hegemonic 
ideologies. We can understand the result of this commitment in terms of how subtraction, or 
the feminine subject, ‘disturbs the balance of the Whole’19 through the incision that it makes 
as it enacts a ‘radical division, at the very heart of the social body.’20 The commitment to the 
Cause, like the decision that subtraction engenders between two forms of universality, takes 
up the slack that we argued was potentially left in the limitations of Žižek’s mode of 
knowledge, since its practice is antagonistically partisan and oppositional. We spoke earlier of
the alternative mode of universalisation in the form of an identification with the part-of-no-
part, the excluded of a socio-political totality that stood in opposition to the whole and its 
ordered parts.21 We can equally see this division emerge with the collective commitment 
described here insofar as it also runs counter to the logics of post-politics. Through the 
collective’s commitment to Communism the foreclosed dimension of class struggle re-
emerges against ideological closure. While, as a form of collective politicisation of the socio-
political totality, Communism names a type of political commitment that post-politics and its 
bio-political equivalent attempts to occlude by reducing life to the pursuit and management of
pleasure.  
By naming Communism as a Cause in the way that we have outlined Žižek also 
attempts to emphasise the political moment of rupture that runs through the socio-political 
totality, revealing a division of open political contestation over the nature of society. The 
collectivity’s role in the commitment to this Cause is to continue to pursue this politicisation. 
The form of the Cause is also vital to this. As the Real that exists only insofar as it is 
continually subject to signification, it introduces and sustains a space for an alternative within 
and against the order of Being. Žižek, thus, avoids the trap of the collective qua Fetish, as in 
19 Žižek, PV, p.103, FA, p.121.
20 Žižek, “LC,” p.177.
21 See Žižek, PATD, p.133. See also Žižek’s account of the forceful intervention of subtraction with regard to the
part of no-part. Žižek, IDLC, pp.410-1.
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the case of the Stalinist Party which was conceived as the embodiment of the Other. The 
revolutionary collective ‘occupies the place of Truth’22 understood as the antagonism qua 
Real that other positive modes of social knowledge attempt to obscure given that it 
demonstrates the political moment as the lack in the Other. The purpose of the collectivity, 
thus, is to keep open the space of politics at the same time that it organises and unites 
Communist struggle.
9.3. Communist Utopianism
Within Žižek’s understanding of Communism as a Cause and basis for a collective political 
practice there remains a question as to what this practice is meant to realise. While we have 
seen that Žižek thinks that part of the function of the identification with the Cause is to create 
the space for invention against the antagonisms of capitalism, until recently he has been 
reticent with regard to what this invention might produce. This is arguably an expected 
consequence of Žižek’s problem with utopian forms of imagination since his critique of 
Marxism and Stalinism. In his recent work, however, Žižek has conceived of a way around 
the dangers that his critique outlines. As a result, Žižek has been able to offer his own account
of an Idea of Communism, as a form of utopian imaginary that might guide Communist 
political practice. Before going on to examine the details and content of Žižek’s Communist 
Idea, I will return to the difficulties that Žižek has to navigate in order to propose this mode of
utopian thinking and avoid the pitfalls of Marxist and Stalinist forms of utopianism that we 
discussed in chapter 2, in terms of Marx’s fantasy in section 2.4.. I will then look at the two 
ways that Žižek overcomes these difficulties with a form of symptomal analysis, which he 
uses to reveal a kind of utopian impulse in certain “signs from the future.”
22 Žižek, “LC,” p.188.
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9.3.1. The Trouble with Utopia
As we have seen, Žižek is highly sceptical of utopian thinking. He conceives of the imaginary
utopia of the possibility of a harmonious and well ordered society, with each part or element 
having a designated place, as having the structure of fantasy. From this position Žižek argues 
that utopia is largely an imaginary attempt to resolve the subject’s impossible relationship 
with jouissance, or, at a socio-political level, an attempt to abolish the inevitability of 
antagonism qua Real. In the case of Stalinism, this mode of utopian expectation was at the 
heart of the misrecognition of the Party. As the embodiment of the whole and the pinnacle of 
History, the Party conceived of its own power on the basis of the fantasy of the People as a 
homogenous, unified mass that supported the Party. As we saw in chapter 2, when the Party 
allowed this fantasy to “take power” it resulted in the dynamic in which anything that 
disturbed this image of unity — opposition to the Party, elements that got in the way of the 
progress of History — was violently dismissed as a “scrap” or “waste.” For Žižek, the fantasy
operated to legitimate the Party’s position as the embodiment of universality and worked to 
sanction its most violent actions. 
Žižek finds similar problems in other contemporary modes of utopian thought. While 
Žižek does not think that Badiou’s Idea of Communism will necessarily result in such 
disastrous consequences, he remains sceptical of its form on similar grounds. Žižek argues 
that Badiou’s Idea of Communism overlooks the historical nature of the Real and, thus, relies 
on a similar obfuscation of the necessity of antagonism. For Žižek, by conceiving of the Idea 
as eternal, as Badiou does in The Meaning of Sarkozy,23 he risks the fantasmatic flight from 
the Real that ends in implicitly accepting that the necessity of an alternative is equally eternal.
As a result, rather than addressing and attempting to overcome capitalism’s antagonisms, the 
Idea will merely offer an imaginary escape from them. The eternal Idea of Communism, as 
23 Badiou, Meaning of Sarkozy, p.99.
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Žižek writes, ‘implies that the situation which generates it is no less eternal, that the 
antagonism to which Communism reacts will always be here.’24 From this perspective, Žižek 
argues we are also ‘only one small step to a “deconstructive” reading of communism as a 
dream of presence […] a dream which thrives on its own impossibility.’25 In the same way 
that fantasy can never be wholly realised, Žižek argues that Badiou’s Idea of Communism 
risks inevitable failure given that it does not locate the ‘new mode’ of Communism in the 
present antagonisms of capitalism.26 
However, locating the Communist Idea in a current antagonism does not necessarily 
overcome the problems that Žižek finds in utopian thinking. As we know from his critique of 
Marxism, it can be equally problematic to conceive of Communism on some present historical
basis. With regard to the limitations of Marx’s critique of utopianism, Žižek argues that 
simply extrapolating from the present into the future is equally liable to a “bad” form of 
utopian thinking. As we saw in chapter 2, Marx’s deduction of the future from the present 
resulted in the productivist, bourgeois fantasy of capitalism without its inherent limitations. In
the context of his engagement with other contemporary Marxisms, Žižek takes the same 
position with regard to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s works Multitude (2004) and 
Empire (2000). Žižek describes their Spinozist-Deleuzian Marxism as the ideology of late-
capitalism insofar as their conception of liberation is ‘uncannily close to that of “postmodern”
digital capitalism.’27 The problem with their position, so Žižek argues, is that it conceives of 
revolutionary transformation in expressive terms. Hardt and Negri argue that capitalism 
contains Communism in utero in the relationships that characterise post-Fordist production. 
From this, as Žižek explains their position, all that is needed is the formal leap of removing 
the constraints of the capitalist form of private property to realise the already-Communist 
24 Žižek, “from the beginning,” p.211.
25 Žižek, FATTAF, p.88.
26 Žižek, FATTAF, p.88.
27 Žižek, Violence, p.56, TWN, p.218, OWB, pp.163-4.
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potential of post-Fordist capitalist production.28 Žižek argues that conceiving of the 
decentralised, mobile and flexible multiplicity as the hegemonic organisational form of 
capitalism, Hardt and Negri’s Communist utopia is a capitalist fantasy. That is to say, their 
conception of a future in terms of an unbridled social productivity shares a remarkable 
resemblance to the ideal image of a post-modern capitalist utopia.29 
Žižek’s critical position is important to bear in mind because it restricts the possibility 
of actualising a utopian re-imagining of the future. If the Communist Idea can not be thought 
of as an eternal referent, as something that exists invariably, we have also seen how Žižek is 
equally sceptical of basing utopian imagination on the present socio-political world given that 
it tends towards a fantasmatic form of contradiction resolution. As a result, it would seem that
Žižek boxes himself into a rather restricted space, unable to conceive of the Idea, or any form 
of utopia, on an imaginary or symbolic basis. Indeed, when Žižek first confronts the problem 
of utopian invention he suggests that it can only occur at some future point after the subject 
has already escaped the constrictions of the present in some liminal post-revolutionary space. 
As he writes in Organs Without Bodies (2002):  ‘in a radical revolution, people not only 
“realise their old (emancipatory, etc.) dreams”; rather, they have to reinvent their very modes 
of dreaming.’30 The problem with this position is that if the imagining of utopia relies on a 
revolutionary break to have already occurred, Žižek will be unable to offer anything more 
than a promise of future modes of post-revolutionary dreaming to those currently in the 
struggle with the antagonisms of contemporary capitalism. An Idea of Communism or any 
utopian re-imagining is off the cards until then. As a result, Žižek, or any other political actor, 
would be unable to offer a conception of the aim or outcome of political practice.
28 Žižek, PV, p.265.
29 Žižek, PV, p.263.
30 Žižek, OWB, p.188.
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9.3.2. A New Utopian Hermeneutic
In Living in the End Times (2012) and Year of Dreaming Dangerously (2012) Žižek conceives
of a new mode of utopian imagination that resolves the limitations of Badiou’s conception of 
the Idea and the problems with utopian modes of thought more generally. This new 
hermeneutic locates, interprets, and renders visible the potential existence of the Communist 
Idea in certain types of thought and practice. Whereas it previously seemed that Žižek was 
unwilling to posit an immanent beyond to the order of Being other than in the form of a 
negative opening, in his recent work he has argued that within the order of Being there are 
also points of immanent escape that directly open the space for the immediate re-imagining of
the future. Žižek describes how certain events and cultural practises, from works of literature 
to ‘[e]vents like the OWS [Occupy Wall Street] protests, the Arab Spring, the demonstrations 
in Greece and Spain’ can and should be read as a specific form of symptom, which he calls a 
‘sign from the future.’31  It is on the basis of these points, understood as immanent to our 
situation but beyond its predominant logics, that Žižek believes it is possible to extrapolate a 
future that might escape the deadlocks of the present.
To make sense of the mode of understanding that Žižek employs we can refer to 
Lacan’s conception of the temporality of the signification of the unconscious, which Žižek 
outlines initially in Sublime Object. For Lacan, the meaningless unconscious traces that 
disturb the subject are symbolically integrated “from the future.” That is to say, the meaning 
of the symptom and the nature of the trauma that characterise the prehistory of the subject are 
determined retroactively. As Lacan puts it, its meaning ‘will have been.’32 As Žižek glosses 
Lacan’s words: the meaning of the unconscious symptom is not ‘discovered, excavated from 
the hidden depth of the past but constructed retroactively […]’33 Žižek describes the 
31 Žižek, YDD, p.128.
32 Lacan, Seminar I, p.158.
33 Žižek, SOI, pp.55-6.
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realisation of this process as a “journey into the future.” By “overtaking” the present we 
suppose in advance a knowledge of what we will one day know to be true. The logic here is 
that of transference, which, while an illusion, is necessary in the production of the meaning of 
the symptom. From the perspective of the present symptoms are meaningless but through 
analysis as a practice based on the supposition that they have a meaning the symptoms are 
eventually ordered and determined. In other words, the meaning of the symptom emerges as 
the subject realises that meaning. 
Žižek’s wager is that the meaning of these ambiguous sites, whether protests, or works
of literature or art, will be similarly determined in the future. What is unique about them at 
present — and herein resides their utopian potential — is that they appear as irrational from 
the perspective of the dominant ideologies and logics of capitalism and liberal democracy. 
What initially appears as “impossible” in these signs, as a result, might in fact be inherently 
possible within some future alternative world. However, like the symptom, their meaning will
only be realised and determined retroactively as a result of the work of the subject who 
struggles for their existence. Without this, they will remain merely irrational fragments 
without purpose or being. 
Žižek, as a result, is able to step around the challenge that his critique of Marxism 
presents to utopian thinking. As we have seen, we cannot base Communism in the logics and 
knowledge of capitalism without reproducing its content at a different level. So, for Žižek, not
only must we remove Marx’s idea of Communism as pure reconciliation but also the notion 
that Communism is the result of capitalism’s objective development. Žižek’s conception of 
the relationship between the “signs from the future” and Communism breaks with this logic 
since these symptoms already exist beyond the socio-symbolic system of capitalism and 
liberal democracy. Take, for example, the case of protests and political revolutions, not only 
do these demonstrate a form of politicisation that disturbs the post-political logic of 
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representative democracy, but they also demonstrate different forms of democratic political 
practice, or, perhaps, new ways of organising our socio-relationships and communities. 
Žižek’s reading of the “signs from the future” has two crucial features. First, it relies 
on the engaged perspective of the proletarian. We described this previously as that of the 
feminine subject, which assumes an openness towards historical possibility and what appears 
impossible within the present.34 This engaged perspective is able to discern the potential in 
these symptoms on the basis that they cannot be integrated within the present. Second, the 
way in which Žižek suggests that we must read these “signs from the future” relies on a mode 
of interpretation that reverses the usual Marxist historicist perspective in which an event is 
understood in terms of its historical conditions and context. Instead, this hermeneutic entails 
positing a future from which they can be interpreted. Here, Žižek evokes Walter Benjamin’s 
understanding of a moment of the past/present that is redeemable only in the future, as he 
describes in his essay “Theses on The Philosophy of History” (2007). As Žižek describes this:
[I]nstead of analyzing them as part of the continuum of past and present, we 
should bring in the perspective of the future, taking them as limited, 
distorted (sometimes even perverted) fragments of a utopian future that lies 
dormant in the present as its hidden potential.35
For Žižek, it is by following these signs from this engaged, futural perspective that we might 
be able to discern and bring into existence what at present appears “impossible” within them. 
It is at this point that Žižek introduces his own understanding of the Communist Idea. Žižek 
argues that these signs demonstrate the Communist Idea at the same time that they must be 
read from its perspective. As he puts it in Year of Dreaming Dangerously: these are ‘elements 
34 Žižek, YDD, p.128.
35 Žižek, YDD, p.128.
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which are here in our space, but whose time is the emancipated future, the future of the 
Communist Idea.’36  
9.4. Žižek's Idea of Communism: The Discourse of the Analyst
Žižek has recently put this utopian hermeneutic into practice in an engagement with several 
“signs from the future” to develop his own Idea of Communism. Working primarily with 
literary and filmic sources Žižek analysis suggests that the Idea which these signs indicate has
the structure of the analyst’s discourse. 
The Discourse of the Analyst
Compared to the discourse of the university, the discourse of the analyst represents a 
quarter-turn counter-clockwise for the different elements. While it is to some extent modelled 
on the analysand-analyst relationship found in the clinical setting, the application of this 
structure is certainly not limited to it.37 Equally it is in no way a telos or end but, as Fink 
writes, ‘one discourse among many.’38 There is a debate with regard to whether the discourse 
36 Žižek, YDD, p.128.
37 See Lacan, Seminar XVII, p.33; see also Jeanne Lorraine Schroeder, The Four Lacanian Discourses: Or 
Turning Law Inside Out, Oxon: Birkbeck Law Press (2008) chapter 4.
38 Fink, The Lacanian Subject, p.129.
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of the analyst is merely a passing moment between other discourses or whether it can name a 
new social link. Whereas Žižek previously held the former view — in Tarrying With The 
Negative where he argues that it emerges only in between other discourses, and, as such, is 
tasked with the production of the master-signifier in the sense of rendering ‘visible its 
“produced,” artificial, contingent character’39 — in Parallax View he argues that despite the 
failure of the attempted institutionalisation of analyst’s discourse — primarily in Lacan’s own
psychoanalytical associations — the fight for new communities on the basis of the discourse 
of the analyst is ‘worth pursing.’40  In Living in the End Times Žižek finds the discourse of the
analyst in operation within certain “signs from the future.” In terms of Žižek’s own thinking 
of alternative modes of socio-political organisation the Communist Idea that he develops 
allows him to realise what he described as the ‘chance of a different [social] link’ in Parallax 
View when discussing the analyst’s discourse and, negatively, the difficulty of imagining 
Bartleby in power.41 In his engagement with Communism Žižek is able to suggest the 
possibility of realising this potential through his utopian reading of Franz Kafka’s short story, 
“Josephine the Singer, or the Mouse Folk” in which we see the analyst’s discourse realised as 
a political community.
Understood as the discourse of the analyst, Žižek’s Idea of Communism is far from a 
complete solution to the antagonisms of liberal democracy and capitalism. However, it does 
offer a vision of an alternative that potentially escapes the libidinal deadlock of late-capitalism
and a new mode of participatory democracy, far removed from the rule by knowledge and the 
bourgeois excess that characterise post-politics. Just as pressingly from the perspective of the 
development of his own position, conceiving of the Idea of Communism as an analyst’s 
discourse allows Žižek to avoid repeating the problems of Stalinist and Marxist utopias. As 
39 Žižek, TWN, p.2.
40 Žižek, PV, p.306.
41 Žižek, PV, p.306.
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we will see, the analyst’s discourse foregrounds the presence of the lack in the Other and as 
such is differentiated from “Marx’s fantasy” which was characterised by the abolition of the 
lack. Presumably, all forms of utopia that Žižek would endorse would have to find some way 
to accommodate and establish this dimension of the Real at their centre. 
9.4.1. The New Model of Egalitarian Collectivity
The central figure in Kafka’s story is Josephine, a singer who enables a form of community 
among the Mouse-folk when she sings. What is pivotal for Žižek is how she is not held in any
particular esteem despite playing a crucial role in the formation of the community. In her 
interaction with the Mice people she is presented as meek, weak, and, at times, a little rude. 
Even her singing is not considered particularly favourably. As the narrator tells us, 
Josephine’s singing is closer to “piping,” a form of noise-making that is common to the other 
mice within the community but is never considered as art by any of them. According to Žižek,
the enigma of the tale that we must resolve is how this performance operates to unite the 
community. The key to this is the position of Josephine. For Žižek, she occupies the position 
of the agent in the analyst’s discourse, the embodiment of the lack in the Other, objet a. What 
she offers is nothing, or more precisely a nothing, she is, as Žižek puts it, ‘a purely differential
marker,’42 a form of positivisation against which the community can understand itself as a 
community. As Jameson (1994) writes of Josephine in his analysis of Kafka’s tale as a utopia: 
she is ‘the vehicle for the collectivity’s affirmation of itself: she reflects their collective 
identity back to them.’43 For Žižek this is why, despite the fact that her ‘voice is the same as 
all the others’’ Josephine’s is still vital to the community. ‘Her piping-singing is a pure 
pretext — ultimately, the people gather for the sake of gathering.’44 It plays a formal role in 
42 Žižek, LITET, p.367.
43 Jameson, Seeds of Time, p.125.
44 Žižek, LITET, p.367.
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relation to the community, allowing them to assemble and unite without being definitive of 
them. It is here that Žižek finds that the quality of Josephine’s singing, or lack thereof, is in 
fact an advantage because its limited value prevents the fetishisation of her. 45 In-itself 
Josephine’s singing functions like one of Duchamp’s ready-mades: an ordinary object is 
elevated to an art-object by the way it is framed or exhibited. Her singing gains an exceptional
status only by way of how the community assembles around it. As a result, the Mice people 
can come and go without coming under its spell, and they can humour Josephine or even be 
antagonistic to her, as Kafka suggests. 
For Žižek, in Kafka’s tale we find the ‘most elementary idea of communism’ in terms 
of  ‘the clarity of a minimalist order sustained by a gentle form of freely imposed discipline 
[…]’46 The minimum of discipline is found in the freedom of assembly sustained only by the 
limited nature of Josephine’s “piping,” while the very unexceptional nature of Josephine 
demonstrates a certain egalitarianism.  Josephine is an authority figure who is neither a leader 
nor a particular authority. Following Kafka’s tale we see that her status means that as soon as 
she tries to go beyond her position as merely a “differential marker” she dissolves once again 
into the throng of the Mice people because ‘her admirers are well aware that there is nothing 
special about her, that she is just one of them.’47 When she demonstrates an egotism that 
threaten her status, it is treated with polite ignorance, a request that is ignored.48 And when 
she leaves her position, she is not missed, but enters back in to the masses with total 
anonymity. For Žižek, this indicates how her exceptional status is both temporary and based 
solely upon her function for the Mice people. 
45 Žižek, LITET, p.370.
46 Žižek, LITET, p.380. Žižek develops this position in an account of Eric Satie’s furniture music and Dziga 
Vertov films but it is equally applicable to his reading of Kafka.
47 Žižek, LITET, p.370.
48 Žižek, LITET, pp.370-1.
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What Žižek finds fascinating in Kafka’s tale is how Josephine’s role indicates the 
possibility of a different form of socio-political organisation beyond the discourse of the 
master or the university. To put this in a different way, Josephine plays the role of a totalising 
exception without being exceptional nor totalising in the traditional sense of the term. She 
does not impose her will, like the master, nor does her knowledge dominate the subject. As a 
result, she allows a totality in which no specific qualities define it. Rather, Josephine is like 
the analyst insofar as her exceptional position carries no authority or fantasmatic standing 
among the collective.49
9.4.2. Beyond the Superego and the Ego-Ideal
In Žižek’s reading of Kafka’s tale a question remains with regard to the role of collectivity: 
what does this “minimal” ordering enable? For Žižek, the purpose of the discourse of the 
analyst as a mode of socio-political organisation is that it enables a flourishing of personal 
idiosyncrasies and a multiplicity of differences. In this regard, Žižek’s Idea of Communism 
can be seen as a response to the libidinal deadlock that results from the subject’s rule by the 
superego. The discourse of the analyst promotes a new way of organising the subject’s 
relationship to its jouissance.50 If we recall Žižek’s analysis of the transformation of 
subjectivity in late-capitalism (section 8.3.2.) we saw how permissive late-capitalist societies 
in fact made jouissance even harder to realise, at the same time as producing an oppressive 
guilt, as a result of the unrestrained superegoistic injunction that emerges from contemporary 
ideology. The analyst’s discourse provides a way beyond this entrapment by the superego, 
without a return to the master.51 
49 Žižek, LITET, p.368.
50 Žižek, PV, p.303.
51 Žižek, PV, pp.306, 308.
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As we have said with regard to the role that Josephine plays qua analyst, she stands 
‘for the ultimate inconsistency and failure of the big Other.’52 Žižek’s wager is that, given her 
very ordinariness, Josephine suspends the possible fetishisation of her exceptional status. As a
result, she embodies the objet a without the fantasy frame that transfigures her into the 
sublime object. Instead, she stands for the ‘void behind the lure.’53 Or, as Lacan describes 
with regard to the identity of the analyst with the objet a: the cause of desire appears to the 
subject as a pure absence.54 As such, Josephine is not another object of desire but, as Žižek 
writes of the analyst, ‘the Void, which provokes the subject into confronting the truth of 
[their] desire.’55 
Understood as the analyst-object the agent of the discourse of the analyst makes the 
subject embrace their own enjoyment without the protection of the Other. It also tells them 
that the prohibition on which the symbolic order was constructed, and which generates the 
desire of its transgression, can be stepped around. In other words, the agent of this discourse 
opens up possibilities for the subject that go beyond those established by the Law and its 
superegoistic supplement. The process can be understood as akin to the end of analysis where 
the analysand realises that ‘the analyst himself [sic] is nothing but a big question mark 
addressed to the analysand.’56 That is to say, through the confrontation with the analyst the 
subject recognises that ‘desire has no support in the Other, that the authorisation of desire can 
come only from themselves.’57 As a result, the function of the analyst-agent is to loosen the 
grip of the superego.58 While the superego bombards subjects with the imperative to “Enjoy!”,
as the embodiment of the void the analyst opens the possibility of limiting the constant 
52 Žižek, PV, p.422, n.66.
53 Žižek, PV, p.304.
54 Lacan, Seminar XVII, p.106.
55 Žižek, PV, p.304.
56 Žižek, ME, p.72.
57 Žižek, ME, pp.72-3.
58 Žižek, PV, p.304.
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demand for jouissance, not through a new set of prohibitions, but, rather, by revealing the 
absence of the basis of the injunction and the impossibility of its realisation. The novelty of 
psychoanalysis that the analyst’s discourse formalises is that it tells the subject that they ‘are 
allowed not to enjoy (as opposed to “not allowed to enjoy”)’.59 
Based on the analyst’s discourse Žižek’s Idea of Communism also suggests that there 
is no return of symbolic authority since the other function of the analyst-agent is to reveal the 
Other’s ‘inability to guarantee the subject’s symbolic identity.’60 As such, it is an order in 
which there is also a suspension of the kind of ego-ideal that master-signifiers produce in the 
subject. While in our present, the subject experiences master-signifiers as alienating social 
demands that are frequently accompanied by real coercion, the Communist society that Žižek 
has in mind enables the subject to separate from imposed ego-ideal through the non-
authoritarian nature of the agent. Here, those attributes and characteristics of the subject that 
contradict and are painfully repressed in the attempt to live up to the socially authorised 
mandates can, as a result, come to the surface and become active and acceptable forms of 
social identity within an order that is not structured by oppressive master-signifiers.  
From the perspective of Žižek’s example of Josephine, her presence opens the space 
for the subject to pursue their own enjoyment and identifications without limit, guilt or 
coercion given the absence of authority that she embodies. As a result, Žižek’s Idea of 
Communism describes a social order in which a proliferation of modes of desire and types of 
identity is possible.  Looking beyond his engagement with Josephine we see that the other 
“signs from the future” that Žižek focuses on are groups of “freaks” and social outcasts. These
“proto-communist” communities are demonstrative of forms of cultural libertarianism and 
modes of collectivity where the peculiar particularities of subjects find purpose and the space 
59 Žižek, PV, p.304.
60 Žižek, PV, p.422, n.66.
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to come to the fore.61 For example, Žižek refers to Fredric Jameson’s account of the 
investigative unit from David Simon’s HBO series The Wire who engineer a situation where 
they are able to utilise their skills while letting their foibles and follies be displaced on to 
other personal activities rather than getting eaten up by the system.62 What Žižek takes from 
these examples is the possibility of a less uniform and far more complex society. This is not to
say that the analyst’s discourse will not also produce something of an uneasiness for the 
subject. It is a mode of social organisation which would place a certain amount of pressure on 
subjects as a result of their libidinal autonomy. As Žižek puts it with regard to the effect of the
analyst, ‘the burden falls upon the subject […] since they renounce any support in the other.’63
What it would do, however, is remove the subject from the tortuous circuit of desire sustained
by the Other and enforced by the superegoistic injunction that can never be sated. 
9.4.3. The Production of the Master-Signifier 
Understood as the discourse of the analyst, Žižek’s Idea of Communism also allows an 
alternative form of political organisation to post-political liberal democracy. Žižek describes 
that the challenge of imagining a radical alternative to post-political democracy resides in how
to institutionalise the ‘egalitarian democratic impulse’ without it becoming normalised and 
regulated.64 The latter, according to Žižek’s critique, is a core feature of liberal democracy in 
its post-political mode. The discourse of the analyst offers another model of democratic 
political organisation that seems to retain this impulse. To understand how this might operate 
it is crucial to consider the central dynamic of the analyst’s discourse. At the level of 
production the discourse of the analyst is defined by S1, in the bottom left hand corner of 
61 Žižek, YDD, p.98, LITET, p.377.
62 Fredric Jameson, “Realism and Utopia in the Wire” in Criticism, vol.52, Nos.3&4 (2010) 
63 Žižek, EYS!, p.69.
64 Žižek, IDLC, p.417.
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Lacan’s matheme. As a discourse it functions to produce this signifier through a decision 
based upon the impossibility of a neutral, totalising knowledge. In the clinical setting the 
analyst stands for the object-cause of desire, objet a.65 On the basis of the transferential 
illusion, the analyst appears to the analysand as “the subject supposed to know,”66 the subject 
who can help locate and resolve their perturbing Real.67 Through this illusion the subject 
addresses their repressed unconscious knowledge, S2, to the analysand.68 The point of 
analysis, then, is to take the subject to the point of the symbolic act in which they makes sense
of the unconscious knowledge by producing S1 as the retroactively effective cause. 
What value does this have for a new mode of collective political organisation? The 
discourse of the analyst means the production of new S1, not on the basis of knowledge or the
supposed wisdom of the authority figure.  The key point with regard to the analyst’s discourse
is that the production of the master-signifier is one that is the subject’s alone. As Bracher 
(1994) points out, the analyst’s discourse is a model in which the ultimate values and 
decisions it produces will not be imposed on subjects by an Other but will be produced by 
them.69 Understood as a model of socio-political organisation, the decision that the analyst’s 
discourse produces will rest upon the collectivity rather than an elite. As such, the discourse 
of the analyst would put an end to the domination of democratic decision by (expert) 
knowledge or the (secret) rule of the bourgeois excess by returning control of the commons to
a decision made in common, as has long been thought to be the basis of a Communist mode of
political organisation.70
65 Žižek, LA, p.131.
66 Jacques Lacan, Television trans Denis Hollier, Rosalind Krauss, Annette Michleson, in October no.40 (1987) 
p.8.
67 Žižek, PV, p.101.
68 Žižek, EYS!, p.45.
69 Mark Bracher, “On the Psychological and Social Functions of Language: Lacan’s Theory of the Four 
Discourses” in Lacanian Theory of Discourse: Subject, Structure, Society, eds. Mark Bracher, Marshall Alcorn, 
Ronald Corthell, and Françoise Massardier-Kenney. New York: New York University Press (1994) pp.123-4.
70 See, for example, Friedrich Engels, “Principles of Communism” in MECW, vol.6. New York: International 
Publishers (1976) pp.341-357.
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9.4.4. The Limitations of Žižek's Idea of Communism
Understood as the discourse of the analyst, Žižek’s Idea of Communism provides answers to 
the problem of imagining an alternative to liberal democracy and the domination of 
contemporary subjectivity by the superego but is clearly limited at the level of economic 
questions, or what provides the “base” of this socio-political superstructure. Speaking of the 
blossoming of new and previously unconceivable modes of enjoyment and types of identity 
seems to indicate not only the absence of imposed and coercive moral and social values but 
the existence of a world where individuals have the means and time to freely pursue such 
diversity without restraint. However, the discourse of the analyst and the “signs from the 
future” that Žižek engages with are all silent in this regard. The absence of any reflection by 
Žižek on this matter is only further highlighted by his choice of sources.  When outlining the 
culturally libertarian consequences of the analyst’s discourse as the Idea of Communism 
Žižek refers heavily to and quotes some of Fredric Jameson’s speculative readings of utopian 
figures in Seeds of Time. In the passage that Žižek focuses on, Jameson speculates that if the 
need to dominate external nature produces the domination of internal nature through the 
creation of an egotistic survival instinct, then, in a future of plenty, where the survival instinct 
is no longer required, our “human nature” will be truly free to take any number of alternative 
forms. As Jameson writes:
Speculation on the consequences of just such a general removal of the need 
for a survival instinct (such a removal being then in general what we call 
Utopia itself) leads us well beyond the bounds of Adorno’s social life world 
and class style (or our own), and into a Utopia of misfits and oddballs, in 
which the constraints for uniformization and conformity have been removed,
and human beings grow wild like plants in a state of nature: […] who, no 
244
Communism
longer fettered by the constraints of a now oppressive sociality, blossom into
the neurotics, compulsives, obsessives, paranoids and schizophrenics, whom 
our society considers sick but who, in a world of true freedom, may make up
the flora and fauna of “human nature” itself.71 
However, when Žižek reflects on this passage from Jameson he ignores the dimension of the 
survival instinct and instead postulates the possibility of an ‘unencumbered blossoming of 
idiosyncrasies’ on the basis of the ‘shared ritual’ of Josephine’s “piping,”72 or in more general 
terms the figure of the analyst. As a result, Žižek obscures the question of what is required in 
order to realise the obsolescence of the social function of such a survival instinct. If we recall 
Marx’s account of Communism as the “realm of freedom” in volume III of Capital (1991), 
Marx refers to the flourishing of human powers only on the basis of a “realm of necessity” in 
which the means of social reproduction is secured for all in a rational, humane and democratic
way so that it can be accomplished with the very minimum ‘expenditure of energy.’ 73 For 
Marx, then, the reduction or abolition of labour is the prerequisite for any potential flourishing
of true diversity and human potential. In contrast, Žižek sees this as a problem for social and 
political organisation to resolve. As a result, there is a highly significant blind spot in Žižek’s 
conception of Communism. It should be noted here that this issue is not wholly beyond 
Žižek’s view. Without offering anything close to a sustained analysis of what this might 
consist of in the above context he nevertheless argues in places for a dialectical understanding
of freedom which conceives of economic and political necessity as its basis. Citing European 
social democracy as an example, Žižek writes: 
71 Jameson, Seeds of Time, p.99. Žižek cites this in LITET, p.377. Jameson’s reflections are based on a prior 
engagement with Adorn and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (1997) in his earlier work on Adorno, 
Late Marxism (1990) (see p. 102.)
72 Žižek, LITET, p.377.
73 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol.3. Trans. David Fernbach, London: Penguin (1991) 
p.958-9.
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Freedom and regulation are not opposites: we are effectively able to make 
free choices only because a thick background of regulations sustains this 
freedom […] The lesson to be learned is thus that freedom of choice 
operates only when a complex network of legal, educational, ethical, 
economic and other conditions form an invisible thick background to the 
exercise of our freedom.74 
Elsewhere, in the context of neo-liberal post-politics Žižek argues that ‘[i]t is not enough [..] 
to reject the depoliticized rule of experts; one must also begin to think seriously about what to 
propose in place of the predominant economic organization.’75 Žižek also states that a 
Communist politics must politicise the distribution of goods and services whose allocation, at 
present, is dictated primarily by the market mechanism.76  Yet, other than an occasional 
reference to Lenin’s State and Revolution77 or the collectivisation of certain infrastructures,78 
Žižek offers little in the way of any speculative prescription. 
The other limitations of Žižek’s Idea of Communism come to the fore when we ask 
how the discourse of the analyst would work as a new mode of social and political 
organisation. Most pressing among these questions is how the analyst’s discourse is prevented
from regressing to yet another master’s discourse, in its traditional or perverse form. As Žižek
himself notes ‘[t]he line of separation between the “totalitarian” leader and the analyst is […] 
almost imperceptible.’79 Both attempt to embody the Other, but whereas the totalitarian leader
stands for the Other as such, and in the perverse relationship disavows this impossibility, the 
analyst stands for its lack. Totalitarianism, as we have seen, fetishises the totalitarian leader, 
engendering the perverse social link by enacting the short-circuit and assuming the leaders 
74 Žižek, LITET, p.359, see also Žižek, DTI, p.76.
75 Žižek, YDD, p.82.
76 Žižek, FATTAF, p.85.
77 Žižek, YDD, p.82.
78 Žižek, “LC,” p.294.
79 Žižek, PV, p.380.
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total equivalence with the Other. How is it kept empty, however? More specifically, how do 
we prevent the analyst from becoming the totalitarian leader by directly standing in for the 
Other rather than its absence? The difficulties Žižek’s position faces can be better viewed 
from his innovative reading of the Hegelian constitutional monarch in Philosophy of Right 
(1967). Žižek has provocatively suggested on a number of occasions that the Hegelian 
constitutional monarchy is a model for a democratic society not dissimilar to the way that he 
conceives of the discourse of the analyst.80 Žižek argues that the monarch’s role is purely 
formal, suggesting an equivalence with the agent of the analyst’s discourse. This is sustained 
Žižek suggests because, like the analyst, the monarch is merely a contingent stand-in of the 
empty place that reflects the communities unity back to them. Moreover, the reliance on 
biological lineage to determine the monarch demonstrates an irrationality that suspends the 
fetishisation of this figure. As a result, Žižek praises the Hegelian constitutional monarchy for
demonstrating the possibility of keeping separate a from S1 in the same way that the analyst 
ensures that the lack in the Other is articulated. In terms of its relationship to the decisions of 
the state, the monarch merely emphasises the subjective moment, confirming what is 
produced by others in the remaining structure of the system.  As Žižek describes the role of 
the monarch in this instance, quoting Hegel, its role is reduced to merely “dotting the i’s and 
crossing the t’s.”81 Žižek’s view on the matter is evidently highly contentious not least 
because throughout history, monarchs have frequently been fetishised and have been able to 
assume a position as the direct embodiment of the Other, whether the People, or God. Žižek 
also overlooks several crucial aspects of Hegel’s account of constitutional monarchy in this 
overly hasty confluence with a form of democracy along the lines of the discourse of the 
analyst. For Hegel, the powers of the monarch are far more extensive than Žižek’s reading 
80 Žižek has turned to on a number of occasions, but in most detail in For They Know Not. Žižek, FTKN, pp.82-
84.
81 Žižek, FTKN, p.84.
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suggests. The monarch has the power to appoint a government, a veto over certain laws, and 
also has the power, as head of the state, to conduct and pursue the state’s foreign affairs. 82 
Most importantly, however, by focusing on the formal role of the monarch, Žižek obscures 
the vital role of the constitution in the constitutional monarch. What concerns Hegel most of 
all is not the formal position of the monarch but how its powers and role are defined and 
limited by the constitutional element. Of course, this does not prevent a fetishistic effect in the
subject’s consideration of the monarch, but it does, however, prevent the monarch taking the 
role of the fetish as the direct short circuit in which it becomes the totalitarian leader. It raises 
the question, then, of how is the power of the analyst limited to ensure it does not take the 
totalitarian position? Žižek’s Idea of Communism does not address this problem but a radical 
constitutionalism might provide an answer of sorts. Without its enforcement, the analyst-agent
is potentially free to exceed its supposedly limited power and minimal role. In this regard, it is
surprising that Žižek has not turned to the go-to source for Marxism on this topic, the Paris 
Commune. Therein a number of measures were created in order to reduce and limit the power 
of leaders, from the right to recall, to ensuring they were not materially benefited by taking up
specific roles of power. 
From the perspective of Žižek’s reading of Hegel’s constitutional monarchy a second 
question that Žižek’s Idea of Communism does not address comes into view: namely, how 
will the state and democratic decisions be administered and enforced? For Hegel, the monarch
is impotent without an executive that maintains and executes the common ends of the state. 
The several layers of state bureaucracy that Hegel describes include the existence of the 
division of labour and mechanisms of control and coercion.  Without broaching this question, 
one is left to wonder whether the “truth” of Žižek’s vision of Communism is a class of 
bureaucrats or civil servants administrating our social world. While Žižek’s examples suggest 
82 G.W.F Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press (1967).
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a classless future in which the division of labour has ended – at least with regard to Kafka’s 
tale, wherein the difference between leader and followers is reduced to a minimal, formal 
difference – what sustains, enables, and realises its results is not considered by Žižek.
9.5. A Communist Politics without the Other
Despite the limitations of the content of Žižek’s Communist Idea there is nothing preventing 
the use of the utopian hermeneutic to extrapolate and develop potential solutions to these 
problems through reading other “signs from the future” that might offer the possibility of a 
more extensively developed conception of political or economic organisation. What seems to 
be a more fundamental challenge, however, is how, at the level of practice, Žižek prevents the
Idea operating as the basis for the legitimating fantasy of the perverse subject. This challenge 
is clearly connected to the question that we raised at the end of chapter 5 in section 5.5. 
regarding how Žižek can offer activists and militants with an answer to the question “what is 
to be done?” without transforming his own position from that of the analyst to that of the 
master. More generally, the emergence of Communism in Žižek’s work brings this challenge 
back in to focus because, as a name for a future society and a political project, Communism 
could operate as a stand-in for the Other. 
Žižek’s intention is that the Idea functions as a guide to subjects engaged in 
transforming the socio-political world. Its purpose is to offer a form that, to put it in 
Gramsci’s terms, is ‘ideally active’ in the practices and discourses of those who want to 
realise it.83 Žižek invites subjects to create and practice this Idea as they attempt to realise it. 
However, as such, it seems that the Idea is ripe for the kind of perverse misrecognition that 
characterised Stalinist subjectivity. When we examined Žižek’s critique in chapter 2, section 
83 Antonio Gramsci, “The Problem of the School,” in The Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935, ed. 
David Forgacs, New York: New York University Press (2000) p.68.
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2.3., we concluded that the disastrous consequences of communist politics in the past were a 
result of the perverse relationship of the Stalinist communist to a fantasy of the Other. The 
fantasy produced the sense that the communist was the “sublime” embodiment of the Other, 
the realisation of the “objective” logic of History or will of the People. Žižek seems to come 
dangerously close to repeating this position when he describes the relationship of the subject 
to the Communist Idea and its presence in the “signs from the future” in terms of a 
‘Communism Absconditus,’ with reference to the notion of a hidden God available only to 
those who commit to his existence, as described by Pascal in Pensees (2004).84 Žižek, 
however, wants to prevent the subject from ever conceiving of this Idea as a legitimating 
fantasy for communist subjects in the way that Stalinist communists perceived the fantasy of 
History and their relationship to it. Žižek does this by emphasising the subjective and partial 
nature of the Idea. 
The circular, retroactive relationship between the Idea and its signs is crucial in this 
regard.  While these signs might appear as “germs” which give birth to the Idea, they will 
only be determined as such in the future. As Žižek describes this relationship, they must be 
recognised as signs ‘that, paradoxically, precede that of which they are the signs.’85 Their 
status as “germs”, in other words, will only be secured after the realisation of what they might
give birth to. This is an important part of Žižek’s insistence that we remove any belief in the 
objectivity of their potential, as if what they contain is ready and waiting in actu to be 
realised. It is for this reason that Žižek describes their futural promise with the term avinir, 
rather than futur. The latter indicates the ‘continuation of the present,’ while à venir, on the 
other hand, ‘is what is to come (à venir), not just what will be.’86 For Žižek à venir, implies 
the existence of an openness within history, the lack of an Other of History. Žižek’s 
84 Žižek, YDD, pp.129-131.
85 Žižek, YDD, p.129.
86 Žižek, LTN, p.264, YDD, p.134.
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“Communism Absconditus,” thus, differs from the Other of History in a slight but crucial 
way: the Idea is historically and subjective derived, with no trans-historical being. Rather than
“objective,” as classical dialectical materialism understood historical development, the 
speculative and contingent basis of the Communist Idea means that History is radically 
subjective.87 On this basis, Žižek’s Idea is carefully delineated from that of Badiou’s. The Idea
is not “eternal,” but both futural and potentially present – rather than a present potentiality – 
in those elements that are antagonistic to the ruling political and ideological logics.88
The Communist Idea, thus, should not be held up as a lofty ideal that everyone can 
accept according to Žižek. As Žižek sums up: ‘we can no longer pretend (or act as if) the 
Communist Truth is simply here for everyone to see, accessible to neutral rational historical 
analysis […]’89 Given that the emergence and realisation of the Idea is always passing through
the contingency that the lack in the Other demonstrates, Žižek emphasises that the Idea is both
historical and subjective and, as such, must be conceived primarily in a regulative way in the 
Kantian sense of an object that has an existence in thought.90 By emphasising the subjective 
moment at the heart of this relationship, Žižek is foregrounding the irreducible political 
moment that must be retained alongside the Idea. With this position Žižek intends to prevent 
the misrecognition of the Idea of Communism as objective, which was precisely the 
misrecognition that drove the violence of Stalinist communism. At the same time, Žižek is 
denying the possibility of the metalinguistic position on which this objectivity is inevitably 
grounded. 
87 Žižek, YDD, p.129.
88 Despite Žižek’s critique of Badiou this is, in fact, far closer to his position than Žižek admits. For Badiou, 
Truths are trans-temporally available but always historical and subjective in their nature. Their relationship with 
other truths is also retroactively effective. See Alain Badiou, The Communist Hypothesis, trans. David Macey 
and Steve Corcoran, London: Verso (2010) pp.229-34.
89 Žižek, YDD, p.131.
90 Žižek, YDD, p.129.
251
Communism
The centrality of this political moment to Žižek’s Communism has far reaching 
implications for how we conceive of the trajectory and course of political transformation. 
Most importantly, it breaks with any conception of political transformation in which its ends 
are guaranteed or determined, even if they are suggested by the “signs from the future.” As 
Žižek argues, Communism today cannot rely on a ‘higher historical necessity or teleology to 
guide and legitimize our acts.’91 Žižek rejects this position for similar reasons that he rejects 
“economism,”92 a position that defined the meta-political stance of traditional Marxism. Quite 
simply, this logic does not exist. Like we touched upon with regards to “the Art of the 
Impossible,” the Communist intervention will always be a risky, wagered position. Its 
consequences can never be guaranteed, nor can they ever be fully known in advance. 
Moreover, because this is an intervention that not only breaks with the current necessities of 
the status quo and its political and ideological logics but also is not determined by any Other, 
it will always be ‘voluntaristic’ in character.93  
In drawing out the consequences of the political moment as a result of the lack in the 
Other, Žižek recalls the debate between Rosa Luxemburg and Eduard Bernstein regarding the 
right moment for political transformation. Žižek, ultimately, sides with the former against 
Bernstein’s ‘revisionist fear of seizing power “too soon.”’94 Žižek argues that Luxemburg was
correct in arguing that a) there are no “objective conditions” for Communism and that to think
these will one day “ripen” to facilitate a smooth transformation to Communism is a 
debilitating illusion. The Communist intervention will not only break with the “objective 
conditions” of the situation but, as with the Act, attempt to create the conditions of its own 
success. As Žižek writes with regard to the Luxemburg-Bernstein debate the 
91 Žižek, YDD, p.131.
92 Žižek, YDD, p.27.
93 Žižek, FATTAF, p.154.
94 Žižek, SOI, p.62.
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only way for the working class to reach its “maturity,” to await the arrival of 
the “appropriate moment” for the seizure of power, is to form itself, to 
educate itself for the act of seizure, and the only possible way of achieving 
this education is precisely the “premature” attempts.95 
The same holds with Žižek’s Communist politics. Given the political nature of the 
intervention and its basis in the lack in the Other, every attempt will always appear as 
“premature” and will have no guarantees given that the conditions for the success of a 
Communist politics will never be present at the moment of the Act, even if there are signs 
which might become the presuppositions of the future.  For Žižek, as a result of the 
contingency and openness that characterise the Other, practice must tread a careful line 
between ‘decisionistic nihilism,’ that conceives of Communism as a total leap of faith in to 
the unknown, and the type of ‘determinist planning’ based upon a metalinguistic position 
common to traditional Marxism.96 With regard to the practice of the Idea this means the 
careful negotiation of the militant insistence of its existence and the acceptance of the 
openness of history and the possibilities that result.
The consequence of this subjective, political moment is that the relationship between 
theory and practice undergoes a substantial transformation. What is removed from view once 
the Other is disregarded is the idea that the theorist examines the concrete situation, and 
armed with the correct understanding of its tendencies and structures, tells subjects how to 
strike, while giving them full confidence in the results of their act.97 Far from the unity of the 
theory and practice that Marxism has traditionally searched for and that the philosopher-
theorist was supposed to hand down to the masses, from the perspective of Žižek’s work there
is always an essential disjunction or non-rapport between theory and practice that must be 
95 Žižek, SOI, p.62.
96 Žižek, YDD, p.129.
97 Žižek, SH, p.25.
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reflected within theory. It is this that Žižek attempts to realise in his various theoretical 
figures. In essence, it means that theory must resist schematising an exact rhythm and 
trajectory of transformation, especially with the kind of ‘eschatological expectation’ that 
traditional Marxism often offered.98 With regard to Žižek’s Communist Idea it means that not 
only must the realisation of the Idea be struggled for in practice, but that the Idea must always
be struggled with in-itself. The Idea must be re-shaped and adapted according to the “signs 
from the future” and the demands of the historical situation. In its engagement with it, 
theory’s role is to also prevent the Idea becoming isolated from continuing critique and futural
analysis, and, thus, becoming subject to the misrecognition that characterises perversion.  As a
result, Žižek can continue to resist standing-in for the Other as long as this subjective moment
continues to resonate. Whereas for the Stalinist communist, the theorist carried the 
responsibility to decipher and offer an Other qua History, in Žižek’s re-conceptualisation 
theory consistently shifts this weight on to the shoulders of the subject. This is why Žižek’s 
Communism avoids repeating the problems of traditional Marxism and Stalinism. Whether as 
the Cause or the subjectively mediated Idea, Žižek continues to emphasis the impulse for 
political transformation in the hole in the Other and, as a result, its partisan and ungrounded 
character. Without the Other, Žižek’s reconceptualisation of Communism hands to subjects 
the freedom and responsibility to determine and pursue the future.
98 Žižek, YDD, pp.133-4.
254
       
Bibliography
Adorno, Theodore W. and Horkheimer, Max. (1997) Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. 
Cumming, John, London: Verso.
Agamben, Giorgio. (2005) The State of Exception, trans. Attell, Kevin, London: 
University of Chicago Press.
Althusser, Louis. (1978) “The Crisis of Marxism” in Marxism Today, pp.215-227. 
———  (1995) “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” in Mapping Ideology, ed. 
Žižek, Slavoj, London: Verso
Avineri, Schlomo. (1968) Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Badiou, Alain. (1999) The Manifesto for Philosophy, trans. Madarasz, Norman, 
London: Continuum.
——— (2000) Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, trans. Hallward, Peter, 
London: Verso. 
——— (2005) Metapolitics, trans. Barker, Jason London: Verso. 
——— (2007) Being and Event, trans. Feltham, Oliver, London: Continuum. 
——— (2008) “‘We need a Popular Discipline’: Contemporary Politics and the Crisis 
of the Negation” interview by Del Lucchese, Filippo and Smith, Jason in Critical 
Inquiry 34, pp.645-59.
——— (2008) The Meaning of Sarkozy, trans. Fernbach, David. London: Verso. 
——— (2009) Theory of the Subject, trans. Bostells, Bruno. London: Continuum. 
——— (2010)  “The Idea of Communism,” in The Idea of Communism, eds. Douzinas, 
Costas and Žižek, Slavoj, London: Verso.
——— (2010) The Communist Hypothesis, trans. Macey, David and Corcoran, Steve, 
London: Verso.
——— (2012) Philosophy For Militants, trans. Bostells, Bruno, London: Verso.
Bellamy Foster, John. (2000) Marx’s Ecology: Nature and Materialism, New York: 
Monthly Review Press.
Benjamin, Walter. (2005) “Theses On The Philosophy of History” in Illuminations, 
trans. Zohn, Harry, New York: Random House.
Bensaïd, Daniel. (2004) “Alain Badiou and the Miracle of the Event” in Think Again: 
Badiou and the Future of Philosophy, ed. Hallward, Peter, London: Continuum. 
Berardi, Franco. (2015) Heroes: Mass Murder and Suicide, London: Verso. 
Bidet, Jacques and Kouvelakis, Stathis. (2008) “Introduction: Marxism, Post-Marxism, 
Neo-Marxisms” in Critical Companion to Contemporary Marxism eds. Bidet, 
Jacques and Kouvelakis, Stathis, Netherlands: Brill. 
255
Bibliography
Boucher, Geoff. (2005) "The Law as a Thing: Žižek and the Graph of Desire" in 
Traversing the Fantasy: Critical Responses to Slavoj Žižek, eds. Boucher, Geoff, 
Glynos, Jason and Sharpe, Matthew, Aldershot: Ashgate.
——— (2010) "An Inversion of Radical Democracy: The Republic of Virtue in Žižek's 
Revolutionary Politics" in International Journal of Žižek Studies vol.4. no.2.
Boucher, Geoff and Sharpe, Matthew. (2010) Žižek and Politics A Critical Introduction,
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Bracher, Mark. (1992) “On the Psychological and Social Functions of Language: 
Lacan’s Theory of the Four Discourses” in Lacanian Theory of Discourse: Subject, 
Structure, Society, eds. Bracher, Mark, Alcorn, Marshall, Corthell, Ronald and 
Massardier-Kenney, Françoise. New York: New York University Press.
Brassier, Ray. (2007) Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction, London: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Brockelman, Thomas. (2008) Žižek and Heidegger: The Question Concerning Techno-
Capitalism, London: Continuum. 
Burns, Tony. (2002) “Joseph Dietzgen and the History of Marxism,” in Science and 
Society, vol.66, no.2. pp.202-227.
Butler, Judith. (1997) The Psychic Life Of Power, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Butler, Judith, Laclau, Ernesto, Žižek, Slavoj. (2000) Contingency, Hegemony and 
Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left, London: Verso.
Butler, Rex. (2005) Slavoj Žižek: Live Theory, London: Continuum.
Carew, Joseph. (2014) “‘Why is there Nothing Rather than Something?’ Less Than 
Nothing’s New Metaphysics,” in International Journal of Žižek Studies, vol.8 no.1. 
Cohn, Norman. (1970) The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and 
Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages, Ayesbury: Paladin. 
Critchley, Simon. (2000) “Demanding Approval: On the Ethics of Alain Badiou” in 
Radical Philosophy, No.100, pp.21-22.
Daly, Glynn, (2004) Conversations with Žižek, Cambridge: Polity
Davis, Mike. (2006) Planet of the Slums, London: Verso.
De George, Richard T. (1970) Patterns of Soviet Thought: The Origins and 
Development of Dialectical and Historical Materialism, Michigan: Ann Arbor.
De Saussure, Ferdinand. (2013) Course in General Linguistics, trans. Harris, Roy, 
London: Bloomsbury.
Deterritorial Support Group. (2011) “Žižek/Gaga: Communism knows no monster,” 
DeterritorialSupportGroup.wordpress.com, published 21st March 2011 [Online] 
accessed from: 
http://deterritorialsupportgroup.wordpress.com/2011/03/21/Žižekgaga-communism-
knows-no-monster/ accessed on: 15th October 2013.
Dean, Jodi. (2006) Žižek’s Politics, London: Routledge. 
256
Bibliography
Declercq, Frédéric. (2006) “Lacan on the Capitalist Discourse: Its Consequences For 
Libidinal Enjoyment and Social Bonds” in Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society 
vol.11 pp.74-83.
Dews, Peter. (2005) “The Tremor of Reflection: Slavoj Žižek’s Lacanian Dialectics” in 
Radical Philosophy, vol.72, pp.17-29.
Dolar, Mladen. (1993) “Beyond Interpellation” in Qui Parle, vol.6, no.2, pp.75-96. 
——— (2013) “The Atom and the Void — from Democritus to Lacan” in Filozofski 
vol.xxxiv, no.2, pp.11-26.
Endnotes. (2010) “Misery and Debt,” in Endnotes #2: Misery and the Value Form.
Engels, Friedrich. (1987) Anti-Dühring Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in Science, in
MECW, vol. 25. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
——— (1976) “Principles of Communism” in MECW, vol.6. New York: International 
Publishers.
——— (1990) Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy in Karl
Marx and Frederick Engels Collected Works. vol. 26. London: Lawrence and 
Wishart. 
 ——— (1992) “Friedrich Engels to Eduard Bernstein in Zurich, London 2-3 April 
1882” in MECW, vol.46, London: Lawrence and Wishart. 
——— “Speech at the Grave of Karl Marx,” March 18th 1883, [Online] 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1883/death/burial.htm as accessed on: 
03.10.2014.
Evans, Dylan. (1996) Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis London: 
Routledge. 
Feldner, Heiko and Vighi, Fabio. (2007) Žižek: Beyond Foucault, Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan. 
Foucault, Michel. (1980) “Power and Strategies” in Power/Knowledge: Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. Gordon, Colin trans. Gordon, Colin, 
Marshall, Leo, Mepham, John and Soper, Kate, New York: Pantheon.
Fox News. (2011) “Red Eye Gregalogue,” Youtube.com, [Online] accessed from: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NowMOwl-Q44 Accessed on: 2.10.2013. 
Freud, Sigmund. (2006) “Fetishism,” in The Freud Reader, ed. Phillips, Adam, London:
Penguin.
Giddens, Anthony. (1994) Beyond Left and Right, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Gigante, Denise. (1998) “Toward a Notion of Critical Self-Creation: Slavoj Žižek and 
the ‘Vortex of Madness,’” in New Literary History, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 153-168.
Gramsci, Antonio. (1992) Selections from the Prison Notebooks, trans. Hoare, Quintin 
and Nowell Smith, Geoffrey, New York: International Publishers.
——— (2000) “The Problem of the School,” in The Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings
1916-1935, ed. Forgacs, David. New York: New York University Press.
257
Bibliography
Hallward, Peter. (2003) Badiou: A Subject to Truth, London: University of Minnesota 
Press.
Hardt, Michael and Negri, Antonio. (2000) Empire, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
——— (2004) Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire, New York: 
Penguin. 
Hayek, Freidrich. (1964) The Counter Revolution in the Sciences, New York: 
Macmillan. 
Hegel, G.W.F. (1967) Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, trans. Knox, T.M. Oxford 
University Press. 
——— (2010) Science of Logic, trans. di Giovanni, George. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
——— (1977) Phenomenology of Spirit trans. Miller, A.V. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Jameson, Fredric. (1973) “The Vanishing Mediator: Narrative Structure in Max 
Weber,” in New German Critique, no.1, pp.52-89.
——— (1983) The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act, 
London: Routledge.
——— (1990) “Cognitive Mapping” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, eds.
C. Nelson and L. Grossberg. University of Illinois Press.
——— (1990) Late Marxism; Adorno or the Persistance of the Dialectic, London: 
Verso. 
——— (1994) Seeds of Time, New York: Columbia University Press.
——— (2010) “Realism and Utopia in the Wire” in Criticism, vol.52, Nos.3&4, pp.359-
372.
——— (2011) Representing Capital, London: Verso.
Johnson, Alan. (2011) "The Power of Nonsense," in Jacobin, no.3-4. [Online] available 
at: https://www.jacobinmag.com/2011/07/the-power-of-nonsense/ last accessed on: 
5.5.2014.
Johnston, Adrian (2007) “There is Truth, and then there are truths — or Slavoj Žižek as 
a Reader of Alain Badiou,” in International Journal of Žižek Studies, volume 1, issue
1, pp.141-185. 
——— (2008) Žižek’s Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity, 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
——— (2009) Badiou, Žižek, and Political Transformation: The Cadence of Change, 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
——— (2013) “A Critique of Natural Economy: Quantum Physics with Žižek” in Žižek
Now: Current Perspectives in Žižek Studies, eds. Khader, Jamil, Rothenberg, Molly 
Anne, Cambridge: Polity.
Joravsky, David (1970) The Lysenko Affair, Harvard: Harvard University Press. 
258
Bibliography
Jordan, Z.A. (1967) The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism: A Philosophical and 
Sociological Analysis, New York: St. Martins Press.
Kolakowski, Lesek. (2005) The Main Currents of Marxism, trans. Falla, P.S., London: 
W.W. Norton.  
Kotsko, Adam. (2008) Žižek and Theology, London: Continuum. 
Kouvelakis, Stathis. (2001) “The Crises of Marxism and the Transformation of 
Capitalism” in Critical Companion to Contemporary Marxism eds. Bidet, Jacques 
and Kouvelakis, Stathis, Netherlands: Brill.
Lacan, Jacques. (1978) “The Discourse of Jacques Lacan at the University of Milan on 
May 12, 1972” in En Italie Lacan 1953-1978, Milan: La Salmandra, pp.32-55.
——— (1987) Television, trans. Denis Hollier, Rosalind Krauss, Annette Michleson, in 
October, no.40. 
——— (1991) The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Freud’s Papers on Technique, 1953-
1954, , ed. Miller, Jacques-Alain, trans. Forrester, John, London: W.W. Norton.
——— (1993) The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses, 1955-1956, ed.
Miller, Jacques-Alain, trans. Grigg, Russell, London: Routledge. 
——— (1998) The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. Miller, Jacques-Alain, trans. Sheridan, Alan, 
London: W.W. Norton. 
——— (1998) The Seminars of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: On Feminine Sexuality, The 
Limits of Love and Knowledge, 1972-1973, ed. Miller, Jacques-Alain, trans. Fink, 
Bruce, London: W.W.Norton.
——— (2007) The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XVII The Other Side of 
Psychoanalysis, ed. Miller, Jacques-Alain, trans. Grigg, Russell, London: W.W. 
Norton.
Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal. (2001) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: 
Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, 2nd ed. London: Verso. 
Laplanche, Jean and Bertrand Pontalis, Jean. (1973) The Language of Psycho-Analysis, 
trans. Nicholson-Smith, Donald, London: Karnac Books.
Lecourt, Dominique. (1977) Proletarian Science? The Case of Lysenko, trans. Brewster,
Ben, London: New Left Books.
Lefort, Claude. (1985) The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, 
Democracy, Totalitarianism, ed. Thompson, J.B., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lenin, V.I. (1972)  “Marxism and Insurrection,” A letter to the Central Committee of 
the R.S.D.L.P.(B.) Sept, 13-14, 1917, in Lenin Collected Works, Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, vol.26, pp.22-27
Lewotine, Richard and Levins, Richard. (1976) “The Problem of Lysenkoism,” in The 
Radicalisation of Science, eds. Rose, Hilary and Rose, Stephen London: Macmillan.
Long, Andrew and McGann, Tara. (1997) ‘Interview with Slavoj Žižek’ in Journal for 
the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society, vol. 2, no.1, pp. 133–7.
259
Bibliography
Lukács, Georg. (1971) History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, 
trans. Livingstone, Rodney, Pontypool: Merlin. 
Mannoni, Octave. (2003) “I Know Very Well, But All The Same…,” in Perversion and
the Social Relation, eds. Rothenbery, Molly Anne, Foster, Dennis and Žižek, Slavoj, 
Durham: Duke University Press. 
Marx, Karl (1843) “Letter to Arnold Ruge, in Dresden” Kreuzenach, [Online] accessed 
from: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/letters/43_09-alt.htm 
Accessed on: 10.09.2015. 
——— (1975) Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy, Third Notebook, MECW, vol.1. 
New York: International Publishers.
——— (1975) The Difference Between The Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of 
Nature MECW, vol 1. New York: International Publishers. 
——— (1975) The Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung MECW, vol.1, 
New York: International Publishers.
——— (1987) “Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,” in 
MECW, vol.29. New York: International Publishers.
——— (1990) Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. I, trans. Fowkes, Ben, 
London: Penguin. 
——— (1991) Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol.3. Trans. David Fernbach, 
London: Penguin. 
——— (1998) “Theses on Feuerbach” in The German Ideology, New York: 
Prometheus Books.
Marx, Karl and Engels, Friederich. (1976) “The German Ideology”, in MECW, vol.5, 
New York: Progress Publishers.
——— (2002) The Communist Manifesto, trans. Moore, Samuel, London: Penguin 
McGowan, Todd. (2003) The End of Dissatisfaction, New York: SUNY Press.
Mcmillan, Chris. (2010) Universality and Communist Strategy; Žižek and the 
Disavowed Foundations of Global Capitalism, PhD Thesis, School of Social and 
Cultural Studies, Massey University, Albany, New Zealand. 
——— (2013) Žižek and Communist Strategy: On the Disavowed Foundations of 
Global Capitalism, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Medvedev, Zhores. (1969) The Rise and Fall of T.D. Lysenko, New York: Anchor.
Meillassoux, Quentin. (2008) After Finitude, trans. Ray Brassier, London: Continuum. 
Miller, Jacques-Alain. (2012) “Suture” in Hallward, eds. Peter and Peden, Knox, 
Concept and Form: key texts from the Cahiers Pour L’Analyse, London: Verso. 
Močnik, Rastko. (1993) ‘Ideology and Fantasy,’ in The Althusserian Legacy, eds. 
Kaplan, E. Ann and Sprinker, Michael, London: Verso. 
Mouffe, Chantal. (2005) On The Political, London: Routledge.
Nietzsche, Freidrich. (1966) Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book For All and One, trans. 
Kaufmann, Walter, London: Penguin. 
260
Bibliography
——— (1967) The Will to Power, trans. Kaufmann, Walter and Hollingdale, R. J., New
York: Random House.
Parker, Ian. (2004) Slavoj Žižek: A Critical Introduction, London: Pluto Press.
Plekhanov, G.V. (1891) Sixtieth Anniversary of Hegel’s Death, [Online] accessed from: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/plekhanov/1891/11/hegel.htm last accessed: 
9.8.2015. 
——— (1956) The Development of the Monist Conception of History, London: 
Lawrence and Wishart.  
Polanyi, Karl. (2001) The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins 
of Our Times, Boston: Beacon Press. 
Rancière, Jacques. (1999) Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, trans. Rose, Julie, 
London: University of Minnesota Press.
Schmitt, Carl. (2014) Dictatorship: From the origin of the modern concept of 
sovereignty to proletarian class struggle, trans. Hoelzl, Michael and Ward, Graham, 
Cambridge: Polity. 
Schroeder, Jeanne Lorraine. (2008) The Four Lacanian Discourses: Or Turning Law 
Inside Out, Oxon: Birkbeck Law Press. 
Stalin, Joseph. (1945) Mastering Bolshevism, New York: New Century Publishers. 
——— (2008) Dialectical and Historical Materialism, New York: Key Press. 
——— (1939) History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik): Short 
Course, [Online] accessed from: 
http://marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch04.htm accessed on 
13.2.2015.
Stavrakakis, Yannis. (2007) The Lacanian Left: Psychoanalysis, Theory, Politics, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Taylor, Paul. (2010) Žižek and the Media, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Thomas, Paul. (2008) Marxism and Scientific Socialism: From Engels to Althusser, 
London: Routledge. 
Timpanaro, Sebastian. (1975) On Materialism, trans. Lawrence Garner, London: New 
Left Books. 
Tolokonnikova, Nadya and Žižek, Slavoj. (2012) “Letter from Nadya Tolokonnikova to 
Slavoj Žižek,” Lacan.com [Online] accessed from: 
http://www.lacan.com/thesymptom/?page_id=2380 accessed on:  15th October 2013 
Tormey, Simon and Robinson, Andrew. (2005) “A Ticklish Subject? Žižek and the 
Future of Left Radicalism,” in Thesis Eleven, Vol.80, pp.94-107. 
van der Linden, Marcel. (2007)Western Marxism and the Soviet Union: A Survey of 
Critical Theories and Debates Since 1917, trans. Bendien, Jurriaan, Leden, NL: Brill.
Vaneigem, Raoul. (2001) The Revolution of Everyday Life, trans. Nicholson-Smith, 
David, London: Rebel Press.
261
Bibliography
Verhaeghe, Paul and Declercq, Frédéric. (2002) “Lacan's analytical goal: ‘Le Sinthome’
or the feminine way.” in Essays on the final Lacan. Re-inventing the symptom, ed. 
Thurston, L., New York: The Other Press. 
Vighi, Fabio. (2010) Žižek’s Dialectics, London: Continuum. 
Williams, Michael and Reuten, Geert. (1993) “After the Rectifying Revolution: The 
Contradiction of the Mixed Economy?” in Capital and Class, no.49, pp.77-112. 
Williams, Raymond. (2005) Culture and Materialism, London: Verso.
Williamson, Roland. (2009) "Hegel Among The Quantum Physicists" in International 
Journal of Žižek Studies vol.3. no.1. 
Žižek, Slavoj. (1990) “Eastern Europe’s Republics of Gilead” in New Left Review, 
no.183, Sept-Oct.
 ——— (1991) Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular 
Culture, London: MIT Press.
——— (1992) “Eastern European Liberalism and its Discontents” in New German 
Critique, no.57 Autumn, pp.25-49.
——— (1993) Tarrying With The Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology, 
Durham: Duke University Press.
——— (1994) “The Spectre of Ideology,” in Mapping Ideology, ed. Žižek, Slavoj, 
London: Verso.
——— (1997) The Abyss of Freedom, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
——— (1997) “Desire : Drive = Truth : Knowledge” in Umbr(a), no.1, pp.147-152.
——— (1997) “Multiculturalism, Or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism,” 
in New Left Review, no.225, Sept-Oct, pp.28-51.
———  (1998) “From ‘Passionate Attachments’ to Dis-Identification,” in Umbr(a) 
no.1., pp.3-17.
——— (2000) The Fragile Absolute; or, Why is the Christian legacy worth fighting 
for? London: Verso.
——— (2000) “From History and Class Consciousness to the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment…and Back,” in New German Critique, no.81. pp.107-123.
——— (2001) On Belief, London: Routledge.
——— (2003) The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity, London: 
MIT Press.
——— (2002) “Lenin’s Choice,” in Revolution at the Gates, ed. Žižek, Slavoj, London:
Verso.
——— (2005) Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle, London: Verso. 
——— (2005[1994]) The Metastases of Enjoyment: On Women and Casualty, London: 
Verso. 
——— (2006) The Parallax View, London: MIT Press.
262
Bibliography
——— (2006) “The Fetish of the Party” in The Universal Exception, eds. Butler, Rex, 
Stephens, Scott, London: Continuum
——— (2007[1996]) Indivisible Remainder: on Schelling and Related Matters, 
London: Verso
——— (2008[1992]) Enjoy Your Symptom! Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out, 
London: Routledge. 
——— (2008[1991]) For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political 
Factor, London: Verso.
——— (2008[1997]) The Plague of Fantasies, London: Verso
——— (2008[1999]) The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology, 
London: Verso.
——— (2008[1989]) The Sublime Object of Ideology, London: Verso.
——— (2008) Violence, London: Profile Books.
———  (2008) “Lacan’s Four Discourses: a Political Reading” in The Desire of the 
Analysts: Psychoanalysis and Cultural Criticism, eds. Forter, Gregg, Allen Miller, 
Paul, New York: SUNY 
——— (2009) First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, London: Verso.
——— (2009) “Philosophy is not a Dialogue,” in Philosophy in the Present, with 
Badiou, Alain, London: Polity.
——— (2009) “How to Begin From the Beginning” in New Left Review, no.57 May-
June.
——— (2009[2008]) In Defence of Lost Causes, London: Verso. 
——— (2010) “A Permanent Economic Emergency” in New Left Review, no.64, July-
Aug.
——— (2011) “Transcript: Don’t fall in love with yourself,” from 
imposemagazine.com [Online] accessed from: 
http://www.imposemagazine.com/bytes/slavoj-Žižek-at-occupy-wall-street-transcript
accessed on 15th October 2013.
——— (2011[2001]) Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? Five Interviews in the 
(Mis)Use of a Notion, London: Verso.
——— (2011) Living in the End Times, London: Verso.
——— (2012) “Occupy Wall Street: what is to be done next?” Guardian.com published
on 24th April 2012 [Online] accessed from: 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/apr/24/occupy-wall-
street-what-is-to-be-done-next accessed on: 15th October 2013. 
——— (2012) “Response to campaign against Syriza,” from Greek Left Review.com 
[Online] accessed from: http://greekleftreview.wordpress.com/2012/06/14/slavoj-
Žižek-response-to-the-campaign-against-syriza/ accessed on: 15th October 2013. 
263
Bibliography
——— (2012) “Save us from the saviours,” in London Review of Books Vol.34, No.11 
[Online] accessed from http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n11/slavoj-Žižek/save-us-from-the-
saviours accessed on: 15th October 2013. 
——— (2012) “Speech in Syriza Event,” from Left.gr [Online] accessed from: 
http://left.gr/news/slavoj-Žižeks-speach-syrizas-event accessed on: 15th October 
2013. 
——— (2012) “The True Blasphemy” from Lacan.com [Online] Accessed from: 
http://www.lacan.com/thesymptom/?page_id=2364 Accessed on: 15th October 2013.
——— (2012) Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism, 
Verso: London.
——— (2012[2004]) Organs without Bodies: Deleuze and Consequences, Oxford: 
Routledge.
——— (2012) The Year of Dreaming Dangerously, Verso: London.
——— (2012[2002]) Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 
and Related Dates, London: Verso.
——— (2014) Absolute Recoil: Towards a News Future of Dialectical Materialism, 
Verso: London.
——— (2014) The Most Sublime Hysteric: Hegel with Lacan, trans. Scott-Railton, 
Thomas, Cambridge: Polity.
——— (2014) Trouble in Paradise: From the End of History to the End of Capitalism, 
London: Penguin.
——— (2014) Demand the Impossible, ed. Park, Yong-June, Cambridge: Polity.
Žižek, Slavoj and Salecl, Renata (1991) “Lacan in Slovenia” in Radical Philosophy, 
no.58. pp.25-31
264
